ENVER HOXHA

ALBANIA CHALLENGES KHRUSHCHEV REVISIONISM

Speeches, Reports, Letters, Radiograms
JUNE-DECEMBER 1960
Pertaining to the Moscow Conference of the 81 Communist and Workers’ Parties

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ALBANIA CHALLENGES
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ENVER HOXHA
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania

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(Materials extracted from Volume 19 of Enver Hoxha's Works in Albanian)
ENVER HOXHA
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania
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On Nov. 8, 1975, the 34th anniversary of the founding of the Party of Labor of Albania, Volume 19 of Enver Hoxha's Works was released to the public and distributed throughout Albania.

This volume, which covers the period from June to December 1960, was immediately hailed for its extraordinary political and ideological importance. It deals, among other things, with the Bucharest Meeting of the communist and workers' parties in June, and the 81 Party Conference in Moscow in November, which for the first time brought out into the open the deep split that had arisen within the ranks of the international communist movement.

The book includes speeches and reports to the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the Party, letters and telegrams to Albanian representatives in Bucharest, Moscow and the United Nations, verbatim reports of discussions held between Albanian leaders and Soviet leaders, as well as verbatim reports of discussions between Enver Hoxha and two of the former leaders of the PLA who had sold out to the Khrushchev revisionists.

Also included is the historic speech by Enver Hoxha at the Moscow Meeting on Nov. 16, 1960, which courageously attacked the revisionist policies of Khrushchev right in the very heart of the Kremlin, and criticized the wrong line of the Soviet leadership. Most of these documents had never been published before.

This volume has aroused intense interest and has stimulated study by many people not only in Albania but throughout the world. Parts of this book have already appeared in several foreign languages in the No. 6, 1975, issue of Albania Today magazine. This edition which we have prepared is the first appearance in English and in book form in this country of those materials in Volume 19 which pertain to the historic struggle of the Party of Labor against the emergence of modern revisionism in the world with its center in the Khrushchev leadership of the CPSU. (We have omitted from this edition other materials in Volume 19 which deal with matters which are unrelated to the above central question.)

Anyone interested in the development of events at this turning point in world history, every student of Marxism-Leninism, and indeed anyone interested in Albania as a nation, will
find this book indispensable and a revelation. It deals with a very unique and volatile period in world history with which many young people are not familiar.

When Stalin died in 1953, the leadership of the Soviet party was usurped by a gang of revisionist traitors headed by Khrushchev. At the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956, Khrushchev attacked Stalin in his infamous "secret" speech, and forced through the congress a whole new revisionist program that emasculated the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

The Party of Labor of Albania, as well as the Communist Party of China, and some other parties, did not accept this attack against Stalin, nor the revisionist line adopted at the 20th Congress. Over the next period, the Albanian party leaders discussed privately with the Soviet party leaders these differences of line, hoping that the Soviet leaders would correct their errors. The Chinese party leaders did likewise.

In June 1960, Khrushchev organized the Bucharest meeting at which he plotted a "coup d'etat" against the Communist Party of China and Mao Tsetung. Without warning, he presented the delegations with a long document full of slanders, charging that the CPC had departed from Marxism-Leninism, and calling on all the party delegations to condemn the CPC and read it out of the international communist movement.

The Albanian delegation in Bucharest refused to knuckle under to Khrushchev's orders, and fought staunchly against his crude violations of all the Leninist principles and standards. For the moment, Khrushchev's scheme was frustrated, and the issue was put off until November, when the 81 Party Conference was to take place.

Enver Hoxha himself led the Albanian delegation to Moscow, where he made his historic speech, exposing the revisionist political platform of the Soviet leadership, ripping to shreds the anti-Marxist theses of Khrushchev, and bringing to light the nefarious intrigues and plots of Khrushchev against the CPC, against the PLA, and against the whole world revolutionary movement.

The Moscow Conference was a watershed, a clear dividing line between Marxism-Leninism and revolution, as against revisionism and counter-revolution. Today, the results can be seen clearly: the Soviet Union has degenerated into a social-fascist, imperialist super-power, and the revisionist parties have become a counter-revolutionary force. But at that time, in 1960, it was not
so easy to make the correct choice. To challenge the Soviet leaders meant to go against the tide, to rebel against the "authorities" and the "lawmakers" of Marxism. It meant to suffer the consequences of revenge by the revisionists, the blockades, diversion, subversion, perhaps even military aggression.

But the PLA, under the leadership of Enver Hoxha, was strong and principled, united, resolute and wise. It fought to defend the principles of Marxism-Leninism against the demagogic slogans of Khrushchev's "creative Marxism." It defended the dictatorship of the proletariat from liquidation by the revisionists. It fought for the principle of class struggle, against the revisionist policy of class collaboration.

It upheld the idea of revolution against that of bourgeois reforms. It denounced Khrushchev's distortion of "peaceful coexistence" which became collaboration with imperialism. It exposed the absurdity of Khrushchev's "world without arms and without war." It denounced the "peaceful road to socialism" advocated by the revisionists (which we can see resulted in the tragic defeats in Indonesia and Chile.) It denounced Khrushchev's embrace of Yugoslav revisionism, and defended the name of Stalin from the attacks of those who wanted to undermine Marxism-Leninism.

The material in this book also reveals the direct connection between the external enemies and the internal ones, who wanted to undermine the unity of the Party and people, who wanted to turn Albania into a colony of Soviet social-imperialism. The Albanian leaders do not hesitate to expose the activities of domestic enemies and traitors.

Fifteen years later, it is clear to every impartial observer that the stand taken in 1960 by Enver Hoxha and the Albanian Party of Labor was entirely correct. The Soviet Union has gone all the way in converting itself into a bureaucrat-capitalist state which is thoroughly social-imperialist and social-fascist. Today it is one of the major aggressive, expansionist super-powers, and it constitutes a principal source of war danger.

Albania, on the other hand, had to struggle through years of deprivation and hardships because of the revisionist-imperialist blockade. But following a policy of independence and self-reliance, and with the internationalist aid of People's China, it has forged ahead with great strides to the point where it is entering the stage of the complete construction of socialism, as expressed
by the new Constitution which is now under consideration.

These documents illustrate the firm basis which exists for the close cooperation and unbreakable friendship between the two peoples, the two countries, and the two parties of Albania and China, under the leadership of Enver Hoxha and Mao Tsetung, a friendship developed as a result of the common struggle in the same trenches to defend the cause of Marxism-Leninism and revolution.

The collection of Enver Hoxha's Works, and especially Volume 19, are convincing proof that the Party of Labor of Albania is an outstanding party, one that has played a brilliant role in the world-wide struggle to preserve the purity of Marxism-Leninism, a party of which the Albanian people are justifiably proud. A corollary of this estimation is that obviously Enver Hoxha is one of the great leaders of the world communist movement, who has made some unique contributions to the treasury of Marxism-Leninism.

In the following years, the PLA, learning from the sad experience of the reversal of socialism in the Soviet Union, has taken strong and unprecedented measures to block the road to the development of a revisionist bureaucracy and ideology in Albania. The struggle for the revolutionization of the whole life of the country, the movement against bureaucracy and for working class control, the drive to lessen the differences between mental and manual labor, between the town and the countryside—these campaigns are designed to keep Albania on the road of socialist revolution through to the end. The Albanian experience shows that even a small country and a small party can make a great contribution to the world revolutionary movement and to the struggle for socialism.

We are proud to bring to the English-speaking public this edition of extracts of Volume 19 of Enver Hoxha's Works, at a propitious time, coinciding with the happy celebration by all the Albanian people and their friends throughout the world of the 35th anniversary of the founding of the Albanian Party of Labor.

Jack Shulman

Gamma Publishing Co.
New York City
June 1976
In the series of volumes of the Works of Comrade Enver Hoxha, the documents of this volume occupy a special place. These documents, most of which are published for the first time, belong to the period June-December 1960. This was an extremely complicated time when profound ideological and political differences had arisen in the international communist movement and in the relations between some parties. In this period our Party had to take decisions of particular responsibility and stand up openly before the whole international communist movement, to defend Marxism-Leninism from the new dangerous current of revisionism that was being crystallized in its midst-Khrushchevite revisionism.

The main place in this volume is taken by documents in which there was worked out the strategic and tactical line of the Party of Labor of Albania (PLA) against the spread of modern revisionism, and especially against the disruptive anti-Marxist activity of the Soviet leadership headed by Khrushchev. Already at that time the PLA had informed the Soviet leadership of its opposition and reservations over a series of wrong theses and actions on the part of the latter. But the facts showed that the Khrushchev group was stubbornly continuing its wrong course fraught with dangers for the international communist and workers' movement, as the behind-the-scenes plot which it organized at the Bucharest Meeting demonstrated with startling clarity. Under these circumstances it became essential that the anti-Marxist line and stand of the Soviet leadership should be subjected to open and courageous criticism before all the communist and workers' parties.

This volume gives a vivid picture of the consistent struggle carried out by the Party of Labor of Albania at the Bucharest and Moscow Meetings. At the Bucharest Meeting the PLA did not agree that the so-called errors of the Communist Party of China should be judged, nor that it should be condemned on the basis of the document full of slanderous accusations concocted by the Soviet leadership, without giving the Communist Party of China the time and possibility to read this material and present its
views. At the Moscow Meeting our Party spoke out with revolutionary courage and, before [the representatives of] international communism, openly criticized the distorted line of the Soviet leadership on a series of major questions of principle. At no time did the PLA make concessions over principles and it never agreed to follow the revisionist course of the Khrushchev group. A series of documents published in this volume, such as reports, speeches, contributions to discussions and talks, are a vivid testimony to this. Included here are a number of radiograms and letters sent from Tirana to Bucharest and Moscow, to Peking and New York, which transmitted to those cities the directives of the PLA, its revolutionary line. The signature Shpati on some of these radiograms recalls the stormy years of the National Liberation War.

The ideological struggle between the PLA and the Soviet leadership became more abrasive following the Bucharest Meeting, when the Khrushchev group launched a savage attack against the PLA to force it to capitulate and follow the revisionist line. At first the Khrushchev group used two main methods: threats and demagogy. But it did not fail to act, also, through its Embassy in Tirana, which carried out hostile and disruptive activities against the PLA and its leadership. The Khrushchevite revisionist leadership tried to "take the fortress from within." For this purpose it worked on Liri Belishova and Koco Tashko and recruited them to its service. The views and stands of these two enemies were blatantly in opposition to the correct line followed by our Party toward the Soviet leadership headed by Khrushchev. Hence their efforts to revise the line of our Party met with failure. The materials of this volume bring to light not only the activity of the external enemies, but also that of the internal enemies, too, the class struggle carried out by the PLA against them to defend its steel-like unity, its crystal clear line, and the purity of Marxism-Leninism [.....]

The lessons deriving from the documents of this volume are major ones. They arm us further in the struggle for the construction of socialism and the defense of the lofty interests of our country and people, against external and internal enemies. The materials of Volume 19 constitute a rich fund of the revolutionary theory and practice of our Party, in the great treasury of Marxism-Leninism.

Tirana. 1975.
RADIOGRAM
TO COMRADE HYSNI KAPO IN BUCHAREST

June 21, 1960
11:30 hrs.

STRICTLY PERSONAL

From your radiograms we see that things are taking a wrong course; therefore the situation is very delicate.

Be very careful. Let them know that you will take part only in the meeting we have decided jointly, in which only the parties of the socialist camp will be present, to decide the date and place of the coming broader Meeting of the communist and workers' parties. Keep us up to date. Inform us exactly when the meeting will be held.

Affectionately yours,

Enver

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1. On June 2, 1960, in a letter to the CC of the PLA, the CC of the CPSU proposed a meeting of representatives of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist camp to be held at the end of June for the purpose of "exchanging opinions on the problems of the present international situation and laying down our common line for the future." On June 7, in another letter, the CC of the CPSU proposed to the CC of the PLA that the meeting should be postponed and its date fixed at a preliminary meeting of representatives of the sister parties of the socialist camp to be held in Bucharest on the occasion of the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party. Agreeing to this, the CC of the PLA authorized Comrade Hysni Kapo, Member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the CC of the PLA, who would head the delegation of the PLA to the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party, to exchange opinions and, together with the representatives of the other sister parties, fix the date of the meeting.

In fact, in Bucharest, the delegation of the PLA found itself faced with an international meeting organized by the Soviet leaders to attack the People's Republic of China.
The question we are going to discuss today has to do with the Bucharest Meeting. As decided, we sent to Rumania a party delegation, headed by Comrade Hysni Kapo, to participate in the proceedings of the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party. We had foreseen that on this occasion the first secretaries, or some of them, would go at the head of the delegations of the parties, but for many reasons, which we know, we judged that I should not go. Our delegation was also authorized, in addition to its participation in the proceedings of the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party, to participate in the Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist camp, according to the agreement reached, in order to fix the place and date of a meeting of all the parties, at which they will discuss, among other things, the disagreements existing between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China.

There is no doubt that these disagreements must be solved as quickly as possible and in the Marxist-Leninist way, in the first place between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, and, in case they are not solved between them, then the theses should be provided for a discussion among the parties where the representatives of the communist and workers' parties will have their say, and the disagreements will be solved in a correct way.

However, the Soviet leaders in Bucharest are making efforts to talk about these disagreements right now. In the radiogram he sent us, Comrade Hysni says that since the Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties has been postponed, they propose to hold a meeting with the representatives of all the parties who are there, at which to raise the disagreements the Soviet Union has with China, of course in the direction the Soviet Union thinks. According to Khrushchev, at this meeting decisions could be taken, too, and all the parties
should express their views, express their solidarity with the Soviet Union and with the Declaration of the Moscow Meeting of 1957, (1) which Khrushchev says "the Chinese comrades are not upholding"! All this is being done by talking with and working on the delegations one after another, with the end in view that the delegation of the Communist Party of China will be told whether it will remain in the socialist camp or not. They say that this meeting is not to isolate China, but is being held in order to "inform ourselves, to adopt a common stand."

I think that the decision we have taken (2) is correct. We must listen not only to what the Soviet comrades say, but also to what the Chinese say, and then have our say in the discussion. Therefore the question arises: What stand will our delegation maintain at this meeting rigged up by the Soviet representatives headed by Khrushchev?

We have been subject to a number of provocations there, against which Hysni has stood firm, but he needs further assistance and instruction, for he finds himself faced with a series of difficulties and with the most diverse pressures and provocations.

As always, we must pursue a correct line, for we have a great responsibility to our people. We are a Marxist-Leninist party, and it is up to us to maintain a Marxist-Leninist stand, whatever may occur. Life has shown that we have never wavered; therefore not even a cannon can shift us now from the correct line our Party is

1) At this meeting of communist and workers' parties, held in 1957 in Moscow, the Khrushchev group tried to legalize the revisionist course of the 20th Congress of the CPSU as the general line of the international communist movement, but encountered the opposition of the delegations of the CP of China, the PLA (headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha), and others, who defended the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism and exposed the revisionist viewpoints of the Soviet leadership.

Confronted with the iron logic of scientific arguments, the revisionists were forced to retreat. In the Declaration of the Conference, however, along with its generally revolutionary content, there remained the incorrect formulation about the 20th Congress of the CPSU as a congress that had allegedly opened a new stage in the international communist movement.

On other questions included in the Declaration, too, the PLA had its reservations which were expressed in the press and through the propaganda of the Party.

2) Concerning participation in the Meeting of the parties of the socialist camp in Bucharest to fix the place and date for a future broader meeting of the communist and workers' parties.
pursuing. Life has shown that we were not mistaken in our opinions and attitudes toward the Yugoslav revisionists; we have been proven correct. If Khrushchev and company have adopted a different stand, not fighting the Yugoslav revisionists, that is their affair. That is the way they see it, but we, too, have the right to tell them our opinion. We have supported the Declaration of the Moscow Meeting of 1957, not only on the Yugoslav question, but also on other questions, such as the unity of the socialist camp, peaceful coexistence, etc. But, on the other hand, concerning many questions included in it, we have had our reservations which we have expressed to the Soviet comrades, or we have adopted a stand in the press and propaganda of the Party. We are for peaceful coexistence, but in the way Lenin conceived it, not to extend it to the field of ideology, for this is extremely dangerous. As far as disarmament is concerned, life has confirmed that imperialism is not disarming; on the contrary it is arming more and more. Then how can we disarm? On the contrary, we must be vigilant. And so we are, and we have done well. On the basis of the line our Party has pursued, the people and all the communists are ready to rise against any danger of aggression. There are some things which we can tell the Soviet comrades are not in order. We can tell them, for example, that we do not agree with them when they do not expose the Yugoslav revisionists through to the end. Likewise, if we have any criticism of the others, we shall tell them openly and in a comradely spirit, in a Marxist way. Therefore, we must prepare ourselves for these things and go to the Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers’ parties to have our say. In these matters everybody should take a clear and firm Marxist-Leninist stand, and provocations by anyone must not be permitted.

Now, if you like, we may read the radiogram by Comrade Hysni.

After reading the radiogram sent by Comrade Hysni Kapo, Comrade Enver Hoxha again took the floor.

As soon as Comrade Gogo [Nushi] (3) arrived in Moscow, he

3) At that time Member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the PLA and President of the Trade Unions of Albania. He stopped at Moscow on his way home from Peking, where he had gone to participate in the meeting of the Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions.
was summoned by Brezhnev. (4) After asking him, "How are you?" and "How are you getting on?" he told him about their theses concerning the Chinese. Likewise when Comrade Mehmet [Shehu] (5) went to Moscow, Kosygin(6) saw him and spoke to him for an hour and a half about these questions. Comrade Mehmet replied: "If these things are so, why have they been left to get worse, since it has been possible to solve them in a Marxist-Leninist way between the two parties first of all, and then, if necessary, they could have been raised with the other parties?" Mehmet told him, "Our Party will maintain a correct, principled, Marxist-Leninist stand, and will not fall into sentimental and opportunist positions."

In his letter Comrade Hysni tells us that Teodor Zhivkov (7) tried a provocation. He said to him, "What is Albania up to? Only Albania does not agree!" Comrade Hysni retorted: "What do you imply by this?" Then Zhivkov said: "I was joking." Hysni pointed out to him that he must have something in his head to say that "Only Albania does not agree." He again answered, "I was joking."

The Bulgarians have published in an illustrated brochure a map of the Balkans in which Albania is presented as a part of Yugoslavia. Concerning this question I told Behar (8) to summon the Bulgarian ambassador and ask him what they were doing, and demand that this brochure be immediately withdrawn from circulation.

With regard to the questions we discussed here, I think we should guide Comrade Hysni. I have prepared the letter, which I am going to read slowly because it is important.

After the reading and approval of the letter (9) Comrade Enver

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4) At that time a member of the Presidium of the CC of the CPSU and President of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

5) Member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the PLA and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PRA.

6) At that time Vice-President of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.

7) First Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, notorious as a lackey of the Moscow revisionists.

8) Behar Shytilla, at that time Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRA.

9) See the letter to Comrade Hysni Kapo in Bucharest, June 22, 1960, which follows.
Hoxha continued:

I want to stress that our strength consists in the unity of thought and deed of our leadership and the entire Party, which is of exceptional importance. Our unity is based on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism; therefore we must make it ever stronger. We have advanced consistently on this road, striving for strict implementation, to the letter, of the decisions we adopt here jointly, in the Political Bureau, and when the need arises we consult one another again. But on those occasions when one of us finds himself in difficulty and alone and without the possibility of consulting anyone, he should act, as we did during the war—when, without comrades, one had to decide for himself whether or not all his forces should be thrown into the attack or how to defend and implement the line of the Party by himself.

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Volume 19 according to the original in the Central Archives of the Party.
Dear Comrade Hysni,

We received your telegrams and letter and studied them in the Political Bureau. We are unanimously of the opinion that the situation is very grave and is not developing in a proper party way. The development of events, the fanning and extension of the conflict between the Soviet Union and China, in the way it is being done, our Political Bureau considers very wrong, very harmful and very dangerous. Therefore it can by no means reconcile itself to the methods and forms that are being used to resolve this conflict which is so costly to our socialist camp and to international communism. Our Political Bureau stands firm, as always, on the Marxist-Leninist line that the disagreements between the Soviet Union and China should never have been left to get worse, that the conflict must not be allowed to deepen, but must be solved in a Marxist-Leninist way and with Marxist-Leninist methods.

The Political Bureau thinks that the disagreements which exist between the Soviet Union and China have not been made known to the communist and workers' parties according to the Leninist rules, but in a fortuitous way, through open and indirect polemics in the press and by word of mouth. This is not the correct method of solving such a conflict if it is desired, as Marxism-Leninism requires, that the other parties, too, should intervene and assist with their experience and weight. This assistance has not been sought until recently. However, according to the telegrams you sent us, even now the Soviet side is aiming to avoid this correct manner of solution. We come to the conclusion that all efforts to clear up these questions between the two biggest parties of the socialist camp in a proper and objective manner, in the Marxist-Leninist way, have not been made. And it seems to us that the solution of the question by a meeting, in which the other communist and workers' parties of our camp should participate, is not being taken as seriously as it should be, since the two parties that have disagreements have not
officially presented their theses and views on these disagreements to the other sister parties.

The Political Bureau considers that our Party has just as great a responsibility as all the other parties, both for strengthening the unity of the socialist camp in a Marxist-Leninist way, and for preserving the purity of the Party and Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet Union is dear to our Party, but China, too, is dear to us. Therefore, we must make no mistakes, we must not get the Party into an impasse and into ideological and political confusion. We have not done this, and we shall never do it. When it is a question of defending our principles, we take no account of whether this one or that one may like it. Our Party has always been guided by the correct Marxist-Leninist stand, and it will always be characterized by principled Marxist-Leninist courage.

Now what stand should be maintained toward the events taking place there? You are clear about the line of the Party and there is no need to dwell on it. But since passions have burst out, and not in proper party forms, you must be very careful. Your response must be cautious and carefully weighed. Always think of the interests of the Party and of Marxism-Leninism. But this does not mean that you should not give a proper reply then and there to whomever it may be. For example, is it not ridiculous and impermissible that a certain Magyaros (1) should come "to convince us," Albanians, of the "correctness" of the line of the Soviet Union and the "faults" of China? Let Magyaros go elsewhere to peddle his wares, and not to us. We do not need Magyaros to come and "enlighten" us about those principles and truths for which our Party has fought and is ready to fight always. Or, for example, make sure that Andropov (2) thoroughly understands that we do not accept that the Soviet representatives should approach our comrades, members of the delegation to the Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party, and say to them in tones of amazement: "What, has your leadership not informed you of these things?" Remind Andropov that Mikoyan (3) wanted

1) Magyaros was then a member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the Rumanian Workers' Party.

2) At that time chief of the Foreign Department for the East European countries at the CC of the CPSU, he is today a Member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU.

3) Member of the Presidium of the CC of the CPSU, First Vice-President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
to talk about these questions (4) only to Comrade Enver, and it was he (Enver) who on his own initiative took along Comrade Mehmet. Mikoyan begged Comrade Enver to keep all he told him absolutely secret; and when this is the case, our leadership keeps its word, for it is not in the habit of gossiping about such things. But tell Andropov that we see two dangerous tendencies in the Soviet comrades who talked with the comrades of our delegation: First, they underrate the danger of revisionism, a thing with which we can never agree, and, second, the tendency to present the leadership of our Party as guilty in the eyes of our comrades, for allegedly not informing them. Tell Andropov that they must stop these anti-Marxist tactics immediately, and that they should know that the unity of our leadership is like steel, just as the unity of our leadership with the entire Party of Labor is also like steel, and whoever tries, in one way or another, to make such attempts, may be sure that he will receive blows from us. Tell Andropov also that it is neither proper nor necessary for the Soviet comrades to inform our comrades, because our leadership, which knows how to defend Marxism-Leninism, also knows when and about what it should inform its members.

Say these things to Andropov without heat, but you well understand why they must be said. They are acting in an irregular way and not in a party way, and it is the occasion to bar the way to these actions. Also say to Andropov, "I am very sorry that you brought Magyaros with you, not as the host, but to convince me of the correctness of the line of the Soviet Union and the wrong way of China. Only good manners, since I was his guest, prevented me from being as blunt with him as he deserved."

Or, when the opportunity presents itself, as when Andropov said to you that "...thinking that you are firmly against the Yugoslavs, the Communist Party of China wanted to win you over, but it was wrong..." etc., say: "The times are gone when our Party of Labor and its leadership could be misled by anyone and become a partisan of wrong lines. Our Party has been

4) At the beginning of February 1960, Comrade Enver Hoxha, who was in Moscow at the head of the delegation of the PLA to take part in the Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries of Europe on the questions of the development of agriculture, met A. Mikoyan at the latter's request. Mikoyan spoke at this meeting for nearly five hours about the ideological and political disagreements between the CPSU and the CP of China.
tempered in struggle and does not step on rotten planks. It has stood, and will always stand, on the road of Marxist-Leninist principles."

Before we come to the essence of the problem, there are also some other questions you should bear in mind, because they might help you. There are some crooked developments taking place, as you wrote in your letter to us. Provocations and behind-the-scenes manoeuvers are being hatched up there. Therefore, stand firm, and show them that there is unity, determination, and courage in our leadership.

On the basis of the decisions of the Political Bureau you will act as follows:

I. Call Andropov and tell him, on behalf of the leadership of the Party (always on behalf of the Party, on behalf of the leadership): "I communicated to my leadership what you told me. Our leadership has had knowledge in a general way about these disagreements and has considered them very grave, very harmful to our common cause, and again expressed its opinion that they must be resolved, and resolved in a correct way, according to Marxist-Leninist organizational rules. Our leadership has expressed the opinion that these ideological and political disagreements between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China should be solved in a Marxist-Leninist way through joint discussions between the two parties. If they cannot be solved in this way, then the representatives of the communist and workers' parties of the camp of socialism should be called on to discuss the issues and express their views. The stands maintained at this meeting could be put before a broader meeting of the communist and workers' parties like that of Moscow in 1957.

"Now it has been decided to hold this meeting. The leadership of our Party considers this a correct decision. It is in agreement, is preparing to express its opinion on the issues, and is awaiting the fixing of the date." Tell them: "I [Hysni] am authorized to discuss the setting of the date. Our leadership has appointed and has communicated, also, that our delegation to the coming meeting will be headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha.

"The meeting which is proposed to be held now in Bucharest with all the representatives of the sister communist and workers' parties, who have come to the Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party, over the disagreements between the CPSU and the CP of China, is considered by our leadership as premature
and very harmful. Our Party also considers very harmful a camouflaged or open campaign in the press about these very delicate questions. Let the coming meeting judge who is right and who is wrong. Our Party will exert all its strength and whatever modest experience it has to resolve these grave disagreements in a principled Marxist-Leninist way. Our Party assumes all its responsibilities; it will fight honestly and courageously, as always, to defend its correct Marxist-Leninist line, to defend Marxism-Leninism, to defend the camp of socialism and its unity. The Soviet Union and the Bolshevik Party have been, are, and will remain very dear to our Party. But it is undeniable and indisputable that, both to you, and also to us and to our whole camp, great China is very dear, too. Therefore, our leadership thinks and reaffirms that the mistakes, wherever they may be, should be considered in a realistic way at a meeting, and that every effort, everything possible, must be done, through Marxist-Leninist ways and methods, to correct them for the good of socialism and communism. This was the official opinion of our leadership when they sent me to Bucharest, and it remains so now after I have informed them of what you communicated to me."

Also tell Andropov: "I [Hysni] am authorized only to represent the Party of Labor of Albania at the Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party and talk with representatives of the other parties of the camp of socialism about fixing the date for the forthcoming meeting. In case the meeting proposed by you and the Rumanian Workers' Party is to be held now immediately in Bucharest, as I pointed out previously, our leadership considers it premature, nevertheless I am authorized to take part in it.

"I have been officially authorized to communicate these things to you so that you will transmit them to your leadership. Our Party says everything it has to say openly and without hesitation, in a Leninist way."

II. At the meeting that may be held, keep cool. Measure your words. Make no pronouncement about the disagreements which exist between the Soviet Union and China. Your statement should be brief and concise.

In essence you will declare on behalf of our Party:
1. Our Party of Labor has approved and implemented the decisions of the Moscow Conference [1957].
2. Emphasize the correct, consistent, and principled policy of our Party, its boundless loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, the
great love of our Party and people for the parties and peoples of the countries of the socialist camp, for all the other sister communist and workers' parties of the world, for the unity of our camp which must in no way be endangered, but must be strengthened and tempered in the Marxist-Leninist way.

3. Express the regret of our Party over those disagreements that have arisen between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, and express the conviction that these will be solved in the Marxist-Leninist way at the coming meeting of the communist and workers' parties which will be held later.

4. Express the determination of our Party that it will fight shoulder to shoulder with the parties of the socialist countries, always being vigilant and mercilessly exposing imperialism and its agents, the revisionists, through to the end.

These things should be the essence of your statement.

We believe that everything will go well. We are on the right road; therefore follow the situation with the coolness and revolutionary courage which characterize you.

Keep us informed about everything.

Splendid news: Yesterday good rain fell everywhere.

All the comrades send you their best regards.

I embrace you,

Enver

P.S. To any attempt or suggestion on the part of the Soviet comrades about my coming to Bucharest, you must answer, "He is not coming."

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FROM THE LETTER TO LIRI BELISHOVA ON THE STAND SHE SHOULD ADOPT IN PEKING TOWARD THE DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA

June 23, 1960

From your letter and information, the Political Bureau thinks that you have made a grave error in informing the Soviet Embassy in Peking of what the Chinese comrades said to you, because, first, you had still not informed the leadership of your Party and did not have its approval; second, they were not problems of our Party, and it was not your business to inform the Soviets; and third, you knew our opinion that these disagreements should and must be solved in Marxist-Leninist meetings and in a Marxist-Leninist way, and not by gossiping with one or the other. Our Party should not take part in such problems in any other way.

Therefore I am writing you this short letter to warn you to be careful and make no pronouncements on the disagreements which exist between the Soviet Union and China, because our Political Bureau has judged that the way this conflict is developing is not proper and is not on a correct course. It has been decided by all the parties of our camp that these questions are to be taken up at a forthcoming meeting, the date of which will be fixed later. That is the right way; therefore we shall express our opinion at that meeting.

If anyone should ask you, say, "These disagreements are harmful and dangerous to our cause; they have been allowed to become worse; they should be resolved between the two parties in a Marxist-Leninist way, and now that it has been decided to hold the Meeting of the communist and workers' parties in the near future, they should be solved there once and for all. As always, our Party will maintain a principled, Marxist-Leninist stand."

1) Member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the CC of the PLA. In June 1960 she had gone with a delegation on a visit to the People's Republic of China and to some other socialist countries of Asia. This letter was sent to her by special courier.
First in Moscow (2) and now in Bucharest, the Soviets have informed all the delegates who came to the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party about their disagreements with the Chinese. In this information material you are mentioned among those who have informed the Soviets about what the Chinese have told them. Of course the Soviets are very pleased about the information you gave them, so they are singing your praises, calling your gesture "heroic," "principled" and other such expressions. They are flattering you and will continue to flatter you very much. Naturally, you must not allow this flattery to go to your head, for it is done with definite aims.

Therefore I am writing this to put you on your guard, and all that I have written is strictly for you only!

Enver

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2) This refers to those delegations that passed through Moscow on the way to Bucharest.
Dear Hysni,

At the morning meeting you should state: "From the letters of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, our leadership knows that our delegations here in Bucharest, which are not high-level, will decide only the date and place of the forthcoming meeting of the communist and workers' parties. Those letters suggested that opinions might be exchanged on the external political situation created as a result of the failure of the Paris Conference. (1) However, I see here that exceptionally serious matters are being put forward concerning the Communist Party of China. The Soviet delegation handed us a voluminous document only 10 hours before the meeting, and we are given no time to catch our breath. This astonishes us."

When you make your speech at the meeting you should declare: "I am not authorized to make statements on these matters because our leadership knows that these matters will be discussed at the forthcoming Meeting of representatives of the parties, as we have all agreed." If some "big wig" makes any provocative allusion about our not making a pronouncement at this meeting, you should produce the official statement we sent you for transmittal to the Soviet leadership through Andropov, and read it after delivering your speech. If the "allusion" is made after your speech, then ask for the floor for a second time and read the statement of our Central Committee, which you have already transmitted to Andropov.

1) This conference was to be held in May 1960, but it did not take place because of the quarrel between Khrushchev and Eisenhower over the shooting down of a US U-2 spy plane over the territory of the Soviet Union on May 1st in the same year. The violation of the Soviet air space by this aircraft aroused the indignation of the broad masses of the Soviet people.
We understand your difficult situation, but don't worry at all, for we are on the right road. I wish you health and patience.

Enver

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WE SHOULD NOT SUBMIT TO ANY PRESSURE

(From a Contribution to the Discussion at the Meeting of the Political Bureau of the CC of the PLA)

June 24, 1960

From Comrade Hysni we have received a series of radiograms concerning the Bucharest Meeting. These radiograms have kept coming until late into the night, or more exactly, until three hours past midnight. I didn't think it necessary to convene the Political Bureau again after midnight, but on the basis of its directives I transmitted the relevant answers to Comrade Hysni.

After reading the radiograms sent by Comrade Hysni and the answers to them, Comrade Enver Hoxha went on:

It is clear that Hysni is in a very difficult position in Bucharest. The agreement was to the effect that the delegations of the communist and workers' parties taking part in the proceedings of the Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party would come together in Bucharest only to fix the date and place of a meeting of the communist and workers' parties of the world. But in fact, Comrade Hysni is faced with an impromptu international meeting, rigged up by the Khrushchev group.

If this meeting issues a communiqué which doesn't run counter to the Declaration of the Moscow Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties of 1957, I think that Hysni should sign it. However, it could happen that the communiqué will have other nuances, because it comes from an out-of-order meeting, at which the representatives of the communist and workers' parties have been handed a 65-page report from the Soviet leadership in which the Communist Party of China is condemned. We cannot accept a communiqué that makes even the slightest allusion against China. This is important, for the situation is such that extremely serious matters are being put forward at the present Bucharest Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties. The report of the Soviet delegation against the Communist Party of China will have great worldwide repercussions, like Khrushchev's "secret" report to
the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the so-called cult of Stalin. (1)

Even if we accept a communique without any allusions, we should still consider that it is not in order because it is the result of an impromptu meeting contrary to Marxist-Leninist organizational norms. Therefore the stand of our Party that this meeting should be opposed is correct.

These are a few preliminary ideas; however with respect to the communique, Hysni was told not to make statements on his own until he receives new directives. If he is handed a communique with allusions against China, he should state categorically: "I will not sign this communique without consulting the leadership of the Party I represent." And if there is no such allusion, Hysni should rise and tell the meeting, "I am authorized by the Party of Labor of Albania to declare that I agree with this communique, but I must add that this communique is a result of a meeting that is not in order. Therefore, we are not prepared for such a meeting and we cannot make statements regarding the matters that are raised against the Communist Party of China."

The Chinese comrades have requested that the meeting be postponed, but the representatives of the other communist and workers' parties do not agree. This is not right and puts the Chinese comrades in a difficult situation. A fraternal party of a socialist country asks for time to prepare for the meeting, but this is not granted. It's clear that this is being done with a purpose.

Hysni should state that our Party of Labor disagrees with the procedure proposed for the Bucharest Meeting of the communist and workers' parties, that it agrees that what should be decided now is only the date and place of the forthcoming meeting of the communist and workers' parties, on which we have reached agreement in principle; and only after we have received explanatory materials from the other side, the Communist Party of China, shall we be prepared to express our opinion at the forthcoming meeting.

1) In this report J. V. Stalin and his great revolutionary activity were attacked. The purpose of this attack was to justify the liquidation of the Marxist-Leninist line of the Bolshevik Party and to replace it with a revisionist line.
Many things may happen, but we should not submit to any pressure. We should always implement our correct Marxist-Leninist line.

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LETTER TO COMRADE HYSNI KAPO IN BUCHAREST

June 25, 1960

Dear Hysni,

We received the radiograms of the evening and I am writing this piece of letter to you now in the morning (1) to say only that you have given a good reply to the "fellow." (2) Don't trouble yourself at all when someone provokes you, but answer, and indeed strongly, yet with coolness. Base things are being done, but right always wins. If they continue to make provocations, leave nothing on our back, but leave it on their back.

I embrace you,

Enver

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1) Sent by the plane which would bring Comrade Hysni back home.
2) Nikita Khrushchev.
Comrade Hysni,

Tomorrow you should speak in line with the instructions of the Political Bureau you have received by letter. At the end of your speech, or at the appropriate moment, you should declare: "On behalf of our Party, I declare that the Party of Labor is in complete disagreement with the spirit of this meeting and the methods employed for the solution of this problem so important to the international communist movement. Our Party is of the opinion that these matters should be handled with cool heads and in a comradely spirit, according to Leninist norms." After this statement, if provocative questions or suggestions are aimed at you, take the floor again and say, "Apart from what I have already said, I have nothing more to say at this meeting" In case you have already spoken, ask to speak again and make this statement. If you are not given the right to speak again, you should hand the text of your speech to the chairman of the meeting and demand that it be recorded in the minutes.

We are waiting for you. Welcome home.

Enver

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FROM THE LETTER TO LIRI BELISHOVA ON THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE BUCHAREST MEETING AND 
THE ATTITUDE SHE SHOULD MAINTAIN IN MOSCOW

June 28, 1960

The Bucharest Meeting was organized in such a way and held in a spirit that was not Marxist-Leninist. Leninist norms were violated in the practice of work and in the relations among parties. These views of our Political Bureau were put forward openly at the meeting.

Our theses: "These were disagreements between two parties, and they ought to have been solved between them. Since this was not done, we agree that a meeting of the communist and workers' parties should be held in Moscow in November this year."

The thesis of the Soviets (with which the other parties of the European countries of people's democracy associated themselves within two days in Bucharest): "China has violated the decisions of the Moscow Meeting, and the disagreements are between China and our camp."

Khrushchev went so far as to call the Chinese "Trotskyites" and tell them, "Get out of the camp if you want to." I cannot write at greater length, but you will understand the situation immediately. Of course, Khrushchev was not at all happy about the cautious and principled stand of our Central Committee, but we defend the principles regardless of whether someone or other may not like it. We shall express our opinion about the Soviet-Chinese disagreements at the forthcoming November meeting in Moscow.

I am writing so that you will keep these things in mind since the Soviet leaders are going to talk with you "to explain things" to you. Listen to them carefully, cool-headedly, but don't express any opinion, simply say: "I am a bit out of touch with

1) This letter, sent by special courier, was handed to Liri Belishova on the same day the delegation, of which she was a member, arrived in Moscow.
things, so I can't give any opinion," and tell them, "Our leadership has acted very correctly in Bucharest, and I fully support the stand of the Central Committee of our Party."

Just that and no more. Let them see the steel-like unity of our leadership, the correctness of our whole line and the Leninist courage of each member of our leadership.

This is how you should act in this very grave and delicate matter. I have only one piece of advice for you: Weigh every word carefully, and the less said the better!

Enver

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As is known, in its relationships with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and all the other communist and workers' parties, the Party of Labor of Albania has always based itself on the immortal principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Proceeding from these principles, we wish to express, openly and sincerely, our profound regret over an event which took place in recent days.

On July 4, 1960, while delivering a speech at a "solemn" meeting in Sremska Mitrovica, Alexander Rankovich, (1) the filthy agent of the capitalist bourgeoisie, one of the arch-revisionists of the Belgrade clique, the mortal enemy of the Albanian people and bloodthirsty executioner of the Albanian population of the Kosova region, launched an open attack against the policy of the socialist countries and, in particular, savagely attacked the Party of Labor of Albania, the Albanian people and our People's Republic.

Describing our socialist country as a "hell dominated by barbed wire" etc., Alexander Rankovich, the agent of imperialism, went so far as to say that the Italian neo-fascist regime is more democratic than our system of people's democracy!

To us Albanian communists, to the Albanian people, there is nothing surprising or unexpected in these statements by an enemy of our people and the socialist camp, a man in the service of imperialism, such as Alexander Rankovich. When the enemy attacks you, this means that you are on the right road. And we have had, and will always have, the stick ready to give the answer they deserve to the enemies of Marxism-Leninism, of our

1) Former Minister for Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia and former Secretary of the CC of the revisionist Yugoslav party.
THE MEETING IN SREMSKA MITROVICA

country, and of the camp of socialism. But the essence of the question, about which we are going to express our concern through this note, does not lie here.

Rankovich's perfidious attacks, made with predetermined aims against socialism in general and the People's Republic of Albania in particular, assume a different significance when, as the TASS News Agency has announced, the Ambassador of the Soviet Union to Belgrade, I.K. Zamchevski, and the Soviet military attaché, V.K. Tarasevich, were present at the "solemn" meeting at Sremska Mitrovica and sat through to the end listening to all the slanders which Alexander Rankovich hurled against us.

On this occasion, the Central Committee of our Party expresses to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union its astonishment and regret over the attitude of the Soviet ambassador and military attaché, an attitude which we consider contrary to the principles of proletarian internationalism, on which the relationship between our two parties and states are built, an attitude unfriendly to the Party of Labor of Albania and the Albanian people, the consistently true, loyal, and unwavering friends of the Soviet people and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Naturally, the question of whether the ambassador and the military attaché of the Soviet Union should or should not have attended a particular meeting is not a matter for us, but for the Soviet Union itself, to decide, and it has never even crossed our minds to interfere in the internal affairs of others. But for our part, we would not have allowed and never will allow the ambassador of the People's Republic of Albania to stay on at a meeting such as the one at Sremska Mitrovica, where enemies of communism and agents of imperialism viciously attack another sister party or another socialist country. And this we would have done, and will continue to do, because we consider it an internationalist duty, in full conformity with the principles on which relationships between Marxist-Leninist parties and socialist countries are based.

Although the whole world learned what was said at Sremska Mitrovica and who attended this revisionist meeting, we consider it our internationalist and friendly duty to take up between our parties, on the basis of Leninist norms, without giving it publicity, the attitude of the Soviet ambassador and military attaché, an attitude which, in fact, was not at all Marxist. Whereas in
regard to the tendentious attacks, slanders and aims of Rankovitch, they will not be allowed to pass without repayment in kind from our side, on this occasion or any other time.

We cannot imagine that Ambassador Zamchevski and Colonel Tarasevich do not know what the Titoite revisionists are, how dangerous they are to the international communist movement and the unity of the socialist camp, what they have done, and what they intend to do against the People's Republic of Albania (2) and our Party of Labor. Today, it is recognized by everybody that the Belgrade revisionists are dangerous enemies of the international communist movement, perfidious plotters against the independence of the Albanian people and of the other socialist countries. The Yugoslav revisionists have gone so far in their plots against the People's Republic of Albania as to attempt a military takeover in 1948 to enslave Albania. The nineteen-year history of our Party tells all about the criminal activities of the Belgrade Trotskyites against our country.

Just as the people of the Soviet Union were quite rightly revolted by the perfidious US aggression, when an American U-2 spy plane violated the air space of the Soviet Union on the order of President Eisenhower, over these 15 years the Albanian people continue to be revolted by the hostile activity of the Belgrade revisionists against the independence of our country. We, the entire Albanian people, without exception, had wholeheartedly approved, and continue to approve, the stand the Soviet Union took vis-a-vis US imperialism in response to the aggression by the U-2 spy plane. We wholeheartedly support any determined stand against US imperialism, the number one enemy of mankind, but at the same time we also fight against the faithful lackeys of US imperialism, the Belgrade revisionists.

We are convinced that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will understand the legitimate anger of the Central Committee of our Party at the non-Marxist stand of the Soviet ambassador, Zamchevski, and the military attache, Tarasevich.

2) The revisionist Yugoslav leadership had made plans to occupy Albania militarily. In 1948 it claimed there was a danger of an imminent attack by Greece, and on this pretext demanded that several Yugoslav divisions should be dispatched urgently to Albania.
We have spoken to you frankly and with communist sincerity about this matter, as about anything else, as Marxism-Leninism teaches us. And you should not misunderstand us.

We assure you that, on our part, we shall make every effort to constantly strengthen the friendship between our peoples, for it is based on the blood they have shed together against the same enemy, on the immortal principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

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I, too, wish to add something about the report delivered by Comrade Hysni [Kapo], who was appointed as head of our delegation to the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party and the meeting of the representatives of the parties which was held in Bucharest. The matters I shall speak about have to do with what was put forward in the report, but I stress that these must be thoroughly understood, for they are very important.

This is how things stand: Between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China there are major disagreements which have created a very grave situation for the camp of socialism and for the whole of international communism. And because this difficult and grave situation has been created as a result of these disagreements between the two parties, it is essential that all the communist and workers' parties—both in the camp of socialism and throughout the world—strive with might and main to help resolve these ideological and political disagreements as quickly as possible, as well as possible, and as fairly as possible by submitting them to a principled discussion, because the interests of international communism, the camp of socialism, and our future require it.

The Political Bureau of the CC of the PLA thinks that these disagreements are not over minor issues; they are not questions which can be solved in passing. Such problems cannot be resolved lightly because they are serious and have to do with the life and future of mankind. We say this with full consciousness, and,
irrespective of the fact that we are representatives of a small nation of one and a half million inhabitants, we see the questions as Marxists who defend the interests of the people, their Party, and the camp of socialism, not only for the present but also for the future. As Marxists, we have the right to express our point of view.

The views which each party will express are of great importance. Therefore, particularly in this case, they must be well threshed out in the leadership of every party; the sources of the conflict and disagreements must be studied with great care, without preconceived opinion, without prejudice; a correct Marxist-Leninist conclusion must be arrived at; and then they must be discussed in a Marxist-Leninist way, at a meeting organized according to the rules, to see who is at fault and why; and every effort must be made to put the guilty party on the right road. At the end of all these efforts, made with great patience, perhaps some capital measure may be taken, according to the need and the scale of the misdemeanor, as is the Marxist-Leninist practice of our parties. Such a practice, Marxism-Leninism teaches us, is necessary not only for these great problems of an international character, but even when measures are taken in connection with a rank-and-file party member. In this case, too, every effort must be made to put the guilty party (if he is really guilty) on the right road. This is the Leninist practice. This is the practice our Party has always carried out, and always will, with respect to minor or major problems. Therefore, nobody has the right to criticize our Party on these matters of principle, on which it stands firm as a rock.

The way in which the Soviet leaders sought to present matters at the Bucharest Meeting concerning their disagreements with the Communist Party of China, as questions which are in opposition to the whole of international communism, and the way in which these questions, which are so important to the camp of socialism and the whole international communist movement, were put forward, seems to the leadership of our Party to be neither wise nor worthy of the Soviet leaders. It is not a correct Marxist-Leninist way. To raise the question immediately in this form, as was done there, and to demand from the representatives of the parties, who had gone to Bucharest for another purpose, that within a few hours they must take a stand against the Communist Party of China, means to accept the very hasty thesis of Nikita Khrushchev, namely, "If you, China, are
not with us, go your own way, get out of the socialist camp, you are no longer our comrade!" Had our delegate accepted this, he would have committed a grave, impermissible error, one that would have been a stain on our Party. Now I am not speaking about the other parties; here in the Central Committee we are judging the stand the Political Bureau has taken. We think that it would have been impermissible for it to have adopted any other stand without judging the matter well and carefully, without having concrete data from both sides. The Political Bureau could never give the present and future generations of our Party and people cause to say, "How did our Party err so gravely at this historic moment?!

Let us make it clear, comrades, I am not speaking about the conflict between us and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The problem is how the Soviet leaders acted in the solution of such a great, such a serious question, which has to do with the existence of the camp of socialism. We are asking the Central Committee to judge whether we acted correctly or not.

Comrades, we are Marxists. Our Party is no longer a party one or two years old, but a party which will complete 20 years next year. It has not spent all this time in a feather bed, but in bloody and irreconcilable struggle with Italian fascism, German nazism, the Ballists (2), the British, the Americans, the Yugoslav revisionists, the Greek monarcho-fascists, and all sorts of other external and internal enemies. Thus, we have learned Marxism in books, in struggle, and in life. Therefore, we are now neither young nor immature. Our Party is not a party of children which is unable to understand Marxism either in theory or in its application in practice. Our Party has always striven to proceed correctly; therefore on its course mistakes of principle have not been made, for it has applied Marxism correctly in all circumstances.

Thus, as Marxists, we are not convinced that these very serious disagreements between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China have arisen within one or two months. Marxist dialectics does not accept this; they have deep roots. There are many facts showing how this process has occurred and how the mistakes, by accumulating, have become more and more serious, reaching the point where it

2) Members of a traitor organization self-styled "Balli Kombetar."
is said that "China wants war," that "it does not stand for disarmament" or "for peaceful coexistence." The Chinese say: "We have been and are for this road." In fact, read the latest note of the Government of the People's Republic of China addressed to the Government of the USSR. It shows that the PRC agrees with the Soviet proposals on disarmament, on the defense of peace. Such a stand on these problems has been upheld not only in this document but also on other occasions.

Let us criticize anybody who violates Marxism-Leninism in a Marxist-Leninist way and take the proper measures to correct him. This is the only correct stand, and this concerns all the parties throughout the world, particularly our Party and people, who consistently defend Marxism-Leninism. Gomulka (3) and company who are now posing as friends of the Soviet Union, have set fire to the friendship with the Soviet Union. It is known that in Poland the Church and reaction were permitted to rise against the Soviet Army. There, they expelled Soviet marshals who commanded the Red Army, which liberated Poland and Europe from fascism, and now they want to instruct us, Albanians. The representative of the Romanian Workers' Party, Magyaros, is put up "to convince" the leadership of our Party on the "correctness" of the line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

We have said this, through the representative of our Party, to Nikita Khrushchev, too. Our comrades who were fighting in the mountains carried the History of the Communist Party (B) of the Soviet Union inside their jackets, while the Romanian legions of the time were martyring the Soviet people. The efforts of Magyaros, together with the representative of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "to convince" the representative of the Party of Labor of Albania of the "correctness" of the line of the CPSU — this we do not accept; these things do not go down with us. We love the Soviet Union not to please Magyaros or Andropov. We have loved the Soviet Union and the Bolshevik Communist Party of Lenin and Stalin, and we always will. But when we see that such things are being done, it is a grave mistake.

3) Former First Secretary of the CC of the Polish United Workers' Party. He was condemned in 1949 for anti-Party and anti-state activity. In October 1956 he was rehabilitated by the revisionists and installed as head of the Party. Time was to prove that he remained stubbornly revisionist.
to fail to adopt a correct stand, because then one mistake leads to another. Marxism-Leninism and dialectics teach us that if you once make a mistake and do not want to understand that you are wrong, that mistake grows bigger, like a snowball. And we shall never allow such a thing.

How could we take part in this unjust activity? From the Chinese comrades we had heard nothing about these matters until recently. Mikoyan informed us only in February of this year. Our plane had barely landed in Moscow, when immediately one of the functionaries of the Central Committee came and told us that Mikoyan wanted to see me the next morning to discuss some important questions. "Agreed," I told him, "but I shall take Comrade Mehmet Shehu with me, too." He replied, "They told me only you," but I said that Mehmet had to come too.

We went, and he kept us not less than about five hours, and this was before the February meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties, which was to deal with problems of agriculture.

Mikoyan told us, "Comrade Albanians, I shall inform you of many disagreements we have with the Communist Party of China, I stress, with the Communist Party of China. We had decided to tell these only to the first secretaries; therefore I ask Comrade Mehmet Shehu not to misunderstand us, not because we have no trust in him, but this is what we had decided."

"No," Mehmet said to him, "I am leaving, indeed I made a great mistake in coming." But Mikoyan himself did not allow him to leave. And then he told us all those things you heard from Comrade Hysni's report.

We told Mikoyan that these were not minor things, but very important problems which existed between two parties; therefore we did not understand why they had been left to get worse; we thought that they should have been solved immediately, for they were very dangerous to our camp.

He told us that he would report what we discussed to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. We told him once more, on behalf of our Party, that this was a very major matter and should therefore be solved between their parties. Finally, he warned us: "This matter is highly secret, therefore do not tell even the Political Bureau." And so we did not tell the Political Bureau, with the exception of a few comrades. You understand that we adopted such an attitude because the ques-
tion seemed to us extremely delicate and we hoped that the disagreements could be resolved through internal discussions and debates.

However, at the Bucharest Meeting Nikita Khrushchev found the stand of our Party surprising when it did not line up together with all the other parties to condemn China in those forms and for those reasons he put forward, without making a thorough judgement of these questions. Perhaps he himself has reflected on these questions, but we, too, have the right to say that we have not reflected on all those voluminous materials given to Hysni, which he had no time even to read, let alone to give his opinion on them. This was not a case of a minor question. On many other matters, not of such a serious nature, we have immediately replied to the Central Committee of the CPSU that we agree; but on such a major question as to say to China "Get out of the camp!" it seems to us that it is not right. The Political Bureau thought that we should never act in this way. For this reason we have been told: "We [the Soviets] deeply regret that the Party of Labor of Albania did not line up with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, for the problems that were raised in Bucharest are problems of the entire socialist camp." But what about us? Isn't it bitter medicine for us not to have the right, as Marxist-Leninists, to ask Nikita Khrushchev whether he has resolved all the [other] questions of an important international character in the same [arbitrary] way he wished to resolve the question of China? We are completely within our rights to ask this.

Let us take the question of the Yugoslav revisionists, about which I shall have more to say later. When Nikita Khrushchev was about to go to Yugoslavia for the first time to reconcile himself with the Yugoslav revisionists, two or three days before he left he sent a letter to the Central Committee of our Party informing us of this matter. Our Political Bureau met and judged the matter without heat. It is known that the condemnation and exposure of the Yugoslav revisionists in 1948 had been done by an international forum of the sister parties, by the Information Bureau, because it was not a simple conflict and only between two parties, but a question that concerned all the communist and workers' parties in the world. Therefore, if another course was to be followed toward the Yugoslav revisionists, the same forum which had previously decided the case, should have been convened again to make a decision or to define the form and method of examining this question, and to state at what point the change
in the attitude toward the revisionists would be made. This is what we think should have been done on the basis of the Leninist norms.

The Political Bureau of our Party sent a letter (4) to the Central Committee of the CPSU, stating that it had no objection to that visit, since it did not depend on us whether Khrushchev should go to Belgrade or not. However, we pointed out that the Central Committee of our Party thought that [if] another decision should be taken on that question, the Information Bureau should be convened again and, at its plenary session, decide what was to be done. Since we were not members of the Information Bureau, we expressed the desire to be invited to that meeting as observers so that we, too, could express our view. However, this was not done, although the question concerned not just two parties, but all the communist and workers' parties. The Central Committee of our Party took a stand on this step, informing the Central Committee of the CPSU by means of another letter, copies of which are in the archives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of our Party.

The counter-revolution in Hungary (5) was carried out, a

4) "We think," the letter said among other things, "that there is a considerable difference between the content of your letter dated May 23, 1955 and the principal thesis of our common stand toward the Yugoslavs up to now. . . . The procedure proposed for the approval of the abrogation of the Resolution of the Meeting of the Information Bureau of November 1949 does not seem correct to us. . . . In our opinion, such a hasty (and precipitate) decision on a question of such major importance of principle without previously submitting it to a thorough analysis together with all the other parties interested in this question, and even more so, its publication in the press and its proclamation at the Belgrade talks, would not only be premature, but would also cause serious damage to the general orientation." (Extract from a copy of the letter in the Central Archives of the Party.)

5) The Hungarian counter-revolution (October 23-November 4, 1956) was the offspring of revisionism which had become widespread and struck deep roots in that country after the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

The Khrushchev group had directly assisted in the destruction of the Hungarian Workers' Party by bringing the Kadar-Nagy revisionist clique to power, and in this way creating the possibility for the outbreak of the counter-revolution. However, confronted with strong pressure from below, and especially when it saw that Hungary was slipping out of the Soviet sphere of influence, the Khrushchevites were obliged to allow the Soviet troops to go to the aid of the Hungarian defenders of the revolution. The counter-revolution was defeated, but its roots remained. The revisionists still
terrible business. There, socialism received a blow from imperialism united with the Yugoslav revisionists, with Imre Nagy, (6) and all the anti-communist scum. What was the stand adopted before and after these events? This, too, was a question that concerned all international communism, particularly the camp of socialism. It was known that a little before this, efforts had been made for the outbreak of such a counter-revolution in Albania; thus, there was a danger to the existence of a Warsaw Treaty (7) member country, Albania, which had been continually threatened during all those years with the loss of her freedom and independence. But our Party knew how to strike at the internal enemies, and as a result nothing happened in our country. However, we had not been informed of what was occurring in Hungary; Albania had been "forgotten." The members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU were sent by aircraft in all directions to the socialist countries to explain the question of the Hungarian counter-revolution; but in the case of Albania, which was a very sensitive spot in the socialist camp, which was under attack for years on end by the revisionists headed by Tito, and even though they were fully aware that a similar sort of counter-revolution was being prepared against our country—nobody came here and we were told nothing.

Have you ever heard about this? Never. We did not make an issue of these things because we thought that they were mistakes kept their key positions in the organs of political power and in the reorganized party.

6) Former Prime Minister of the PR of Hungary from July 1953. In 1954 he was dismissed from his post and expelled from the Party for his anti-socialist and anti-communist activity. In 1956 the revisionists tried to bring him to power again. With their help he became one of the main leaders of the counter-revolution, plunging Hungary into a bloodbath.

7) This treaty was established in October 1954 with the participation of eight European socialist countries as a counterweight to the aggressive North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to guarantee peace and security in Europe. After the betrayal by the Soviet leadership, it was transformed into an aggressive treaty of the fascist type. The aggression against the Socialist Czechoslovak Republic (August 21, 1968) by the armed forces of five members of the Warsaw Treaty proved this. The People's Republic of Albania, which was one of the members of this Treaty, had left it de facto back in 1960-61, whereas on September 12, 1968, it freed itself de jure from any obligation stemming from this Treaty, by special decision of the People's Assembly of the PRA.
by individual people and that they would one day be corrected. We did not even tell the Central Committee of our Party, although the Central Committee is the leadership of the Party of Labor. But in those difficult days we did not want to communicate this sorrow of the Political Bureau to all the comrades of the Central Committee; we did not want these criticisms to lead to the slightest coolness with the Soviet comrades, even unconsciously. We did not allow this. But we thought that individual people make mistakes, both in our ranks and in theirs.

The events of Poland (8) occurred. We were not informed about them, no meeting was held, and we must bear in mind that they were not simply internal questions of Poland, because we are linked with Poland by a treaty under which, if the occasion arises, our people will be required to shed blood for the Oder-Neisse border.

This being the case, do the Albanian people not have the right to ask what all those priests are doing in the Polish army? Shall we fight together with such an army? We are bound by a treaty, but despite this we were not even consulted about these matters. Once Khrushchev told me frankly, "We do not understand what Gomulka is talking about. Only the fascists can speak like Gomulka." Thus, were these problems of concern to two parties only? We are making an issue of them only today, for today Nikita Khrushchev and the other Soviet leaders are expressing regret that we allegedly have not properly understood their incorrect actions in Bucharest when we say that those matters are questions between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. This stand of theirs is not logical.

Two or three days before the Bucharest Meeting, Kosygin went to Mehmet Shehu, who was in Moscow, and told him, among other things: "We cannot make any compromise, any concessions whatever, toward the Chinese"; and he repeated this idea four times. This meant that everything had been decided in advance by the Soviets. If no differing opinions could be accepted, why was I needed there?-to fill out the attendance

8) In June 1956 international imperialism and the revisionists organized the counter-revolutionary revolt in Poznan, Poland, to overthrow the socialist order and reestablish capitalism, an aim which they achieved later through bourgeois-revisionist ideological and political degeneration.
roll? To raise my hand? No, if you invite me, I, too, must say what I think. We are for the Moscow Declaration [1957], and we fight for its application in our country. But, comrades, in the implementation of things we have something to say, the Soviets also have their say, the Chinese or Czechoslovak comrades, too, have something to say about us, and we about them, etc. There can arise such questions in real life. Of course, it may occur that any party can make concessions or mistakes in practice. But what are we here for? To help one another to correct our course.

But we see that in the practice of the Central Committee of the CPSU and of many other parties, there are a number of things which do not conform with the implementation of the line. They involve the question of the struggle against Yugoslav revisionism, on the basis of the Moscow Declaration, and before the Moscow Declaration.

At this point I do not want to go all over again what the Yugoslav revisionists are and how they must be fought. But not everybody thinks as we do about the way in which they must be fought. However, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of our Party can never accept criticism of our Party for its heroic Marxist-Leninist stand against the Yugoslav revisionists, who are striving to disrupt the parties and socialist countries and who seek to liquidate Albania. The Central Committee, the entire Party and the people have approved the correct stand we have maintained, and continue to maintain, toward the Yugoslav revisionists. Many parties and communists throughout the world respect our stand.

However, our Political Bureau has not made public the disagreements concerning the application in practice of the Marxist-Leninist line by all the sister parties, without exception, against the Yugoslav revisionists; it has known how to maneuver with wisdom, with a cool head, and not in a hot-blooded way, as Khrushchev says. The Political Bureau has acted in such a way as to avoid any hint — not only to the people, not only to international opinion, but on many occasions even to the Central Committee — that in the practical application of this matter there are differences between us.

The proofs have been so great that there is no doubt at all that the Yugoslav revisionists are sworn enemies of the socialist camp. They are agents of imperialism. Even the Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs himself said this at the conference of Ministers of Internal Affairs of the socialist countries of Europe, which was
ENVER HOXHA

held in Prague two weeks ago, and everybody agreed with this conclusion.

Nikita Khrushchev has criticized our attitude toward the Yugoslav revisionists. When we went to Moscow in 1957 with the delegation of the Party and Government and spoke, among other things, about our stand toward the Yugoslav revisionists, Khrushchev became so angry that he stood up and said: "One cannot talk with you, we shall break off the talks." We were indignant, but we preserved our aplomb, for we were in the right and were defending our people and our Party, we were defending our friendship with the Soviet Union. We did not yield to the pressure exerted on us, and because of our correct attitude Khrushchev was obliged to sit down and we continued the talks. After what had happened to us, Mehmet and I were very worried when we went to the meeting, but we were not afraid. To behave in such a way toward our Party because it adopts a revolutionary stand against the Yugoslav revisionists is not in the least correct. Nevertheless, we never wavered; on the contrary, we were patient and convinced that we were right, and that time would show the correctness of the line of our Party. It was not long before it again became apparent what kind of people the Yugoslav revisionists were, as was shown by the plots they prepared at their congress. (9) At that time the Communist Party of the Soviet Union itself took a stand, and Khrushchev himself exposed them, describing them as "bandits," a "Trojan horse," and so on.

Not only that, fifteen days before the counter-revolution took place in Hungary, Mehmet and I, at a meeting with Suslov (10) in Moscow, while we were talking about international affairs told him about our impressions with regard to Hungary. We pointed out to him what was happening there, that measures should be taken, and that we should be vigilant. He asked our opinion about Imre Nagy (11). When we answered that he was a

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9) The seventh congress of the Yugoslav revisionist party (April 22-26, 1958) adopted an out-and-out anti-Marxist, anti-socialist program which was presented as an "international manifesto." At this congress all the revisionist cliques of all countries were taken under their protection.

10) Member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

11) After the failure of the counter-revolution in Hungary, Imre Nagy was taken under protection by the Yugoslav revisionists, who granted him asylum in their embassy in Budapest. Later he was sent to Rumania, where,
crook, an anti-Marxist, Suslov immediately told us that we were wrong, that Nagy was not a bad man. We told him that this was our opinion, while he told us that the party there had made a mistake in expelling Nagy. Time showed what Imre Nagy was, and how correct and accurate was our opinion about him.

Nikita Khrushchev had received a long letter from the traitor Panajot Plaku,(12) who wrote to him about his great "patriotism," the "ardent love" he had for the Soviet Union and the Party of Labor of Albania, and asked that Khrushchev, with his authority, intervene to liquidate the leadership of our Party with Enver Hoxha at the head, because we were allegedly "anti-Marxists," "Stalinists." He wrote that he had gone to Yugoslavia because a plot had been organized to kill him. As soon as Khrushchev received the letter, he said to us: "What if this Plaku returns to Albania, or we accept him in the Soviet Union?" We answered, "If he comes to Albania, we shall hang him twenty times, while if he goes to the Soviet Union, you will be committing an act that will be fatal to our friendship." At that he withdrew.

But the affair goes still further. Khrushchev told us that we had not done well in executing Dali Ndreu and Liri Gega, who was pregnant. "Even the Tsar did not do such a thing," he said. We answered with coolness that we do not execute people for nothing and that we shoot only those who betray the homeland and the people, and after it has been proved that they have committed hostile deeds and the cup has been filled. These people were denounced by the Party for years on end, they were traitors and agents of the Yugoslav revisionists; and our security caught them only when they attempted to flee the country, and the people's court, on the basis of the facts, sent them to the punishment they deserved. As to the claim that Liri Gega was pregnant, this is a slanderous lie.

We have never talked about these things; you are hearing them for the first time. To have failed to criticize these mistakes, as our Political Bureau has criticized them, would have been impermissible. And you would not have allowed it either, for these things do not strengthen our friendship. What have we

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since he had played his part and the revisionists had no further need of him, he was brought to trial and executed.

12) A traitor to the PLA and the Albanian people.
done, despite all these things that have happened and which have been done to us, both on the international arena and in our internal affairs? Have you seen anything in the press, or have you had the slightest doubt about any action toward the Soviet Union or the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union? No.

We have told nobody about these attitudes that have been adopted toward us, but we are Marxists, and now the time has come to tell them. The word has been spread that the Albanians are hot-blooded. And why are we hot-blooded? Is it hot-blooded to defend your homeland and your people from the Yugoslav revisionists, from the Greek monarcho-fascists, from the Italian neo-fascists, who for more than 16 years have been attacking us and provoking us on the border? If we are described as hot-blooded because we defend the vital interests of our people, we do not accept this. May we be cursed by our mothers' milk, may we be cursed by the bread with which the Party and the people nurture us, if we fail to defend the interests of our people. By acting in this way, we are also defending the interests of the Soviet Union and the entire camp of socialism at the same time.

I want to tell you about a little example which occurred the evening before last. The ambassador of the Soviet Union, Ivanov, came for a meeting and brought me some information from Khrushchev in connection with his meeting with Sophocles Venizelos.* Among other things, Venizelos spoke to Khrushchev about Albania. Venizelos told him, "We shall come to terms with Albania if we talk about the question of Northern Epirus, (13) too, a question that must be solved in the form of autonomy." Khrushchev replied, "You must solve these questions in a peaceful way, but I shall speak to the Albanian comrades about this view."

I immediately told the Soviet ambassador that Khrushchev had not given the correct answer, that he should not have given him that reply, but should have told Venizelos that Albania's borders are inviolable. The Soviet ambassador said to me: "But you know the stand of the Soviet Union." "I know this, but

* Sophocles Venizelos, a reactionary Greek politician.

(13) The Greek chauvinists call Southern Albania, which they dream of annexing, "Northern Epirus", thus describing this ancient Albanian land in this absurd way as "Greek territory".
concretely the answer he gave Venizelos was not correct. We do not know this Venizelos,” I told Ambassador Ivanov, “but we know his father (14) very well. If Moscow does not know him, although it ought to, let us say that he burned all Southern Albania and killed thousands of Albanians. He wanted to burn Gjirokastra, too; he organized bandit gangs, and it was he who long ago launched the idea of the autonomy of Northern Epirus.” Thus, the idea of Venizelos junior is an old one: it is the idea of Great-Greece chauvinism. Therefore, to defend the integrity of our country and to oppose this idea, the Albanian people have shed their blood in the past and, if need be, will shed it in the future, too. We are for peace in the Balkans, we are for normal state relations, trade relations, but we do not accept such conditions with Greece. We shall normalize our relations with Greece when it says that it is not in a state of war with Albania; otherwise we shall not make any agreement. We can cooperate with it only on the basis of parity. We have responded to them according to the manner in which they have acted to us until now. Tomorrow some Soviet leader may declare that Comrade Enver has said that the Soviet Union does not defend Albania. It is not so — things must come out clearly as they are said.

We speak on the basis of facts and do not exaggerate, because in the first place we have regard for the great collective interest. In this case, too, it is a question of the higher interest. With the stand we expressed in Bucharest, the Political Bureau has acted very correctly and cool-headedly, for it could not be permitted that all these important political and ideological questions between the two great parties should be solved so lightly and irresponsibly.

Finally, we ask: "What was done in Bucharest?” Nothing was solved, except that the forces were lined up for a fierce struggle, as if we had to do with the USA, and not with our great sister, China. We have stood loyal to the proposals of the Soviet leaders to go to the Moscow Meeting and solve these questions, but we must also have the material from the side of the Chinese comrades. China, too, must be allowed to speak and present its

14) Eleutherios Venizelos (1864-1936), a Greek reactionary leader, representative of the interests of the Greek big bourgeoisie. Prime Minister of Greece for several years in succession. In 1919 he sent the Greek army to take part in the intervention against Soviet Russia.
point of view, just as the Soviet Union has presented its case in Bucharest. Then we should judge.

Since we have decided to hold the Moscow Meeting with a definite program, it is necessary that we, too, should have the time to study the problems well. The Soviets have accepted this, so why are they acting in such a way? This is not right. This is how the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of our Party sees the situation.

The Political Bureau thinks that our Party should in no way sully itself with such non-Marxist-Leninist organizational actions. But then for what purposes did the other parties go? Each party leadership is answerable to its party and to its people, as well as to international communism. Let the Central Committee of our Party judge us, and we are answerable to it, to the Party, to the people, and to international communism for our stand.

But why did the first secretaries of the parties of the socialist countries go to Bucharest, while I did not go? I did very well in not going, for I was carrying out the decision of the Political Bureau to avoid compromising our Party on questions that are not Marxist-Leninist. I would have presented there the opinions of the Political Bureau, which were very well transmitted by Hysni. My failure to go upset the Soviet leaders because everybody else went; only Enver did not go, because there was something fishy going on. The Party will send me to Moscow in November to speak for it. Our Party will express its view when this view has been approved in the Central Committee, for this is not a simple thing.

In Bucharest the date was fixed and the commission appointed, comprised of representatives of 26 parties, to study these questions well, to put them on paper, so that the materials will be sent to the central committees of all the respective parties for study and discussion. After this, the Central Committee must be told: comrades, here is the material of one side, here is the material of the other side, and here too is the view of the Political Bureau — this is why we think we must adopt this stand. This is how we think we must discuss this question in the Central Committee, and then go to the meeting. This is the most proper way. To refuse to allow one or two months' time for a sister party to reflect, and hence to act hastily in a way that can yield no results whatever, is not correct. I think that on this occasion the Political Bureau has adopted a Marxist-Leninist stand in defense of the interests of the socialist camp. Our stand has not
been to the liking of the Soviet leaders, for on these questions we
did not line up with them, as did Gomulka, Kadar (15) and
Zhivkov. But the truth is that only the Party of Labor of Albania
has acted well to defend the Soviet Union and the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, and we must always be principled on
these questions. Mistakes and disagreements may occur, but they
must be solved in a correct way, on the basis of Leninist
principles and norms.

After all that has happened, we feel regret and sorrow when
we see the Soviet and Bulgarian ambassadors in Belgrade remain­
ing to the end in Sremska Mitrovica and applauding the agent
Rankovich of Serbia, who spoke such filth against the social­ist
camp and in particular against Albania. He described socialist
Albania as a "hell dominated by barbed wire," and our people's
democracy as worse than the present regime in Italy. He took the
relations between Yugoslavia and Italy as an example, as a model,
because millions of Yugoslavs and Italians come and go freely
every year across each other's borders. We regret this stand, and
we have told this to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party
has taken a decision not to attack the Yugoslav revisionists either
in the press or in the speeches of their leaders. When shaking
hands with Comrade Hysni, who had just gone to Bucharest,
Teodor Zhivkov was so utterly shameless as to say: "What is
Albania up to? Only Albania does not agree!" "What do you
imply by this?" Hysni asked him. "No, no, I was joking!" replied
Zhikov. If you are not consistent in the struggle against the
Yugoslav revisionists, those things that happened in Bulgaria must
occur. Two months ago, a brochure was printed in a Bulgarian
publishing house containing grave errors. It is illustrated with a
map of the Balkans, in which Albania is shown as a part of the
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Of course, the Central
Committee of our Party protested against this, and although the
Bulgarian leaders expressed their regret for what happened and

15) First Secretary of the CC of the Hungarian SWP. In 1951 he was
imprisoned for grave mistakes and anti-party and anti-socialist activity. In
1954, as a result of the campaign launched by Khrushchev against the
so-called "cult of the individual," he was rehabilitated. At the time of the
October-November events of 1956 in Hungary, the modern revisionists,
mainly the Soviet ones, placed him at the head of the Government and,
later, even at the head of the Hungarian Party.
promised they would take measures to call in all those brochures, they have been spread to all parts of the world. They present this as simply a technical mistake. But why was there no mistake made of giving a part of Bulgaria, for example, to Turkey?

In Poland six months ago, people recommended by the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of Poland, at the celebration of the November 29 festival, attempted to steal state documents and to set fire to the Albanian Embassy. After having been caught red-handed, in order to cover their tracks, the thieves took the film "Scanderbeg." But the criminal was caught, and we lodged a protest over this affair. But what happened? The prosecutor demanded a sentence of 12 years of imprisonment, but the court sentenced the culprit to two months' probation.

One week ago, the former cipher clerk of the Polish Embassy in Tirana, and now an employee of the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw, went to our Embassy and drew a pistol to kill our ambassador, but our men there grabbed him and handed him over to police.

What do these things mean? What is this white terror against our country? We have sent a note of protest to the Polish Government, we have called our ambassador home, and we have told the Polish Government that if it does not assure the Albanian Government that no more such actions against the personnel of our Embassy in Warsaw will occur, we shall not return our ambassador there. We also informed all the ambassadors of the socialist countries of this event, and they were very indignant about it.

Then what do these things mean? Why do they happen? We must evaluate them, and you must tell us whether we have been mistaken or not, whether we have acted wisely or with heat. You understand that these matters are of great importance to all of us, and that they must be solved as soon as possible in a correct way, in a comradely way. There is no other way to solve these questions. Lenin laid down the norms; let us implement them. Why two norms, why two standards of measurement or weight? Here there must be only one norm, one measure, one weight. From all this we should be clear that we are right, that our conscience is clear and nothing has changed in our unwavering stand.

We must be clear about these questions, for in this way we will never go wrong. And we must not go wrong, we must never
distort the compass, and we must not allow anyone else to

distort it.

We must bear in mind that this is the beginning of a very
complicated affair. Yet with our convictions and within our
modest possibilities, we shall do our utmost to see that these
matters are put into proper order in a Marxist-Leninist way. Now
the steel-like unity of the Central Committee of our Party, of the
Central Committee with the membership of the Party, and of the
Party with our people, is required.

We must come out of this Plenum strong as steel, as we have
always been, and now even more so, for we are defending
Marxism-Leninism. We must resolutely defend our homeland and
our Party, for in this way we defend the people and their future.
This is the only correct road.

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of the minutes of the 17th Plenum
of the CC of the PLA in the
Central Archives of the Party.
WE SHALL SPEAK IN MOSCOW AS MARXISM-LENINISM TEACHES US; FOR US THERE IS NO OTHER LANGUAGE

(Closing Speech at the 17th Plenum of the CC of the PLA)

July 12, 1960

As all of you have stated, and as Comrade Mehmet [Shehu] correctly expressed the view of the whole Party, in a Marxist-Leninist way, the questions raised at this Plenum are vital, and there was not the slightest doubt that the Central Committee of our Party, which has emerged from the war, from the great efforts and toil of our people and our Party, would certainly rise to the occasion at this very difficult moment which the international communist movement is going through.

We can draw a major conclusion: namely, that even before they have had the chance to go deeply into the matter, the members of the Central Committee of our Party [have demonstrated that they] are exceptionally vigilant and armed with Marxist-Leninist ideology, they understand these problems much better than many people who have a great deal to say every day, but who in fact are working to deceive people and nations. The members of the Central Committee of our Party have been tempered in the struggle of the Party for the defense of Marxism-Leninism. They are modest in appearance, and this is a great merit of our leadership. But the comrades of the Plenum of our Central Committee are at a high level as to their correct understanding of political and ideological problems, and they have an exceptionally keen ability to see and judge things, and to express their view with extraordinary and exemplary courage about anyone who makes major blunders that are so costly to socialism and to the world proletarian revolution.

Because our Party has had such a leadership it has won all these battles, and with this leadership it will surmount all difficulties, however great they may be. The opinion you express, comrades of the Central Committee, that our small but brave and heroic Party will certainly contribute to the good of the international communist movement, is also completely correct.
We shall go to Moscow and speak as Marxism-Leninism teaches us; this is the only way we shall speak, as the Central Committee instructs us — for us there is no other language. Certainly, what we have to say will not be to the liking of some, but we think that our just words, based on Marxism-Leninism and on the facts, will not remain within the four walls of the room in which the meeting will take place; they will certainly be heard by all the other parties and peoples. The truth cannot be concealed, it cannot be locked up in jail, it cannot be stifled by threats or blackmail. Our Party, which has emerged from the bosom of the people, can never be intimidated by threats or by blackmail; it will always stand unflinchingly.

It is essential to maintain such a determined stand, for this is vital to us as communists, as Marxists, as patriots. Why are the Soviet leaders carrying on as at a fair, and with an astonishing lack of seriousness seeking to discuss a hash of formulas, grabbing at a few words and expressions — you said this or you said that — which is not only impermissible but also very suspect? At the Moscow Meeting we shall contribute to the discussion according to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and based on our revolutionary experience, on the day-to-day facts.

At a time when imperialism is arming itself to the teeth and committing so many provocations, at a time when the revolutionary situation in Asia and elsewhere is on the upsurge, when in Japan, for example, millions of people are attacking Kishi and his government, when they are drawing inspiration from the heroic Communist Party of China, from the ideas of Mao Tsetung — can it be permitted that the Soviet leaders and Khrushchev, clinging to formulas, should be heading toward the disruption of the camp of socialism?! Precisely at these moments the Soviet leaders are splitting the camp and discrediting this great revolutionary force which is inspiring the whole of Asia.

Precisely now, when the fate of mankind is in the balance, to tell China to get out of the camp is a great crime against mankind and international communism, at a time when the German Bundeswehr is receiving missile weapons and is menacing Europe and the world, Nikita Khrushchev is attacking the Communist Party of China and accusing it of being a warmonger because it rightfully says that the slogans about disarmament are nothing but illusions. Apparently only Nikita Khrushchev is for peace!

Assuredly, the facts and the stand of the Marxist-Leninist parties will expose this non-Marxist activity and will compel
Khrushchev to act differently. At the meeting of officer graduates held in the Kremlin, he was compelled to say: "We withdrew from Geneva, from the Commission of the Ten, because disarmament has become an illusion, a smokescreen to deceive the peoples."

See what methods are being used. What is said today is not said tomorrow; one word for a question, five against it — that means great confusion — and when you seek to dot the i's, they leap like an acrobat and write in Pravda that they have said both this and that. So they have said — but what emerges here? You left the Commission of the Ten, but from whom did you ask permission? How long have you, comrades, known about this matter? About 10 days. But are we or are we not one of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty? Only today I received a telegram in which we are informed by the Soviet government that they have left Geneva and the issue has been passed over to the UNO. What is all this? Comrades, there are many such things.

The comrades here enumerated all the questions, thereby demonstrating the great maturity of the Central Committee of our Party, and not only of the Political Bureau. Any one of us could make mistakes, but this has not happened with us, because we are closely linked with one another, we exchange opinions with one another, we sift through them well, and thus we stay on the right road. This is the Marxist-Leninist method, the most correct method to avoid mistakes; and we have not made errors, not because of the merits of one or two persons but because of our unity of opinion, our frank, comradely and fraternal discussions, for we are fighters for the one great cause, the triumph of communism, the well-being of our people, the building of socialism in Albania, to bring this much-suffering people into the light.

This unity makes our strength invincible, it increases our confidence in our struggle against difficulties, in coping with tempests, to come out victorious, and we shall assuredly emerge victorious. However, what is ahead of us is no bed of roses, and we shall have a struggle. Why? Because the Soviet leaders are not acting with sound Marxist-Leninist logic. I can tell you, and this is the view of the whole Political Bureau, that in their activity there are grave and profound errors, violation of Leninist norms, subjectivism, anti-Marxism, and terrible chauvinism. They can quote as many formulas and norms as you like, but we must open our eyes and say: let us analyze their actions a little, for we
are told, "Either the way we say or not at all!" What does this mean? Then do not speak to us about Leninism! I have my own opinions and I want to express them, good or bad. However, you are taking anti-Leninist measures which, if you find me a coward, will bring me to my knees. But real communists are not like that; there are only a few such.

This is a very great issue. The Party has taught us and educated us not to accept the rotten wares the revisionists peddle, not to take soap for cheese.

We have long ago prepared ourselves for this struggle. Perhaps you may even criticize us for having shown ourselves, so to speak, somewhat secretive toward you over these matters. And you are right about this. You cannot imagine what great strength we have gained here from the Plenum of the Central Committee, what great lessons we have drawn about the courage we must display in the future, because from the way the forces were lined up in Bucharest, it will be very difficult to defeat the ranks of the enemies immediately. At the Moscow Meeting a terrible battle will take place. But in the way the questions were raised here and as the Central Committee has armed us, if our eyes have not trembled before now, they will never tremble in the future.

Therefore, this meeting of the Plenum has been a great lesson to us, the members of the Political Bureau, although you threw us many bouquets. We did not tell the Central Committee about these things before because we did not want to communicate these troubles to the entire leadership of the Party. We were fully convinced that these questions would one day come out, would be put before you and solved. And we are confident that these questions will be solved. At the November meeting we think something will be achieved, but it will not be easy because we saw the speed with which Khrushchev organized the Bucharest Meeting, as well as what was said to Comrade Hysni by the official delegate of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Violating everything we had decided, he told Hysni that decisions should be taken at this meeting, that is to expel China. But such a thing was not done in Bucharest, because Khrushchev was scared off and retreated. Thus, he had intended to take decisions. Although he was unable to do so, he prepared the ground for the other meeting in November in order to say to China: "Look how all the rest of us are united, therefore think about it; either submit to the majority or else clear out!" China, however, will not swallow this. The Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China, at the end of the Bucharest Meeting, distributed to all the delegations a letter, on a Marxist basis, in which it directly accused Khrushchev and condemned the anti-Marxist methods which were used by him and others, and pointed out that these things will be brought up at the coming meeting.

Khrushchev accuses China of wanting war and blatantly, and with evil aims, distorts what Comrade Mao Tsetung says. We heard Comrade Mao Tsetung ourselves when he spoke at the Meeting of the communist and workers' parties in Moscow in 1957. He spoke in detail about the great strength of the socialist camp, beginning as far back as World War II, the war in Korea, Indochina, etc. Then, after he spoke about the great strength of our camp, he stressed that it is possible that the imperialists might attack us. If there is war, imperialism may even use the atom bomb and hundreds of millions of people may be killed; nevertheless, he said, we shall win. And the Soviet leaders do not put the right interpretation on the expression of the Chinese comrades that "imperialism is a paper tiger." The Soviet leaders grasp at some expression and frame it differently. By this formulation the Chinese have sought to argue the decay of imperialism. Mao Tsetung himself pointed out the great strength of our camp, saying that in face of the great strength of the socialist camp, imperialism is a paper tiger.

We are for coexistence, but not for coexistence such as that advocated by Khrushchev who calls Nehru a brother, at a time when Nehru is putting down the revolts of the hungry Indian people with bloodshed.

Each time I have gone to the Kremlin, I have seen a bust of Gandhi on Khrushchev's desk. You know who Gandhi is. Why does the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union want to keep a bust of Gandhi (1) on his desk?

The disarmament of which Nikita Khrushchev speaks is nothing but an illusion, it is a stage-effect. But on these questions which have to do with the fate of the revolution, with the fate of mankind, we, the people of a small country, also are answerable, let alone the Soviet leaders, who have an exceptional responsibility. Therefore there must be no vacillation. If Nikita Khrushchev and company lead the question into an impasse, we, too, have our say, and our Party has spoken and says its word only in

1) M.K. Gandhi (1869-1948), Indian political personality.
a correct, Marxist-Leninist way.

[. . .] I think that the question of Liri Belishova (2) should be carefully re-examined by the Political Bureau, and she herself should reflect on these things. The unity of the leadership is of exceptional importance. We must guard it like the apple of our eye, for our enemies are attempting to disrupt it, attempting to corrupt the waverers. Without unity the Party cannot live, and the building of socialism in our country is endangered.

The methods used by the Soviet leaders are anti-Marxist. Comrade Hysni said this in Bucharest, on behalf of the Political Bureau, where he suggested that such methods should cease immediately. By such methods the enemies aim at setting the people of our Party against the leadership, but our Party will beat back such methods.

On the one hand, Mikoyan tells Mehmet and me, "Please, comrade Albanians, keep these things secret;" therefore we did not tell even the Political Bureau. On the other hand, Andropov says to the members of our delegation to the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party in Bucharest: "Has the Political Bureau told you nothing about these questions?" We told Khrushchev, through Comrade Hysni, that our Party knows what and when the members of the Party should be told.

We now see that the Soviet representatives have certainly received instructions about what they are doing. For example, even here they go to a functionary in the apparatus of the Central Committee, whom they don't know at all, and say, "How are you, when shall we meet together, to talk about these questions?" But he replied: "There is a proper place to talk about these matters, and it is not with me."

What are these things? They are not Marxist. Therefore we sent a letter to the Party committees. The Political Bureau has adopted a decision that not a word will be printed in our newspapers from the Soviet materials, in which they make the slightest allusion, direct or indirect, to this conflict, for we do not want to confuse the Party without its having judged the question, and to worry it about the unity of our camp at these

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2) Liri Belishova was severely criticized by the Plenum of the CC of the PLA over the mistakes in line that she had made during her visit to the PR of China, and over the anti-party position she took in Moscow in her meetings with the Soviet leaders. (See this volume, p. 88).
very difficult international moments.

You are clear about these matters. It is very important to our Party that the members of the Plenum of the Central Committee, the first secretaries and the cadres, have correctly understood these matters, even before the Central Committee and the Political Bureau have put these things before the Party. Thus, on the basis of your example, the whole Party has been armed; there is no doubt about this whatever. It is clear that we want these disagreements to be solved. Our attitudes are clear, therefore we shall come back again to the Central Committee to receive your help, with a view to being completely armed. But let me point out that there are certain things you must bear in mind.

This major problem, which is concerning us now, and will concern us until it is correctly solved, should not become a hindrance to the friendship we should show toward the peoples of the Soviet Union. If the Soviet people who are working in our country raise these matters, they should be told that these disagreements will be solved at the Moscow Meeting in a Marxist-Leninist way.

The other question is that our vigilance must be constantly up to the mark. We should be armed and know how to foresee the way in which the numerous enemies around us will exploit this situation. They will strive to spread their poison through their men here in order to expand and incite this struggle against our Party and against the construction of socialism in Albania. Therefore, the keenest vigilance is necessary.

Another problem is the work we must do for the realization of the plans, as Comrade Mehmet [Shehu] pointed out. We must consider the economic questions seriously, we must think a great deal about them, because the situation can become difficult. Therefore, we must be prepared for any eventuality. What eventuality, for instance? It is possible that the enemies could attack us. That is why we must be vigilant toward them, as always; we must confront the enemy with a fierce and uncompromising struggle, we must hit them mercilessly.

Certainly, our enemies will cook up conspiracies. We know the plans of the Yugoslav revisionists against our country. For this reason we have been and shall be vigilant, but now our vigilance must be raised to a still higher level in the Party ranks in all directions, up to the discipline of production, so that nothing will escape the work of the Party.

Economic problems should be taken well in hand by the
Party; we must not think that the weather conditions were not good, etc., and leave things to take their course. We have the possibilities to work well, to take in more wheat, maize, cotton and other products, irrespective of the weather conditions. We must utilize these great possibilities and achieve total mobilization in this direction, for the imperialists might try to spring some surprise.

For this purpose, the army should be armed, be ready and vigilant, and this revolutionary fire, which burns in the hearts of the communists, must pervade the entire army. The Party must be aroused, with a firm grasp on its weapons, it must be disciplined, politically elevated. With such readiness and preparedness, things will certainly go well for us.

The organs of the Ministry for Internal Affairs must show great revolutionary vigilance; they must be, as they have always been, on the offensive against the internal and external enemies, for the defense of our borders against the innumerable attempts the enemies will make. The Party should mobilize all its forces there, stand firm and mercilessly smash the heads of the enemies. Our line has been and remains correct, and our vigilance has never slackened. Therefore, in the future, too, we should always be vigilant and not fall asleep. This is of exceptional importance.

The truth is that the Albanian communists are brave. They are not hot-blooded, as Khrushchev says, but cool. A brave man is cool. I say this because there has been no alarm whatever in our work. We have experienced other very difficult moments, but we have stood firm and our heads have not been befuddled.

We must mobilize the masses on the road of the Party for the purpose of realizing the plans and enhancing our revolutionary vigilance. All of us, without panic — for the enemy wants to panic us — must carry out well the tasks imposed on us by the moment. The enemy has all sorts of methods to arouse panic, but the Party should set the example, the communists must stand unflinching, heroic, calm and unruffled. If such a stand is adopted, the people, too, will be inspired and tempered by the firm stand of the Party. Therefore, we should point out all these qualities of our Party, take them to the grass-roots level, mobilize our men and women, and temper them with all these virtues of the Party.

This Plenum has been a great school for all of us. Hence, let us arm ourselves with the teachings of this Plenum and set to
work. Now we propose to publish the draft communiqué so that our people and friends will know about the holding of our meeting of the Central Committee.

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THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS THE LEADERSHIP OF
THE PARTY WHICH ALWAYS JUDGES FAIRLY, WISELY,
CALMLY AND, WHEN NECESSARY, SEVERELY, TOO

(From the Conversation with Koço Tashko) (1)

August 3, 1960

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: I received your letter in
which you asked to meet me. I authorized Comrade Hysni Kapo
to talk with you, but you were not satisfied because you wanted
to speak with me or with nobody. Of course, anybody may ask
to talk with the First Secretary of the Central Committee, but it
may happen that the First Secretary is very busy or absent from
Tirana. In such cases I authorize somebody else, as I did in your
case. In the evening, as soon as I received your letter, I sent it
immediately to Hysni through an officer. The officer was
instructed to inform you to come and meet Hysni at the Central
Committee. This was not to your liking, and you used bad
language toward one of our officers. When a secretary of the
Central Committee asks you to come to meet him, you should go
there at once, at the fixed time, and not when it pleases you.
Otherwise how can a man call himself a communist, if he does
not show himself to be correct and disciplined when invited by a
comrade whom the Party has elected to the leadership? (2)
Besides, you know that our officers are our comrades, they are
communists, they are not "policemen," as you call them. You
are wrong to speak like this, because you are a Party member.
The Party has charged our officers with important tasks.

We have invited you (3) today to talk over the problems which
you raised in your letter, and what you discussed with Hysni.

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1) At that time Chairman of the Central Auditing Commission of the
PLA.

2) Even for his meeting with Comrade Enver Hoxha, Koço Tashko was
three hours late, for which he was severely criticized.

3) Comrade Rita Marko, Member of the Political Bureau of the CC of
the PLA, was also present at this meeting.
Therefore, you must speak openly, clearly, in detail, like a Party member. We have time at our disposal, and the patience to hear you out. Tell us about your problems one by one. In what respect are you opposed to the Central Committee and where does it stem from? Tell us about the talks you have had with the functionaries of the Soviet Embassy, what they said to you and what you said to them.

**Koço Tashko** began speaking in an irresponsible and insolent manner. Patiently, **Comrade Enver Hoxha** tried to help him, from time to time breaking in to ask a question.

**COMRADE ENVER HOXHA:** You are trying to jump from one thing to another, by telling us what was said at the Plenum (4) of the Central Committee of our Party, as if I were not present at the meeting. Why don't you tell us about the other matters we want to know? You told us nothing about what you said to Hysni. I say you should judge things better. Many things you raise here are the offspring of your imagination.

You are not in order when you say that the criticisms we leveled at Khrushchev were not fair. In your opinion, on what problems has Khrushchev been wrong? Or is he not wrong at all? As you said yourself, your opinion is that "Khrushchev was unjustly attacked by those who spoke at the Plenum, and no measures were taken against them."

This is astonishing. Instead of condemning the attitude of Khrushchev, you seek to condemn the comrades of the Plenum who quite rightly spoke against him.

A little while ago you said: "Perhaps by traveling so much in the capitalist countries, Khrushchev might bring back other ideas. I want to say that there is the possibility that some circumstances might influence him. But if Khrushchev is making mistakes, Stalin made mistakes, too." No, Koço, don't mix Khrushchev with Stalin. Do not speak in general, but tell us concretely: has Khrushchev made mistakes or not?

**KOÇO TASHKO:** I say that he has not made mistakes.

**COMRADE ENVER HOXHA:** But you say that Khrushchev might make mistakes just as Stalin!

**KOÇO TASHKO:** Even if he is wrong, I believe that he will be corrected.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: You said that you were not in agreement when I did not go to the Bucharest Meeting, that allegedly I did not reply to the invitation of the Soviet comrades. It is not as you say. I had no such invitation. You fabricate non-existent things.

The norms of the Marxist-Leninist parties are known by all. If you do not know these norms, then I shall tell you: It has not happened, and does not happen, that the Central Committee of our Party may say to the First Secretary, "Don't go" when he is invited to a meeting of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist camp or of the world. Just at the last Plenum it was decided that at the coming meeting to be held in November in Moscow, the First Secretary of the Central Committee would go at the head of the delegation of our Party. We were invited to Bucharest by the Rumanian Workers' Party only to take part in its Congress, and we sent our delegation there. As regards the meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties which was held in Bucharest, according to the agreement reached beforehand, it was aimed only at fixing the time and place of the coming meeting of the communist and workers' parties of the world; therefore our Central Committee did not consider it necessary to send me to Bucharest, but authorized Comrade Hysni Kapo to take part in that meeting. Now, as for whence you deduce these things you are saying, other than what they are in reality, and what your starting point is, we do not understand. Therefore explain this to us yourself.

You are a Party member. How can it be explained that you think that all the things that were said at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party were not put forward correctly and are without foundation? What is well-founded then? These things that you tell us?

KOÇO TASHKO: You should have more confidence in Khrushchev!

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: When, according to Marxist-Leninist organizational norms and the rules of proletarian internationalism, one party criticizes another party, or when a leader criticizes a leader of another party, because he has committed mistakes, this is a correct stand.

You are of the opinion that the Moscow Meeting should not be held in November, but as soon as possible. But this is a proposal made by you. The essence of the matter is that we shall go to the Moscow Meeting, and there we shall express our
viewpoints. What have you to say on this?

KOÇO TASHKO: I do not agree that you should go into details.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: What do you agree? Tell us.
KOÇO TASHKO: I told you. I have nothing to add, I am a sick man.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: No, Koço Tashko, you are not as physically sick as you pretend. You are sick in the head. But the Party is healthy. The Party can cure those who are sick in the head if they so desire. It is the Party's duty to help people have their say, to correct themselves, to march on the right road, but, in order to receive this aid, their hearts must be open before the Party. Do you know these principles?

KOÇO TASHKO: I know them, that is why I asked to talk with you because I could not speak at the Plenum as I can here. Who would let you speak like this there? They would have me by the throat.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: What is this you are saying? Explain yourself a little. Who does not allow you to speak at the Plenum of the Central Committee? According to you, when you cannot speak at the Plenum, this means that the situation there is unhealthy. You said that you have great faith in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, then why don't you have the same faith in our Party as well, of which you yourself are a member?

KOÇO TASHKO: I said this because, if they interrupted me when I spoke, I am nervous and . . . , one interjection, one remark against me, throws me off balance.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: As to what you feel, I do not know. I only know the Leninist norms of our Party. The Central Committee is the leadership of the Party which always judges things correctly, wisely, calmly, but, when necessary, severely, too. Then, how can you speak like this about the Central Committee, about the leadership of the Party? The members of the Central Committee are not children, who, as you say, would not judge you well but would hurl themselves at your throat! What do you mean by saying that you are nervous?

KOÇO TASKHO: That I cannot speak there. It is a question of temperament.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: But can such a stand before the Central Committee of our Party be called Marxist? Last night you said to Hysni that if you had spoken at the Plenum, you
would have caused a split, while here you are telling me that, if you had spoken, "they would have had you by the throat." Which statement do you stand by? If you explain this with "health reasons," you do not convince us. It is your duty to give the explanations that the Central Committee demands from you, because you are a Party member. Therefore, tell us why you think that the members of the Plenum would not judge you fairly.

A communist speaks openly at meetings of the Party. When he considers that he is expressing a correct view, this is in the interests of the Party; therefore he defends his opinion to the end, even if all the others are opposed to his view. That is what Lenin teaches us. The interests of the Party should be put above everything else, and not personal interests. A communist might even die, he might collapse unconscious at the meeting, but the Party must know his viewpoint now or after 50 years; therefore he should express this viewpoint, just as it is. That is how Party members think, but not you, who are afraid to speak at the Plenum, and you tell us here: "My heart might stop beating if I speak!" I ask you again, tell us, what is this idea you expressed to Hysni that your speech would cause a split?

KOÇO TASHKO: I said that the comrades of the Central Committee must not think that I was criticizing you.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: This is what you think, and not the comrades of the Plenum, who understand criticism correctly. And why shouldn't you criticize me? Tell us, what is the Central Committee and what am I? I am a Party member, a soldier of the Party. Above me is the Political Bureau, above the Political Bureau is the Central Committee, above which is the Congress of the Party. Then why do you prefer to have a tête-à-tête talk alone with me and not with the Central Committee, which is the leading forum of the Party, while I am a member of the Central Committee? Tomorrow you will come to the Central Committee again and give explanations for these viewpoints.

KOÇO TASHKO: But there are some things which one should discuss rather more in confidence.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: It seems to me you do not have a correct understanding of the Central Committee. What is there in all this to be discussed in confidence? Why should you discuss these things more in confidence, for what reasons? How can it be explained that you want to avoid saying these things in
the Central Committee? Why are you worried that by speaking at the Plenum of the Central Committee you would cause a split in its ranks? You did not explain this.

You admitted here that if you had spoken at the Plenum it might have been thought that "Koço waited and said these things at a meeting where there was a lot of people!" How can you speak in such a way about the Central Committee? Are you in your senses or not? What is the Central Committee, a "mob," a random gathering? Better to have raised these matters at the Plenum, as there would have been no split at all; only the authority the Party has given you would have declined. Think it over, speak out as you should speak in the Party, you poor man! What are these things? You have been nursing these thoughts for 20 days without saying a word to us.

You have said that you agree only on the question of our going to Moscow and that "If we do have any opinions about Khrushchev, we should say them to him." But you know very well, because you were at the Central Committee and heard it there, that we have continually told Khrushchev what we think. Therefore the things we have to say to Khrushchev are not new to him, we have told him to his face, and have not kept them to ourselves. Did you hear this at the Plenum or not?

As the facts show, you do not agree with the decisions of the Plenum, except on one thing, that we must go to Moscow.

These are not family problems, nor are they friendly ones. You come out with views contrary to the Central Committee. Then why do you today raise such worrying problems about which the Central Committee has decided what stand should be adopted, and not at the proper time? On such party problems why wait and think "to meet Comrade Enver when he goes on holiday?" For all these problems that you have, and which are in opposition to the Party, you should have come to us the very next day. Why did you leave this problem for 20 days? This is not a Party stand. How will you explain this stand to your [Party] branch [basic organization]?

KOÇO TASHKO: I did not come because I thought you are busy with Thorez. (5)

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: I stayed only two hours with

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5) At that time General Secretary of the Communist Party of France, who during those days had come to Albania for vacation.
Thorez. You should have asked for a meeting. It was your duty to tell the Party everything, and not to think that "Comrade Enver is now with Thorez," "I shall go to meet him when he goes to Korça on holiday," etc. If I had not gone to Korça, what would you have done? I suppose you would still have kept these things to yourself, especially since you didn't want to tell them to any other Secretary of the Central Committee.

KOÇO TASHKO: As I said to the Soviet comrades, I hoped that you would talk with Thorez about these problems, and that through his mediation a way to solve them would be found.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: So this is what you think! It seems to me that this is what kept you from meeting me at once. Why do you have hopes in Thorez and yourself, and not in Enver, who is your First Secretary? However, in your opinion, is it correct that now Thorez has come, things will be put right? Tell us what things will be put right. Have you thought about it or not?

You thought that now that Thorez had come attempts would be made to improve your relations with Khrushchev. What are these attempts? What mediation should we have sought from Thorez, in your opinion? Explain yourself!

KOÇO TASHKO: This is very simple: Thorez is General Secretary of a glorious party, and I thought that Comrade Enver would tell him that the Moscow Meeting should be held earlier than November.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: It is still stuck in your mind that the November Meeting should be held earlier. I told you that this does not depend on us. We have been and still are of the opinion that this meeting should be held, and we have declared this before the representatives of more than 50 parties. It was decided at Bucharest that this meeting would be held in Moscow, on the occasion of the celebrations of the Great October Socialist Revolution. It has also been decided that before the meeting the proceedings of the commission comprising the representatives of the 12 parties of the socialist countries and the representatives of the 14 other parties of the capitalist states should take place. These problems will be discussed first at the commission and then the materials will be sent to every party, hence to our Party, too. When they come, we shall study these materials very carefully and act as was decided at the Plenum of the Central Committee, which you know. Therefore
you had no need to demand from our Party that the meeting should be held as early as possible. If the meeting is held earlier, we are ready to go.

You want the meeting to be held very soon, but you do not come, according to the Party rules, and tell the First Secretary of your great anxiety. Then what are the reasons that you think that "now that Thorez has come the problems will be set on the right path and put in order?" What problems are you talking about?

KOÇO TASHKO: Good grief — about the known problems! All those things that were said at the Plenum and what we are talking about here!

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: That is to say that we should tell Thorez everything, and he should put them forward in the place you have in mind! But how was it decided at the Central Committee? At the Plenum we decided to put forward these problems at the Moscow Meeting. If we were to solve these problems through Thorez, this would mean we would be acting outside the decision of the Central Committee. How does it come about that you think in such a way?

KOÇO TASHKO: I think it is correct to make use of Thorez for any disagreement you have with Brezhnev, Kozlov, (6) and others.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: What is this Brezhnev, why do you try to frighten us with these names? We have nothing to do with the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. Don't try to provoke us here. I have told Kozlov to his face what's wrong with him, and I shall do so again.

Now tell us about the meetings you have had with the Soviet representatives. We are interested to know what you talked about. Tell us the important things.

KOÇO TASHKO: On the 29th of July Bespalov(7) phoned me and asked me to come and talk to him. I met him at the Soviet Club. We saw a film and afterward went to Dajti Hotel. Bespalov told me that the relations between us had become cool.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Didn't they say why they had become cool?

KOÇO TASHKO: He did not say, nor did I ask. We talked

6) Member of the Presidium and secretary of the CC of the CPSU.
7) At that time first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana.
about many things. I told him that the Plenum of the Central Committee of our Party had charged Comrade Enver with the solution of the problems. I said that perhaps something might be done through the talks that would be held with Thorez.

**COMRADE ENVER HOXHA:** But what was your opinion?

**KOÇO TASHKO:** My opinion was that these problems should be solved at the November Meeting or at any other meeting that might be held. I do not exclude some other meeting, apart from that of November.

**COMRADE ENVER HOXHA:** Thus, you do not exclude another meeting. Go on.

**KOÇO TASHKO:** I told Bespalov that with the coming of Thorez to our country, there would be something positive, because that day I had read in the newspaper *Zëri i Popullit* the speech Thorez made in Korça, and I was impressed by the fact that he spoke very well of our Party, the Central Committee, and Comrade Enver.

**COMRADE ENVER HOXHA:** That is to say that you came to the conclusion that we had talked, that we had discussed these problems, too, and were of one mind with Thorez. Thus, you judge from outside, formulate in your imagination ideas that Thorez has not come here for a vacation but to talk. And you say this even to Bespalov. You think that the comrades of the Bureau must have come to agreement with Thorez; and proceeding from the estimation Thorez made of our Party in the speech he delivered in Korça, you judge that even the leadership of our Party has given way. Thus, according to your thinking, all the things decided by the Plenum have been discarded and Enver has come to the same opinions as Koço. Have you met Novikov (8)?

**KOÇO TASHKO:** I have met him. Bespalov asked me to dinner at Novikov's. Ivanov (9) was to be there, too. After dinner we had a long talk. Near the end, I don't remember how it arose, we talked about Thorez.

**COMRADE ENVER HOXHA:** Try to remember how this conversation developed.

**KOÇO TASHKO:** We just talked about Thorez.

**COMRADE ENVER HOXHA:** It was all about Thorez?

**KOÇO TASHKO:** Yes, that Thorez would save the day.

8) At that time adviser of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana.

9) At that time ambassador of the Soviet Union in Tirana.
COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: But Ivanov, what did he say?
KOÇO TASHKO: I don't know, he spoke in general.
COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: We know Ivanov very well. He is not the one to speak in general.
KOÇO TASHKO: Ivanov has never talked with me about the problems we are speaking about. Neither has Zolotov (10), or Bespalov — they are close friends of mine.
COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: I find it surprising that they have not talked with you, when you are close friends, at a time when they are approaching cadres whom they scarcely know and saying, "Come and talk with us."
KOÇO TASHKO: They have not talked with me, not only now, but even in 1957, when I was in the Soviet Union. From all they did for me at that time, I understood something. They did me all those great honors. They said, "If you like, you may stay in the villa where Comrade Enver stays with the government delegation;" they even invited me to the reception that was given in the Kremlin. Hence, they have uvazhenie [respect (Russian)] for me and behave well. But recently, when Ivanov shakes hands with me, he does so very briefly, in order to avoid compromising me in the eyes of somebody who does not like me.
COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: But why could he compromise you? Who doesn't like you? Is this true?
KOÇO TASHKO: I don't know, I cannot explain.
COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: But later, why did Ivanov become closer to you again?
KOÇO TASHKO: This is one of the questions that I have in the back of my mind, too.
COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: You said that "all the talk with the Soviet representatives was about Thorez, that this was a very important question." But when you consider the question of Thorez as important, why do you talk with Novikov and Ivanov, and not come to me? You had all these talks with them before sending me your letter.
KOÇO TASHKO: I went to them by chance.
COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: The party comrades will laugh at you when this question is discussed. Since you accept the thesis that Comrade Enver might have talked with Thorez,  

10) Soviet employee in Tirana.
why do you discuss these questions with the Soviet representa­

tives?

KOÇO TASHKO: I don't see anything wrong with that.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: We are in the offices of the
Central Committee here, so speak in the proper manner. I am not
a prosecutor, but the First Secretary of the Central Committee of
the Party, therefore discuss the problems as they are discussed in
the Party. What you are telling us doesn't add up. On the one
hand, you say that you can talk only with Comrade Enver
because he is the First Secretary of the Central Committee and
on the other hand, the idea you have about our Party, you do
not tell him, but you go and tell it to Bespalov, whom you
consider a close friend, as you yourself said. What are you
saying? Bespalov has his place, and the First Secretary of the
Central Committee of our Party has his.

Why didn't you respect the organizational rules of the Party
and talk with me? If you had disagreements with the Central
Committee and wanted to speak to the First Secretary about
them, you should have done it at the proper time, immediately
after the Plenum. Whether you should have gone to the Soviet
representatives or not is another matter. In my opinion you had
no business to go there, yet you not only went and talked with
them, but went without saying a word to us and had three
meetings with the Soviet representatives.

KOÇO TASHKO: No, I had only two.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: This is stated in writing in
your letter. Even if you had not met them at all, even the idea of
going to them for talks before coming to your Party is impermis­
sible and contrary to the organizational rules of the Party.

I do not accept that you wrote your letter to me before you
talked with the Soviet representatives: the very content of it
precludes such acceptance.

According to you, it seems that Thorez has come from Paris
just to talk with us about these questions, and then go on to
Moscow. When Ivanov told you that, besides Thorez, there were
also some others who would go to Moscow on the 8th of August.
Were you not curious to ask who were these others? Then, who
asked you to say to Ivanov that an invitation to this meeting
should go to Comrade Enver? Who authorized you to speak in
the name of the First Secretary of the Central Committee? Now
you come and say to me that you are of the opinion that the
problems should not be left to be discussed in November, "since
they will get worse." We know this, but we know the other side, too, that our Party is not making matters worse. It is your actions that are doing this; therefore do not accuse our Party.

For four or five years we have not uttered a word about the unjust actions of certain Soviet leaders. Some Soviet leaders attack us, but we have been patient. Yet now you come and say that we should not leave these things to get worse. Isn't this an accusation? I told you, and I repeat, that it does not depend on our Party to decide the time of the meeting. Why are you so insistent that this meeting should be held as soon as possible? You tell Ivanov that an invitation should go to Comrade Enver, then you come here and tell me to go and talk with Ivanov myself. Have you thought about what course you are on? Why do you act like this? What wrong has our Party done you? It has brought you up, it has helped you, it is helping and will help you, but what you have done is very grave.

You say that you love the Party. Why then do you not tell the Party the things that are worrying you?

KOÇO TASHKO: I told you that I am a phlegmatic type, so you should also keep in mind the human aspect and types of people. And what is more, after I met the Soviet representatives, they put me in a difficult position.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: How did they put you in a difficult position? Explain yourself!

KOÇO TASHKO: I intended to meet you, but I postponed it from day to day. As soon as I talked with Bespalov, I understood that this problem could not be put off any longer.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Explain to us a little, why did you go and talk with him, since you condemn this talk?

KOÇO TASHKO: No, I do not condemn it, but I had something to say to you also.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: You tell them everything but you tell the First Secretary of your Party only "something." But who is to blame for what you have done? If you realize your mistake, then make a little self-criticism. Didn't the Soviet representatives with whom you talked ask how the Plenum went?

KOÇO TASHKO (hesitates, then says): They may have asked me...

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Tell us frankly, did you say anything about the Plenum? Didn't Ivanov ask how these problems were discussed at the Plenum? I ask you again, did
Ivanov ask you how these matters were discussed at the Plenum? Did he ask you such a question?

What was that you said to Hysni, you who pose as allegedly knowing the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, when you put our leadership in the position of the Mensheviks and Trotskyites, and said that what is happening here with us "is like the time of Kronstadt(11)" in the Soviet Union? Is this what you think about your Party? Then what are we — white-guardists? Do you know the history of our Party? It was not you who inculcated the great love of our people for the peoples of the Soviet Union, but our Party, during the war, with blood and sweat, yet now you come and make such accusations against us! These things that you said have their roots elsewhere, therefore think and reflect only in the Party way, otherwise you will not correct yourself. Come down to earth. The Party has respected you more than you deserved. Your imagination is sick, and this is not a recent illness — you have had this sickness for some time.

To tell the truth, from no one else in my life have I heard such a discussion and presentation of the matter — without start, without finish, without any connection between one thing and another — like this I heard from you. Many comrades have come and have opened their hearts to me when they have made some mistake, but they have emerged from the discussion feeling better. But now you speak to me about "humanism," about the phlegmatic type! I have been humane with people, with the comrades. What do you want when you tell me now "to see the human side, too?" Do you want me to fail to defend the line of the Party, its interests? Please! I put the interests of the Party and of the people above everything else, and I will defend them as long as I live. If anybody has facts with which to criticize me and the Central Committee, we shall welcome his just criticism gladly, and this is how we have always received it.

But if anybody criticizes us for the stand we maintain toward the Yugoslav revisionists, we say "stop", whoever he might be, even to Khrushchev, because we call a spade a spade. He himself

11) With openly hostile tendentiousness Koço Tashko puts the fair criticism which the PLA makes of the Khrushchevite revisionists on a par with the Kronstadt rebellion of 1921, when the Menshevik and Trotskyite forces, assisted by the Anglo-American imperialists, rose against the Soviet power.
has said that the Yugoslav leadership is an agent of imperialism. Then why should our Party be attacked for its just stand against the Yugoslav revisionists? For what reasons? How can we keep our mouths shut about these things? When we say that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the mother party, this does not mean that we should keep silent about the mistakes of someone in its leadership.

After the talks we held in Moscow in 1957, out of respect for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, for a time we did not write against Yugoslav revisionism in our press. However, it was not long before the Yugoslav revisionists held their notorious 7th Congress, with regard to which the correctness of the line of our Party was once again obvious. By taking a revolutionary stand, we are defending the Soviet Union itself and its Communist Party, while those who violate the principles of Marxism-Leninism in one way or another, we shall criticize in a Marxist-Leninist way, whoever they may be. Don't we have the right to criticize someone when the cup is full? When mistakes are made, we cannot sit in silence. We shall criticize in a Marxist-Leninist way, because this is the way to defend the freedom and independence of our Homeland and of the Soviet Union itself, because so much blood has been shed to win these things. This is the way to defend Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, Koço Tashko, not your way. You mix up things in your imagination. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has the right to act as it likes, but we have the right to have our say about the complaints made against our Party. Our Party fights to the end to defend the interests of the people and of Marxism-Leninism from the enemies, but your sick imagination says otherwise. Criticism is criticism, therefore, when you are faced with mistakes, it is opportunism not to criticize. However, you have suffered to some degree from this disease. I have followed the life of the Party very carefully from the very beginning. There are occasions when little should be said, but there are also occasions when you should grit your teeth, and, when it is a matter of principles, they must be defended, we must not violate them.

Have you seen our writings where we criticize Yugoslav revisionists? In them we have constantly spoken about the experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Then why come and point out to me one by one the articles published by the Soviet comrades? I know them, but there are also
differences in our attitudes, which are not just tactical differences. We have made our criticism known to Khrushchev, too. We do not speak about them in secret. We have told him openly to his face, and he has spoken to us the same way. But these differences have not led us to a split. You know the viewpoint of our Party, that the disagreements that have emerged are between two parties, between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, and we have said at the proper time that the examination of these questions in Bucharest was premature, hasty, that they should be solved carefully and by strictly applying the Leninist organizational rules on the relations between parties. What then impels you to adopt this stand against the Central Committee? Therefore, as a comrade, I advise you to reflect upon these questions. During these next two or three days, according to the Party rules, you have the possibility to write to the Central Committee about these questions.

**KOÇO TASHKO:** I have nothing more to say.

**COMRADE ENVER HOXHA:** That means that you will not act like a Party member, to whom the Party lends a hand to think over his mistakes. Then don't come out tomorrow and say that Comrade Enver did not give you the possibility to reflect more deeply over your mistakes.

**KOÇO TASHKO:** I have nothing to say. What I had to say I said here.

**COMRADE ENVER HOXHA:** In short, this is your stand. Are you not going to re-examine your position? I advise you once again to reflect today, tomorrow, till the day after tomorrow, and hand us your views in writing, then we shall judge your case in the Central Committee, because it is a problem of importance which the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party must discuss and decide.

**KOÇO TASHKO:** I shall not write. I said what I had to say.

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LETTER TO THE CC OF THE CPSU CONCERNING
THE OPEN INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS
OF THE PLA AND THE ALBANIAN STATE BY SOME
FUNCTIONARIES OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN TIRANA

Moscow

August 6, 1960

In its relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, the Party of Labor of Albania has always been guided by
the great principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian interna-
tionalism. . . .

It is with the greatest regret that we inform you that in these
recent times, following the Meeting of the representatives of the
communist and workers' parties in Bucharest, we notice a radical
change in the attitude of several persons who are functionaries of
the Soviet Embassy in Tirana, an attitude which can only bring
harm to the friendly relations between our two countries and our
two parties, for it concerns the blatant interference of these
persons in the internal affairs of our Party and State, in contrast
to the Marxist-Leninist stand that has been always adopted by
Soviet personnel toward our internal questions.

We note with great regret that Comrade K.I. Novikov,
Counsellor to the Soviet Embassy in Tirana, going beyond any
party rules and norms determining our fraternal relations, has
many times attempted to gather information from the cadres and
functionaries of our Party in Tirana, Elbasan, Durrës, and
elsewhere, on such important questions about our Party as those
examined by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party,
which concern the general political line of the Party of Labor of
Albania. He has spoken to our Party cadres in open opposition to
the general line of the Party, and has carried out agitation with
them in order to manoeuver them into wrong positions opposed
to the Central Committee of our Party.

The First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, F.P. Bespalov,
together with the Ambassador, Comrade V.I. Ivanov, and the
Counsellor of the Embassy, Comrade K.I. Novikov, through
methods impermissible in the relations between Marxist-Leninist
parties, have been able to exert a negative influence on Koço Tashko, Chairman of the Central Auditing Commission in our Party, drawing him into positions openly against the general line of our Party.

Such activity is flagrant and impermissible interference in the internal affairs of our Marxist-Leninist Party on the part of these functionaries of the Soviet Embassy, open activity against the unity of our Party and against its general line.

We have been very concerned particularly by the stand of the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade Ivanov, recently, who went to such lengths in his unfriendly activity toward our Party as to dare to ask our generals and officers publicly, at the Tirana airport, the astonishing and suspect question: "To whom does the army stand loyal?" There and then our generals gave him the proper answer and came with tears in their eyes to the Central Committee of the Party, shocked by such a tendentious question from Comrade Ivanov and asking the logical question: "Why does he ask such a question, why should he doubt the loyalty of our army to the Party, the Homeland, the people and the camp of socialism?" For all of us, this stand of the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, Comrade Ivanov, is utterly impermissible.

These facts (and there are many others like them) have caused us immense distress. Until now we have turned a deaf ear and have shut one eye to the actions of these functionaries of the Soviet Embassy, and this we have done simply for the sake of the great friendship which exists between our two countries. But now that the actions of several functionaries of the Soviet Embassy against the general line and the unity of our Party are assuming intolerable proportions, we deem it our duty to inform you in a comradely manner in the hope that you will take the appropriate measures. These actions of several functionaries of the Soviet Embassy do not contribute to the strengthening of the friendship which exists between our two countries; they harm the internationalist relations existing between our two parties.

We feel it our duty to inform you of such things, to talk with you openly and directly, as we have always done, as the Party of the great Lenin itself teaches us. We do not understand why such a change in the attitude of these functionaries of the Soviet Embassy should occur. They speak to our cadres in open opposition to the stand adopted by our Party at the Meeting of the communist and workers' parties in Bucharest and are striving intensively to disrupt the unity of our Party and its leadership.
The stand of our Party at the Bucharest Meeting is as clear as daylight. At that meeting our Party frankly and clearly expressed its views, and nobody is permitted to distort the reality about the attitude of our Party. Just as we spoke frankly and clearly at the Bucharest Meeting about the questions which were raised at that meeting, so, too, we shall speak frankly and clearly at the coming meeting which will take place in Moscow, as determined by all the parties that participated in the Bucharest Meeting. Nobody is permitted, for any reason, to interfere in our internal affairs in order to change the correct Marxist-Leninist stand of our Party, as some functionaries of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana are attempting to do.

Our Party, like all the other Marxist-Leninist parties, has the right to have its own view and to express its own view freely, in the way it sees fit, as the great Lenin teaches us. Marxism-Leninism has given our Party this right to express its views freely, and it is entirely impermissible that attempts should be made to present our Party as if, in these recent times, it has allegedly taken a wrong road, as several functionaries of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana are seeking to "prove." Whoever tries to distort the reality about the stand of our Party, is gravely mistaken. The Party of Labor of Albania has been, is, and will remain, throughout all its life, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, and the best evidence of this is the whole glorious road our Party has traversed, from its creation up till today....

The Party of Labor of Albania, as always, will struggle with all the strength it has to remain loyal to the end to Marxism-Leninism, as the great Lenin teaches us. . . .

The Central Committee of our Party considers that the differences in the stands maintained by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Party of Labor of Albania at the Bucharest Meeting must not become cause for interference in each other's internal affairs by any person whatever, for this would not help the cause and would impair the common interests of our two parties.

We are convinced that you will take the necessary measures
to prevent any repetition of such incidents in the activity of the functionaries of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana.

Communist greetings
On behalf of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania

First Secretary
Enver Hoxha

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August 9, 1960

Some important ideological and political disagreements have arisen between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. Word about these disagreements is beginning to appear both in the Chinese and Soviet press — as well as in the speeches of the leaders of these two countries — of course, without mentioning one another by name, but making allusions that anybody can easily understand. These questions also have been spoken about and discussed openly at the Bucharest Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties who were delegates of their parties to the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party.

The Central Committee of the Party considers it necessary to inform all the Party organizations of our stand toward this problem by means of this letter.

On June 2, 1960 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union sent a letter to the Central Committee of our Party, in which it proposed to hold, at the end of June, a meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties of the countries of the socialist camp "to exchange opinions about the problems of the present international situation and to determine our further common line." The Central Committee of our Party immediately replied to this letter, stressing that it was in full agreement with holding the proposed meeting at the end of June, and that the delegation of our Party for this purpose would be headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha. However, on June 7 our Central Committee received another letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU. This letter informed us that all the parties had agreed in principle to holding the Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist camp, but some of them had proposed that the meeting should be postponed to a later date. Concerning
this, the June 7 letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU said: "We could have a preliminary discussion with the representa­tives of your Party about the time for convening the meeting at the time of the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party, on June 20, after which, in agreement with the central committees of the sister parties, we shall fix the definite date of the meeting." The Central Committee of our Party replied to the Central Committee of the CPSU that it agreed that the meeting should be postponed, and that agreement should be reached in Bucharest about fixing the date when it should be held. For this purpose, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee author­ized Comrade Hysni Kapo, who headed the delegation of our Party to the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party, to exchange opinions with the representatives of the sister parties who were at the Congress regarding the fixing of the date of the meeting that was proposed in the letters of the Central Com­mittee of the CPSU.

But in fact, our delegation, which went to participate in the Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party and discuss the fixing of the date of the Meeting of the representatives of the commu­nist and workers' parties of the socialist camp, found itself in Bucharest faced with an international meeting already prepared. This meeting was contrary to what had been decided; it was contrary to the content of the letters of the Central Committee of the CPSU, of which we spoke above. The agenda, too, was quite different: instead of exchanging opinions about fixing the date of the Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties, as stated in the letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU, accusations were made there against the Commu­nist Party of China. To this end, only 10 hours before the meeting a 45-page document prepared by the Soviet comrades was distributed to all the foreign delegates (the majority of whom were only members of the central committees), in which the views of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were expressed concerning the disagreements they have with the Chinese comrades. And on this very important and delicate question it was demanded that the representatives of more than 50 communist and workers' parties of various countries, who had come to Bucharest for another purpose, should adopt a stand, after 10 hours, and accuse the Communist Party of China.

It is quite clear that this meeting had been organized in haste and in opposition to the most elementary Leninist organizational
rules. As you know very well, dear comrades, even when the question of a rank-and-file member is to be put forward for discussion in the Party branch [basic organization], the Party teaches us to be careful, cautious, just, and never hasty. Implementing this Leninist principle of the Party, the branch may hold one, two and frequently even three meetings, the members are informed at least three days before of the agenda and its content, commissions are appointed to prepare the necessary materials, etc. And this, and this alone is the correct way of the Party, the organizational way Marxism-Leninism teaches us. But if we act in this way over one party member, is it in order that a whole party, which has several million party members in its ranks, which leads a people of almost 700 million, should be accused in such a hasty way and in violation of every organizational rule?

In these circumstances, considering the way in which the Bucharest Meeting was prepared and held, the Political Bureau of our Party adopted a correct stand, the only correct, principled and Marxist-Leninist stand that could be adopted. What is this stand?

It can be summed up in a few words: first, the said disagreements are disagreements between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China; second, the Bucharest Meeting was premature and held in contravention of the Leninist organizational rules; third, our Party will have its say about these disagreements at the coming meeting, which must be prepared according to the rules and the practice existing among the communist and workers' parties.

Our Party of Labor thinks that the meeting organized in Bucharest was out of order. It was contrary to the agreement reached through the correspondence between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the other sister parties, according to which only the date of the coming meeting would be set at Bucharest; it was premature and in contravention of the organizational rules which the communist and Workers' parties observe. Thus, on the one hand, taking the above facts into account, and on the other hand, since only 10 hours before the meeting we received a document in which only the view of the Soviet comrades was expressed, our Party could make no pronouncement in Bucharest about the disagreements existing between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. Our Party will have its say, will express its view about the said disagreements at the coming meeting of the representa-
tives of the communist and workers' parties, which will take place later, after having studied the materials of both sides carefully, cautiously, and with Marxist-Leninist justice. Our Party, which has always fought for and loyally defended the principles of Marxism-Leninism, is of the opinion that only at a meeting organized according to Leninist organizational rules, after having heard the arguments of the two sides, with patience and without heat, in a comradely spirit, can the conclusion be reached as to who is right and who is wrong, how we should work jointly in the future for the good of socialism and communism, for the good of the unity of our socialist camp.

This wise, principled, and Leninist stand was maintained by Comrade Hysni Kapo at the Bucharest Meeting on the instructions of the Political Bureau. As you know from the communiqué published in the press, this stand was fully and unanimously approved by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party which was held on July 11-12, 1960. The Central Committee is convinced that this correct and principled stand will be unanimously approved by every member of our heroic Party. Only those who do not want to respect the Leninist norms can fail to approve our correct stand.

The disagreements existing between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China concern the two biggest countries and parties of the socialist camp. Our Party cannot remain indifferent to them. ... In the future our Party will work, as before, to strengthen our great love for and friendship with the Soviet Union, with the Soviet peoples, with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, for there is no stronger and more sincere love than that which is based on the triumphant precepts of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. But at the same time it is undeniable and indisputable that great China, its people and party are dear to us, too, just as to all the countries of the socialist camp.

Therefore, our Party, just as all the other parties, is concerned that this important question should be solved correctly, on the basis of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. Our Party is confident that this question will be resolved at the coming meeting, which will be held within two to three months and the preparation of which has been charged to a commission of representatives of many sister parties, including our Party. We have this firm confidence, for we have confidence in Marxism-
Leninism, which has withstood many storms and has always emerged victorious.

Our Party of Labor has always worked and fought for the triumph of Marxism-Leninism, for its application in life, for the preservation of the purity of its principles. For this reason, during its entire glorious history, our Party has always had an entirely correct line, a line which responds to the teachings of Lenin, which responds to the interests of the Albanian people, the interests of socialism and communism. Our Party will pursue its line, based on these principles, without any wavering whatever, in the future, too. We shall fight and work for the triumph of Marxism-Leninism, for the implementation of the principles of the Moscow Declaration of 1957, and of the Bucharest Communiqué, which, as announced in the press, was unanimously approved by the Central Committee of our Party.

Our Party will enhance and strengthen its revolutionary vigilance, which must always be at the proper level, as befits our heroic Party, because the enemies of the Party and the people, the weak, opportunist, and cowardly elements will strive, as always, in various ways to attack the Party and its correct line, to arouse doubts about, and slander, our friendship with the great Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, to spread various slogans and views with a view to causing ideological confusion in our ranks. Being vigilant, all the members of our glorious Party must fight with courage and determination against any effort by the enemies to attain these base aims.

Our Party must strengthen even more the steel-like unity of its ranks, the unity of the entire Party around the Leninist Central Committee of our Party, the unity of the Party with our heroic people. Our unbreakable unity has always been the decisive condition for successfully overcoming any obstacle, for advancing toward new successes. Now, too, it is the decisive condition for the triumph of the line of the Party, for crushing any activity of our enemies, for defeating the opportunists, the weak and cowardly elements.

The Central Committee of the Party is firmly confident that all Party branches, all Party members, whom the Party has educated as loyal sons of our Party and our people, faithful to the death to Marxism-Leninism, in judging this important question, will show themselves cautious, just, courageous, and prin-
cipled as always, and will close their ranks still more tightly around the Central Committee of our Party.

The First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania

Enver Hoxha

Published for the first time in "Principal Documents of the PLA", vol. 3, 1970, p. 348.
Dear Comrades,

As is known, at the Bucharest Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties, which was held in June this year, concerning the disagreements that have arisen between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, the delegation of the Party of Labor of Albania, in conformity with the directives of the Central Committee of our Party, maintained a different stand from that of the delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the delegations of the majority of the parties participating in the meeting.

The Party of Labor of Albania nurtures the most profound respect for all the communist and workers' parties of the world and expresses its great regret that, for the first time in its revolutionary history, it was obliged to take such a stand as it took at the Bucharest Meeting, which is in opposition to the stand of the majority of the delegations of the communist and workers' parties. Our Party, like any other Marxist party, has the right to express its opinion according to its conscience and to adopt the stand which it deems correct.

At the Bucharest Meeting the delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union distributed to the delegations of other parties a written document which stated that the Communist Party of China has violated the 1957 Moscow Declaration. At that meeting ... we found ourselves faced with a truly interna-

1) A copy of this letter was also sent to the parties of other socialist countries.
tional conference specially organized to criticize the Communist Party of China for "violation" of the Moscow Declaration, on the basis of the material presented by the delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was handed to the delegation of our Party only 10 hours before the meeting.

As we know, Marxism-Leninism teaches us that not only when the mistakes of a Marxist party such as the Communist Party of China, which has millions of members in its ranks and has proved itself over a long period of consistent revolutionary activity, are being examined, but even when the mistakes of a single communist are examined, we must be very careful, very cautious, we must thoroughly analyze all the causes of the mistake this communist has made, we must strive to convince him of his mistakes, take his case to the basic organization or to the appropriate forum of the Party, where the case should be examined with the greatest objectivity on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles, aiming at the attainment of a single end: the improvement of this communist and putting him on the right road. If we make such great efforts in order to analyze the mistakes of one communist and save him from these mistakes, then it is self-evident what great efforts should have been made before "exchanging opinions about the mistakes of a party" at an international communist meeting, such as the Bucharest Meeting. But this, unfortunately, was not done.

The Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania proceeds from the Marxist-Leninist principle that, in order to express its opinion about the ideological and political mistakes of another Marxist party, it must first be convinced with facts about the existence of these mistakes, and this conviction must be established by analyzing, in the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, without passion and on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist method, all the relevant arguments concerning this question, that is, both the arguments presented by the side making the criticism and the arguments presented by the side which is being criticized. After this Marxist-Leninist analysis has been made by the Plenum of the Central Committee of our Party, then and only then shall we be in a position to express our objective opinion about the mistakes of another party. We think that this is the fairest method in examining the ideological mistakes of a sister party. The Central Committee of our Party will use this method to reach its final conclusions about the "mistakes" which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
attributes to the Communist Party of China, and will express its own opinion on this at the coming meeting of the communist and workers' parties in November this year. We think that to act otherwise, to act as was done at the Bucharest Meeting, would mean to condemn a sister party without thorough and dispassionate analysis of all the facts in order to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the said party has made mistakes or not. In these cases haste is harmful.

For these reasons, at the Bucharest Meeting the delegation of our Party declared that these disagreements had arisen between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and that efforts for their solution should have been made through discussions between these two parties and, if no solution were achieved, then the case should have been brought before all the other sister parties to hear their opinions; that the Bucharest Meeting was premature and not in conformity with Leninist norms; that, in regard to the disagreements between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, the Party of Labor of Albania would express its view at the coming meeting of the communist and workers' parties in November.

Of course, the disagreements between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China are of great principled, ideological and political importance, and the solution of these disagreements is of vital importance to the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement. Not only are all the Marxist parties, including the Party of Labor of Albania, interested today in the solution of these disagreements, but, indeed, all the Marxist parties are duty-bound to make their contribution to the solution of these disagreements, inasmuch as these disagreements have now gone beyond the bounds of relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China and have assumed an international character.

After the Bucharest Meeting, some communist and workers' parties of the countries of the socialist camp, including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, have sent the Central Committee of our Party copies of the letters which they have addressed to the Communist Party of China. In these letters the conclusion is reached that the Communist Party of China "has deviated from Marxist-Leninist theory and practice...." Asser-
tions are made which convince us even more strongly that our stand at the Bucharest Meeting was completely correct and Marxist-Leninist. In our view, these assertions prove that the Bucharest Meeting was not confined simply to the "exchange" of opinions about "the mistakes of the Communist Party of China", and that the Communist Party of China has been condemned de facto by the parties which sent us these letters.

In addition, it is stressed in these letters that at the Bucharest Meeting the "complete unity of all the communist and workers' parties" in the criticism they made of the "mistakes" of the Communist Party of China was confirmed. Such an assertion implies that the Party of Labor of Albania, too, has aligned itself with the majority of the other communist and workers' parties in regard to the "mistakes" attributed to the Communist Party of China. If we are speaking of the approval of the communiqué of the Bucharest Meeting, we agree that there was unity of all the parties, for the communiqué was approved by our Party, too. But if we are speaking of "unity of all the parties" concerning the disagreements between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, this does not correspond to the truth, at least as far as our Party is concerned, because the Party of Labor of Albania did not associate itself with the majority of the other parties, and it will express its view about these disagreements at the coming meeting of the communist and workers' parties in November, as it has many times declared. To affirm that there was "complete unity of all the parties" at the Bucharest Meeting in the criticism of the "mistakes" of the Communist Party of China means to distort the facts and the truth.

Today the Central Committee of our Party is more convinced than it was at the Bucharest Meeting that not only has that meeting not eliminated the disagreements between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, but it has made these disagreements even deeper, reaching disquieting proportions.

The solution of the disagreements between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, as we said, is of vital importance to the unity of the camp of socialism and to the unity of the international communist movement. Therefore, we think that every effort must be made to solve these disagreements on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles. It is a fact that the enemies of Marxism-Leninism,
imperialism and revisionism, have already begun to exploit the existence of these disagreements to attack Marxism-Leninism and to discredit and split the camp of socialism and the international communist movement.

The Central Committee of our Party thinks that there is nothing more important to the life of all the communist and workers' parties of the world today, to the preservation and strengthening of the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement, than the solution of these disagreements on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism...

Our Party will always be vigilant against the war-mongering plans and actions of imperialism and against modern revisionism, which, as defined in the Moscow Declaration, is the main danger to the international communist movement.

Fraternal greetings,
For the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania

Enver Hoxha

Published for the first time in abridged form in Volume 19 according to the original in the Central Archives of the Party.

Moscow
August 29, 1960

We recently received your letter of August 13 of this year, dealing with the Bucharest Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties, in which you propose a meeting of representatives of our parties to be held prior to the November Meeting of the communist and workers' parties, with the aim that "the Party of Labor of Albania and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union should go to the coming November meeting with a complete unity of views," and "to put out in time the spark of misunderstanding that has arisen, so that it will not flare up."

As we know, Marxism-Leninism teaches us that when misunderstandings, contradictions, and disagreements arise between two Marxist parties, they should be settled by means of joint discussions between the two parties concerned, on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles. Marxism-Leninism teaches us also that it would be a violation of the elementary Marxist-Leninist norms which govern the relations among the communist and workers' parties if two parties were to hold talks with the objective of criticizing the general line of another Marxist party.

It is known that at the Bucharest Meeting of the communist and workers' parties, the relations between the Party of Labor of Albania and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were not discussed. At that meeting, contrary to what had been decided previously by all the parties of the countries of the socialist camp about the agenda, quite unexpectedly and hastily such a major and vital question was discussed as that of the ideological and political disagreements of principle which have arisen between
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China.

At the Bucharest Meeting our stand was clear; we did not take it as a result of some "misunderstanding" on our part, as alluded to in your letter; rather, we took it with full consciousness, and we accept our full responsibility before our people and the international communist movement for this stand.

Our stand at the Bucharest Meeting is the consistent application of the general, ideological and political line of our Party, a line which, as has been recognized by you, has always been a principled Marxist-Leninist line, in full conformity with the Moscow Declaration.

The contradiction that arose in Bucharest between our stand and yours is a result not of the examination of relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Party of Labor of Albania, but is a result of the "exchange of views" on the mistakes attributed to the Communist Party of China by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Therefore, if a meeting were to be held between representatives of the Party of Labor of Albania and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as proposed in the above-mentioned letter, at this meeting the mistakes attributed to the Communist Party of China by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would be discussed, and this would be done by representatives of our two Parties without the presence of the interested third party, that is, the Communist Party of China. It is clear that such an action would not be correct, would not be helpful to the problem, but would harm it.

Like every other Marxist party, our Party, too, feels it has a duty to make its contribution to the solution of these disagreements. Indifference and neutrality toward such major problems cannot be reconciled with Marxism-Leninism. Therefore, as we have declared many times, in regard to the question of the disagreements between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, our Party will express its viewpoint at the coming meeting of the communist and workers' parties.

We assure you that the Party of Labor of Albania will always remain loyal to Marxism-Leninism . . . and to the interests of its people and its Fatherland.

We are convinced that it was not we who gave rise to the "spark of misunderstanding" at the Bucharest Meeting, and
LETTER TO THE CPSU

assure you that neither will we ever be the ones to fan this spark into a blaze.

We are confident that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and all the other sister parties will take a correct view of our Marxist-Leninist stand.

Fraternal greetings,
For the Central Committee of the
Party of Labor of Albania

Enver Hoxha

Published for the first time

Published according to Volume 19.
Before we speak of Liri Belishova, I shall inform the Plenum of some decisions taken by the Political Bureau.

In recent weeks we have had correspondence with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

We have been informed by the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Rumania and Czechoslovakia about a letter which each of them has addressed to the Communist Party of China. In essence these letters make serious accusations against the Communist Party of China regarding deviation from Marxism-Leninism, dogmatism, sectarianism, and great-state chauvinism, and other charges like these. At the same time, these letters defend N. S. Khrushchev against what is said in a document which was distributed to the representatives of the communist and workers' parties of the socialist camp by the delegation of the Communist Party of China at the end of the Bucharest Meeting.

The material of the Chinese comrades said, among other things, that the Bucharest Meeting was not held in accordance with the proper forms, that N. S. Khrushchev's interjections and actions during the meeting were not Marxist-Leninist, and that these questions which were raised are of great importance to the further development of the international communist movement.

Later we received a letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in which, after stating that the ties between our two parties have been exceptionally close, they say that at the Bucharest Meeting a "spark of misunderstanding" arose between our parties, which must not be allowed to catch fire. Therefore, they proposed to us the holding of a meeting, of whatever level we would like and when we would like, to discuss these misunderstandings together, so that "the Party of Labor of Albania and the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union will go with complete unity of views" to the coming November meeting in Moscow.

We have sent three letters to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. . . . (1)

For the best preparation of the Plenum in regard to the questions we shall discuss, I recommend that the Chinese articles "Long Live Leninism!", the material distributed by the Soviet representatives at the Bucharest Meeting, the 1957 Moscow Declaration, the copies of the letters we have recently addressed to the CC of the CPSU, of which I spoke above, as well as the materials that have been recommended and not read as yet, should be put at the disposal of the members and candidate members of the Central Committee. All these should be studied carefully so that when we discuss them at the Plenum, the comrades will be prepared. If we receive other materials from the Communist Party of China about its views, these, too, will be made available for study.

Let us now get down concretely to the question of Liri Belishova.

You know that at the July Plenum, apart from other things, Liri Belishova was criticized for the major serious mistakes she made during her stay in China and the Soviet Union. But at that meeting of the Plenum these mistakes were only touched upon in passing, in the course of the discussion. However, after these questions, which several comrades mentioned, were raised, Liri Belishova did not appear before the Plenum with a self-criticism, although she knew that the Political Bureau had arrived at the conclusion that her self-criticism before the Bureau was incomplete, that there were many gaps in it. Precisely for these reasons I said at the Plenum that, after being re-examined once more in the Political Bureau, her case should be presented to the Plenum. In fact we did examine the question of Liri Belishova. (2)

We gave her the possibility to reflect deeply, to ponder over the grave mistakes she has made in such complicated and difficult situations, to come out with correct conclusions and reveal the causes which impelled her to make these mistakes.

1) These letters are published in this volume on pages: 70, 80, 85, respectively.

2) On September 3 the Political Bureau distributed a document to all members of the Plenum dealing with Liri Belishova's mistakes and with the stand she had adopted in the Political Bureau.
At the meeting of the Political Bureau she showed some signs of irritation in connection with the comrades' questions, which served to uncover and make clearer Liri Belishova's wavering on the political and ideological line of our Party. Later, I too summoned her separately, to help her reflect on these questions. Indeed I reminded her of the non-Marxist methods the Soviet leaders had used to disrupt the leaderships of a number of communist and workers' parties; therefore I advised her to think over these questions.

I want to say that the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, which is always guided by the principle that things must be explained to comrades to save them from the wrong road and mistakes, had tried to help Liri Belishova patiently and calmly. Her mistakes are not small and trivial, but are profound mistakes, in which, if she does not understand them, there is the danger that they will become even more grave and harmful, both to the Party and to her position in the Party.

On the other hand, by criticizing a person who makes mistakes, the Party helps him to arm himself, to make efforts to understand the reasons for his mistakes, so that he no longer falls into such mistakes. This has been the road of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and myself, in order to correct those who make mistakes.

The Political Bureau thinks that Liri Belishova's mistakes are very great and serious. They show that in fact she is in opposition to the line of our Party, she is not in agreement, not in unity of thought and action on a number of ideological and political questions with the Central Committee of the Party, with our entire Party. She does not understand the vital importance to our Party, as to any Marxist party, of the question of the ideological and political unity in the Party and, all the more so, the question of the unity of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau itself. This question is of vital importance particularly in the existing situation, when the imperialist enemies and the modern revisionists are striving to split the leadership of our Party at all costs, even if they can cause some small cracks, to weaken it and then attack the Party. Therefore, those who damage this steel-like unity, which the Party has forged with struggle and bloodshed through all sorts of storms, must be severely punished, as they deserve, as the great interests of the Party and the people require.

What are the mistakes of Liri Belishova?
As you know, Liri went to China. This trip had an official character, and the delegation of which she was a member did not include all sorts of people, but Party people. Thus, the delegation did not comprise apolitical people, but known personalities of our Party and State.

Before leaving for China, she knew of the disagreements that existed between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, not to the full extent to which they developed later, but she knew many things. When it was recommended to her, as far as possible, to avoid expressing opinions on these still unresolved problems, this means that she had knowledge of the nature of the disagreements between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. However, Liri Belishova went to China and did not act as recommended.

During her stay in China, Liri Belishova showed a surprising fear and avoided any discussion with the Chinese comrades, when it was a question of expressing the opinion of our Party about modern revisionism, about our friendship with the CP and the Government of China, and about the correct meaning of the ties with the Soviet Union. Indeed, in various ways she asked them, as far as possible, to refrain from discussing party questions because, allegedly, "she was not authorized," (3) etc.

Why she did this, we shall see later, but the fact is that the Chinese comrades wanted to discuss party questions with us. We

3) This was a false justification of Liri Belishova's. Not only did she have the necessary instructions from the Political Bureau of the CC of the PLA concerning the stand she should adopt in the PRC, but also through a special radiogram of June 4, 1960, Comrade Enver Hoxha drew her attention and instructed her: "We are reading your greetings in newspapers, and they astonish us. They are extremely dry and contain mistakes. "First of all you must speak longer and exceptionally warmly of China; sternly expose the imperialists and the Yugoslav revisionists.... It is entirely impermissible to speak of a certain modern revisionism. The successes of our country and the correct policy of the Party in every field must be pointed out well and at length everywhere. The speeches must be politically and ideologically elevated and not with banal phrases... Tear up the hackneyed greetings and speeches you have prepared, and formulate entirely new ones."

While the other radiogram of June 6 said: "Talks with the Chinese comrades on the ideological questions under discussion may be held only by you." (Taken from the copies of the originals of the radiograms which are in the Central Archives of the Party).
cannot prevent them from talking, but we have our own stand, and this stand must be expressed on every occasion. It is not so simple to seek to avoid talking about party questions. Although Liri Belishova strove at all costs to avoid dealing with party problems in the talks with the Chinese comrades, they considered it reasonable to talk to us about so great and delicate a question. Of course, they did this because they had great trust in, and deep respect for, our Party. Apparently, this is not how Liri Belishova evaluated this question. Instead of maintaining the stand that should have been maintained in these talks with the Chinese comrades, without any instructions to do such a thing, she opposed their views on some questions and gave them to understand that we were leaning toward the Soviet leaders. Not only had our Party not expressed itself in favor of such a stand, but all the comrades of the Political Bureau were in disagreement with many stands of the Soviet leaders about political and ideological problems that were apparent both in their practical activity and in their press. Therefore, our Party had never pronounced itself against China. With her attitude, Liri Belishova implied to the Chinese comrades that our Party did not agree with their views.

The other mistake of Liri Belishova's was that she went and made contact with the counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Peking, and told him about the things the Chinese comrades had said to her. From this her aim emerges very clearly. The Soviet leaders, from Khrushchev down to Polyansky, understood how Liri was thinking, that they were her personal opinions, that she was against the Chinese views and for the Soviet position on these questions.

Liri Belishova was considered by them the "heroine" of the situation. The Soviet leaders utilized her actions to create a difficult situation in our Party, in our leadership and among our cadres. After the Bucharest Meeting they got hold of all the comrades who were in the USSR to expound their views (4) and to

4) On June 6, 1960, Comrade Enver Hoxha, in a "very urgent" radiogram sent to Liri Belishova, instructed her: "Concerning the Chinese articles on Leninism, you should find the opportunity to say to them that the CC of the PLA finds them very good, and there is no reason why you should not declare yourself in support of them. Continue to put forward the Une of our Party everywhere and in all aspects." (Taken from the original copy in the Central Archives of the Party).
get their opinion, in one way or another, to see if they were with the Central Committee of the PLA. One of these views was that in China Liri Belishova took a "heroic" stand, that "she gave the Chinese comrades the proper reply and did not allow them to issue a communiqué on the talks they held with her." This is what the Soviet leaders are saying.

Not only was Liri Belishova predisposed to adopt such a stand, but she made another organizational mistake; she violated the discipline of the Party. She did nothing at all to seek the opinion of the Political Bureau. She did not understand that this was a harmful action to fan the flames in this situation of disagreements which existed between these two parties. She knew that disagreements existed between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, and not between the Communist Party of China and the whole of international communism, as this matter was put forward at the Bucharest Meeting.

We have had sincere relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on everything. But in the way the events developed, and when it is a matter of a third party being accused, we should not pour oil on the fire. Before she left for China, I talked with Liri Belishova about what Mikoyan had told us concerning the Communist Party of China. I also instructed her not to talk about this question with anyone, as long as we had still not informed even the CC of the Party of these disagreements. Liri Belishova should have understood that since we had not informed our Party, it was not up to us to inform the Communist Party of China of what Mikoyan had said about them. Not only was Liri Belishova instructed, but even if she had no instruction at all, as a member of the Political Bureau she should have realized that the questions raised with her by the Chinese comrades could not be discussed with a third party without obtaining the approval of the Central Committee.

Why did Liri Belishova not seek the opinion of the leadership of the Party? Because she did not have a correct concept of the leadership, of the Political Bureau. She has been conceited and has overrated her own abilities and intelligence, otherwise, like any other member of the Central Committee, when difficulties are encountered about an important problem, she should consult the leadership of the Party and not act without receiving its advice. Liri Belishova did not do this because she liked the
position she held.

At the Political Bureau she tried hard to justify her mistakes in Peking. She clung to such arguments as that she was alone and had nobody to consult. But the fact is that she continued to make mistakes in Moscow, too — indeed up to the meeting of the Political Bureau after she returned. She does not want to understand her grave mistakes, and she does not admit them.

When Liri Belishova was in Peking I sent her a radiogram. What was its content? When the holding of the Bucharest Meeting in June was preposed to us, we had received a radiogram from our embassy in Peking, by which we were briefly informed of what had happened at the meeting of the Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions, about the major differences of principle between the delegations of the Soviet Union and China. We knew that Liri Belishova would have meetings with the Chinese comrades, so we sent a radiogram concerning the meeting of the communist and workers' parties which was expected to be held in June. We told her that Chinese comrades had proposed the postponement of the June meeting, and if the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the other parties agreed with their proposal, we had no objection. If it was to be held in June, we said in the radiogram, the Chinese comrades should be informed, if they would allow us to express our modest opinion, that the participation of the great Communist Party of China in this meeting was essential.

During this time we received another letter from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, informing us of the postponement of the meeting which was to have been held in June. Then we sent another radiogram to Liri Belishova in which we said that it was not necessary to transmit to the Chinese comrades the content of the first radiogram, because our fear that the Chinese comrades would not come to the meeting they wanted postponed, had disappeared. Liri Belishova read and interpreted the radiogram in the way she wanted and according to the plan she was turning over in her mind.

Likewise, we instructed her to find the opportunity to inform the Chinese comrades that we had read and liked the articles published by them on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth.

Liri Belishova did not carry out this instruction from the Political Bureau, because she had her own views. But irrespective of the fact that these articles were not to her liking, she should
have transmitted the view of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of our Party to the Chinese comrades. When she returned, she could have expressed her personal view to the Political Bureau. This shows that Liri Belishova had gone to China with definite opinions that were at variance with those of the comrades of the Political Bureau, who at that time held frequent discussions on the political and ideological stands of the CPSU and the CP of China.

When she reached Moscow, Liri Belishova was more completely armed. You know that we sent her two simple but very clear letters, fully sufficient weapons for her to avoid making mistakes. (5) Taking into account her attitude in China, and especially the shortcomings in her character, such as conceit and ambition, plus the flattery of her by the Soviet leadership who had called her a "heroine," we feared for what she might do and we took this measure so that she could not fall into errors again. Thus, we sent these two letters in order to save her. However, she did not carry out the instructions sent to her.

In the first letter, which she received as soon as she arrived in Ulan-Bator, the Political Bureau pointed out to her that she had made grave mistakes in China, and for this reason she should take care not to let the flattery and high-sounding praise that she might receive from the Soviet leaders go to her head. In the second letter, which she received as soon as she landed in Moscow, she was informed of the holding of the Bucharest Meeting, the stand adopted there by our Party, and it was stressed to her that this stand did not please the Soviet leaders, therefore she should be careful to defend the line of the Party, to stress that she fully agreed with the stand of the Central Committee of the Party, as expressed in Bucharest by Comrade Hysni. This stand would have been correct and would have barred the way to all efforts by anyone who might try to split our leadership.

Thus, Liri Belishova had been forewarned so as to avoid any mistakes, had she agreed with the line of the Central Committee.

5) When she returned to Albania, Liri Belishova was asked by the Political Bureau and the basic organization of which she was a member to hand these letters in. She said that she had allegedly destroyed them. In fact she handed them over to the Soviet leaders during the meetings she had with them. (See the letters in this volume, p. 13 and p. 22).
But the fact is that this is not what happened.

We know the tactics pursued by the Soviet leaders. They invited Liri Belishova to lunch, but there she did not maintain the stand on which she had been instructed by the Political Bureau. She used there the tactics of jokes. "We must make jokes," she thought, "to get out of this situation," but in fact jokes did not help her, and a situation was created that was favorable to the Soviet leaders, unfavorable and in opposition to the stand of the Central Committee of our Party, and compatible, in the final analysis, with the views of Liri Belishova.

During the lunch the Soviet leaders began with praises and toasts to Liri Belishova, and with attacks on our Party, but Liri Belishova dodged the touchy issues, the blows and venom against our Party, directed particularly by Kozlov. Kozlov expressed his dissatisfaction over the stand of Comrade Hysni [Kapo] in Bucharest, and she did not knock him back immediately. She pretends not to be clear about this question, but she allegedly told Kozlov that "Enver Hoxha has no skeleton in the closet like Gomulka" who they said had adopted a pravilno, yasno (correct, clear (Russian)) stand. She should have intervened immediately to say that at Bucharest our Party adopted a correct and clear stand, and that she agreed with that stand.

Then Kozlov said, "We want friendship, but without zigzags." But who is developing friendship with zigzags? Liri Belishova did not give the proper reply to this, either. In the letter we said to her that Khrushchev did not like the stand of our Party at the Bucharest Meeting; therefore she should have understood that when there was talk of zigzags it was our Party that was being attacked, and she should have replied that our Party does not make zigzags.

Thus, such a stand of Liri Belishova's is deliberate.

During the lunch other insinuations were made, such as: "Whom are you Albanians with — with the 200 or the 600 million?" But this, too, went without a proper reply from Liri Belishova. At the meeting I had with Ivanov, I told him that what Kozlov said was anti-Marxist. And what did he mean by "with the 200 or the 600 million?" Our Party was on a Marxist road, therefore it was with all the countries of our socialist camp. However, at the Plenum Liri Belishova told us that she did not hear this question properly, or did not understand it. But it is impossible that this escaped her ears, for he said it at lunch, sitting near her, and we do not agree with such a justification.
They might even have said these things in a confusing, indirect way, but at the end of the lunch she should have risen and said: "Comrades, there are no zigzags in our line. We are for the unity of all the countries of our camp; therefore let us drink this toast to the triumph of Marxism-Leninism!" But in fact this was not the way she acted; the lunch and these venom-filled remarks of the Soviet leaders were passed off with a laugh.

But why with a laugh? Because Liri Belishova did not agree with the line of our Party on these questions, she had a different view and she thought that her view was correct and, in the final account, in her opinion, the views of the leadership of our Party were not correct, and that in this situation we were making mistakes.

Thus, even when she came back, Liri Belishova showed some signs and took some actions which confirm this. She began especially to say to the comrades: "Comrade Enver should be sidetracked, we should not draw him into this situation so that he will not compromise himself over these questions." In plain language, according to her view, this means, "Nobody knows how the conflict between the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will end. Therefore, we should leave Comrade Enver out of it, not let him meddle in it, and when this problem is over, then we shall see who is right, you or I. That's the time for Comrade Enver to come out and give the stick to the others who were wrong, and in this way we are in order."

That is, even after her return to Tirana, in spite of the advice given her at the meeting of the Political Bureau, Liri Belishova continued to maintain the same stand and to concoct intrigues to disrupt the leadership of the Party.

Linked with this is also Liri Belishova's other thesis: "We must prepare several variants for the Moscow Meeting" and, after we see which way the "wind" is blowing, make use of the one that seems to us the most advantageous. This is a very wrong, opportunist view, entirely unacceptable to our Party of Labor. We must go to the Moscow meeting, not with "several variants" but with a clear-cut stand, not with ten banners but with one, the banner of Marxism-Leninism.

Another view of Liri Belishova's was that the comrades of the Plenum or the alternate members of the Political Bureau should not be given the documents exchanged between the Political Bureau and Comrade Hysni Kapo in Bucharest, who was in-
structed through them about the stand he should adopt there. What does this mean? This is connected with the fact that "these documents bear Enver's signature, therefore we should not expose him." Why should we not inform the Central Committee about the practice followed by the Political Bureau, and let the Plenum judge its work? What is wrong with this?

But in reality there are, and there should have been, second thoughts in Liri Belishova's head. The explanations she has given have not convinced the Political Bureau that she has thoroughly and profoundly understood her mistakes. She should bring out the reasons why she acted as she did and who impelled her, from what bases these thoughts arose in her — that is, she should make a profound analysis of her mistakes. That is why we analyzed this question again in the Political Bureau.

The aim of this discussion in the Political Bureau was to help Liri Belishova. The contributions to the discussion were heated, severe, for they concerned the defense of the interests of the Party, its line, its life. We must stand firm in behalf of the interests of the Party. To tell the truth, Liri Belishova was given plenty of help by the comrades, and she should have made a frank self-criticism, with the gloves off. But her self-criticism in the Political Bureau was not satisfactory. She said nothing; indeed, through her contributions she indirectly expressed dissatisfaction and doubts about the stand adopted in her regard.

Liri Belishova presented her mistakes in a very simple way. She did not make a Marxist-Leninist analysis of these mistakes, of their sources — something which was expected from her. She did not proceed from the principle of telling the Party the real causes that impelled her to make mistakes, but she clung to such arguments as "she was alone and had nobody to consult." This tactic of Liri Belishova's is not healthy. She should have told the Political Bureau frankly why these mistakes were made and where they had their source.

The comrades of the Political Bureau analyzed Liri Belishova's mistakes and arrived at the conclusion that such mistakes would not have been made so easily, had she not had some distorted views about the others and an overestimation of herself.

Liri Belishova should have understood clearly that revisionism does not exist only in Yugoslavia, but that revisionist views also exist in parties of other countries, which are deviating from the correct Marxist-Leninist road.

Many times we have discussed with Liri Belishova that many
actions of the Soviet leaders are not on the right road, but are on an opportunist road, which is to the advantage of the revisionists, particularly of the Yugoslav revisionists.

And this has not been a matter only of tactical stands on their part. We observe that the Soviet leaders have allowed the struggle against the Yugoslav revisionists to die down. From time to time they write theoretical articles against the Yugoslav revisionists, but even those have many gaps in them; while as to the concrete struggle against them, this they have cut right out. Indeed there are parties, such as the Communist Party of Bulgaria, which have even taken decisions not to say anything against the Yugoslav revisionists.

We cannot say that these matters were a bolt from the blue to Liri Belishova, and therefore she has no right to say: "How could I imagine that in the line of the Soviet leaders there are such revisionist views?" We talk about such problems every day, but Liri Belishova's eyes have been blinded by the flattery and great praise of the Soviet leaders, and she has reconciled herself with them. She has forgotten that on such an important question as that of the disagreements between the CPSU and the CP of China no Marxist party whatever can be hindered from expressing its viewpoint, just as it cannot be hindered from expressing it also on the actions of Khrushchev or Kozlov, which we think are not correct at all.

When we speak of love for the USSR, we must not include here those who make mistakes, whoever they may be — Soviets, Czechs, Bulgarians or Albanians. Every Marxist and leader must clearly understand that we do not love the USSR for the beautiful eyes of Ivanov. He [Ivanov] does not love the Soviet Union, or our friendship with the Soviet Union, as long as he acts in a hostile way against a people and a party who nurture a sincere love for the Soviet people, which he has seen with his own eyes during his three-year stay in our country. And why should we keep Ivanov happy to avoid ruining our friendship? The same goes for Kozlov, Khrushchev, and others.

We have our own views, which we have expressed and will express. But Liri Belishova was not reconciled to this stand, for she has wavered in the party line. She has been led to these positions by her conceit, she has become very swell-headed, she overrates her own capacities and underrates others. For this she has been criticized several times.

In spite of the advice given her, she adopts a very arrogant
attitude toward the cadres, she has offended them and continues
to do so, she has attacked them so severely that even in the
apparatus of the Central Committee there are comrades who have
asked to leave for this reason. Despite the criticism made of her,
she demonstrated her arrogance toward the cadres even at the
last meeting of the Central Committee of the A L Y U [Albanian
Labor Youth Union]. She acted in the same way also at the
Teachers' Conference. To act in this way after all the criticism
made of you, means that you fail to reflect on your mistakes.

These manifestations show that when you have such scorn
for the cadres subordinate to you, you will also have a similar
concept of those with whom you are on a par. As a matter of
fact, even with regard to comrades of the Political Bureau, Liri
Belishova often has not taken a correct and healthy stand. To
underrate the comrades of the leadership, and to display this on
many occasions even in public, is impermissible. The criticism
made of the cadres before the masses is one thing; we have done
this and shall continue to do it. But despising and discrediting the
cadres is another thing.

There are many facts of this nature about Liri Belishova. Therefor,e when you have such a concept of the cadres, in
complicated situations you make mistakes, as she did, even
making mistakes in regard to the line. When you have such views
about the cadres up to the leadership, of course you will not have
sound views about the decisions this leadership adopts either,
decisions that are a many-sided concretization of the political
line of the Party.

Therefore, if you go on with such rubbish in your head, if
you live with this overestimation of yourself, you are sure to
make mistakes in the political line, too.

Thus, Liri Belishova has been wrong on these questions, and
still has not understood her grave mistakes. The Political Bureau
came to the conclusion that Liri Belishova should reflect further
on her mistakes. We remained dissatisfied with her self-criticism;
she promised us that she would think it over, and she must have
done so. Now it depends on the self-criticism she will make
before the Plenum, and on how much she has benefited from the
help of the Political Bureau.

Her case now depends on the evaluation she will make of
these problems before the Plenum of the Central Committee. We
advise her to look straight and deeply into her mistakes from a
sound Marxist-Leninist basis, for there is no comrade who holds
any ill-will, not only toward Liri Belishova but toward anyone at all who has made mistakes. We only wish her well; that is why we are trying to correct her. But with these views she cannot be in the Political Bureau, for it is a very serious thing to be in disagreement with the line of the Central Committee. The Political Bureau has decided to propose to the Plenum that Liri Belishova be discharged from her function as a member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Central Committee for Propaganda (6), because these high bodies of the Party must not include comrades who run counter to the views and ideological and political line of the Central Committee. In the Political Bureau and Central Committee there must be complete unity of thought and action, and in the first place on the main questions, such as the current question, which is of exceptional importance to the building of socialism in our country and to international communism.

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6) Despite the great efforts of the Political Bureau and the Plenum of the CC to put Liri Belishova back on the correct Marxist-Leninist line, because she was completely compromised by the Khrushchevite revisionists, she lacked the courage to tell the Party everything, and sticking to the instructions of her bosses in Moscow, she continued stubbornly to maintain an anti-Marxist, anti-Party, hostile stand. Therefore the Plenum unanimously expelled her from its ranks. Later, seeing that she was continuing to maintain an anti-Marxist, hostile stand toward the general line of the PLA and Marxism-Leninism, the Party branch in which she took part expelled her from the Party, too.
THE DEFENSE OF THE MARXIST-LENINIST LINE
IS VITAL FOR OUR PARTY AND PEOPLE
AND FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

(Contribution to the Discussion
at the 18th Plenum of the CC of the PLA)

September 7, 1960

[. . .] The question of defending the line of the Party, in all its aspects, is vital to the people of our country and to international communism.

Let us speak here as Marxists, not as the leaders of a small state. As Marxists we have the right to have our say, to defend communism, just as much as the Soviets and any other Marxist-Leninist party, big or small. It is not a matter of conceit on our part when we say that we are defending and assisting the cause of international communism by our consistent, correct stand. Marxists have a proper understanding of this. Those who are not Marxists and conceal their anti-Marxist, bourgeois views might sneer: "Who are you to make such claims that you are defending international communism? You carry no weight with us." But it does not worry us what others may say, just as it doesn't worry us that they call us "dogmatic," "sectarian," and other such epithets that do not fit our Party.

The line of our Party has been correct and Marxist-Leninist. It has been tested in practice for nearly 20 years, in the daily struggle for the liberation of the Fatherland, for the construction of socialism, for the defense of Marxism-Leninism from enemies of every hue and from the Yugoslav revisionists. The great successes our people have achieved, the great changes Albania has undergone in the economic, political, cultural and other fields have proved this. The Albanian people speak with admiration of all these achievements.

With our people, the main thing to be seen is their conviction, their correct understanding that it is Marxism-Leninism, the correct Marxist-Leninist line of our Party, that has brought them these major economic, cultural and social transformations. This is of very great importance, and this is proved by the very close ties of our Party with the people.
Thus, the life and work of our Party show that its line is correct, it has found the approval and support of our people, and it is neither dogmatic nor sectarian. We reject this epithet they apply to us — today under their breath or tomorrow at the top of their voices — and we will continue on our Marxist-Leninist road. Those who attempt to do such things are doomed to failure. Life and the struggle will expose them.

It is not only our Party members and our people who speak with admiration about the correct line of our Party, about the great achievements of our country, but also the communist and workers' parties of many countries of the world. They speak in this way because of the fact that the Party of Labor of Albania liberated the country and set it on the road of progress, on the road of socialism. They see the great vitality and the heroism of the Albanian people and our Party, who are weathering all these storms with great determination.

Therefore nobody, not even Liri Belishova, should think that this admiration by communists all over the world for our small but heroic Party is due to Khrushchev. By no means. If it were up to Khrushchev and the present Soviet leadership, Albania would not be what it is today, and the esteem and admiration the other parties have for our Party and country would not exist.

Here we are in the Central Committee, therefore it is correct that the discussion should be frank and Marxist. Liri Belishova may be surprised by the open allusions we have made on some occasions in the meetings of the Political Bureau. We have said, for example, that there are party leaders who value the leadership of another party by the quantity of potatoes or tomatoes produced, and not on the basis of the political line it pursues. Liri Belishova has interjected, "How can you speak about these comrades like this?" We have told her that we are speaking about them on the basis of facts, here in the Central Committee and not in the marketplace, and we speak frankly. However, the time will come when these thoughts and opinions, along with other facts drawn from life, will certainly be voiced at international conferences as well.

Many other parties have supported the Party of Labor of Albania in its resolute stand toward modern revisionism, especially against Yugoslav revisionism. This shows that there are really great and sound forces in these parties, although the worm of revisionism has penetrated into the leadership of some of them and is gnawing away at them from within. Nevertheless, it is very
difficult to subdue the Marxist-Leninist forces that exist in all the parties. They have understood our stand regardless of the fact that we have not come out openly against the mistakes of the Soviet leaders.

Liri Belishova should not think that this is a tactic to protect Khrushchev — not by any means. We have always fought against revisionism, and will continue to do so. International communism has seen that we are against Khrushchev, and the true Marxist-Leninists have appreciated the correct stand and tactics of our Party. Our stand has been correct, and because of this nobody has dared to attack us openly; nevertheless, attempts have been made, and they are mounting to the level of threats, pressure and blackmail, but we have put them in their place.

Then they resorted to the tactic of discrediting the Party of Labor of Albania. In what way? They tell us, "You are shouting and screaming so much against revisionism, that this is making them feel unduly important. This has been whispered around all the leaderships of the countries of the people's democracies and has even reached the leaderships of some communist parties of Western Europe. But what they say has no foundation. In fact, this is a call to phase out the struggle against Yugoslav revisionism.

Now these tactics are continuing. It has been changed in form and will be turned into open attacks against our Party because we did not fall into line as the Soviet leadership desired, that is to say, we followed another road. But none of these tactics succeeded in intimidating our Party, and there is no force that can do so, even if they do call us "dogmatic," "sectarian," or "narrow-minded nationalists," and try to lead us into a blind alley. The strength of our Party and its Central Committee proves this. It is clear that the attempts to set us on that road are in vain.

This is not a matter of respect. We do respect and love the peoples of the Soviet Union, but not Pospyelov. (1) As long as he remained on the Marxist-Leninist road, we had respect for him, but now that he maintains such an anti-Marxist attitude toward our Party, we say to him, "Please stop!" When he can find not the slightest violation of Marxism on our part, why should he tell

1) Pyotr N. Pospyelov, Deputy Member of the Presidium of the CC of the CPSU.
us to "Read Lenin!" That is what he said to our ambassador in Moscow, Comrade Nesti Nase, who has stood up to the attacks by Pospyelov very well.

We want the disagreements between parties to be settled in a correct way. But they have not made, and do not want to make, any effort to settle these disagreements. But that is not all: Pospyelov should know that Marxism-Leninism teaches us that talks should not be held behind the back of another party, that a comrade's mistakes should be spoken about openly, according to Marxist-Leninist rules. What respect should we have for those who act differently? If you defend Marxism-Leninism, you should be consistent to the end. And we say to Pospyelov: "You have read Lenin all your life, but facts are showing that now you are distorting him."

The question of the correctness of the line of the Party throughout its existence is clear. Has our Party been wrong over the Yugoslav questions? Facts have shown that it has not been wrong. Others have made mistakes, and first of all Khrushchev. He is not sufficiently a Marxist to have the courage to say, "I have been wrong." Since he has made mistakes, he should turn around and make a self-criticism and say, "I have accused Stalin of having been wrong about the Yugoslavs." Life has proved that Stalin was right. Then, if your are a Marxist, come out and say that Stalin was not wrong about these questions.

What does it mean when we are told that we should keep quiet and not expose the Yugoslav revisionists, since that would allegedly give them undue importance? This means we should be quiet, because if you speak out against the Yugoslav revisionists, the worthlessness of others will be brought to light, too, since not only the Yugoslavs are revisionists. If you sharpen the struggle against the Yugoslav revisionists, this will open your eyes to other revisionist elements, too, in whatever form they may present themselves.

The Czech leaders say: "Your Party takes a stand against the revisionists, but why does it not also take a stand against the Communist Party of China, which doesn't respect the principles of coexistence?" But why should we condemn the Communist Party of China? What is the line of our Party on this question? We are for peaceful coexistence, but when Lenin spoke about coexistence, he did not advise us to kiss and embrace the representatives of the monopoly bourgeoisie.

If you see a film they have produced of late, it will certainly
revolt you. This film which, it seems, is called SOS shows how a Soviet seaman and a collective farmer go and live together, I gather, with a British multimillionaire. His daughter gives the collective farmer the best room, and falls in love with the Soviet seaman, while the British lord drives his drunken son-in-law out of his house, and so on and so forth.

We are for peaceful coexistence; not for coexistence such as that represented in the film, but for Leninist coexistence, so that we can expose imperialism and revisionism, expose any manoeuver and attempt of theirs to destroy us. Their aim is to destroy communism, our aim is to destroy imperialism and its agency, revisionism. We want to coexist, for example, with Greece, and why not? But we do not want to give Greece Gjirokastra and Korça, (2) which the chauvinists covet — in no way! We can by no means make concessions to the Greek chauvinists under the guise of peaceful coexistence. Tomorrow, Khrushchev may even award the Peace Medal to such people who harbor annexationist aims toward us, but we shall take up these questions at the coming meeting.

We are not for opening our doors to American spies, to decadent art and the American way of life. No, we are not for this road. With our ideology, we should fight all the manoeuvres and condemn the plans and the line of reconciliation with bourgeois ideology. Imperialism aims at destroying our countries not only by means of violence, but also by means of its ideology, its theater, its music, its ballet, its press and television, etc. We do not understand coexistence as the propagation of the American way of life. We do not approve of Czech or Soviet officials giving receptions and dances a la Americana in their embassies. The comrades representing our country abroad have been scandalized by such manifestations. We are not for such a road.

We have told Mikoyan, too, that they should revise their view of the border question between China and India. We say to them that if the Greeks cross our borders at Gramos, (3) we shall certainly not sit back with arms folded. And the Chinese took the same stand with the Indians.

But now the Soviets are accusing China of warmongering and of not consulting anybody about their activity. But whom did

2) Regions in Southern Albania.
3) A mountain on the Albanian border with Greece.
the Soviets consult on the Cuban question, when they stated that if the United States attacked Cuba, the Soviet Union would retaliate against the United States with missiles? In the first place, if there is war over Cuba, all of us will be involved in it. Second, if the Soviet leaders respect the other countries of our camp, at least they must consult us about such important steps. Certainly, Cuba is the country of a people who have fought. But if the Soviet leaders consider their stand in defending Cuba as correct, then why should they accuse China over the question of Taiwan, a large island of 10-12 million inhabitants and of great strategic importance? On this island, which is an integral part of China, the U.S. 7th Fleet has established a lair. Why should China be patient and not demand the return of its territory? However, China has not lost patience but, on our part, efforts and pressure should be exerted on imperialism because we are a great force.

We and the Chinese both say that our camp is strong, but it is another matter if, because of an opportunist line in understanding peaceful coexistence, questions of such major importance are neglected, and not only national ones but those connected with the strengthening of our entire camp. It is altogether wrong to fail to show the proper concern over the interests of great China. They may say that they have raised their voice for this purpose in the United Nations Organization, but how many other situations are there in which we can speak of defending the interests of China?

It is said in all quarters that our camp is monolithic and united, etc. But we know very well that the existence of such grave differences in our camp is not a good thing at all. And if attempts are not made in a Marxist-Leninist way to eliminate these differences, then the Soviet leaders will embark on a very dangerous revisionist course.

Who must bear the blame for this? We have demanded that the Marxist-Leninist norms must be respected in the relations between parties. The Soviet leaders accuse us of allegedly putting great stress on form and dealing with matters in a stereotyped way. But the questions we have raised are not matters of form. Khrushchev went four times to Brioni (Yugoslavia) to talk with the Yugoslavs about the Hungarian question. Why didn't he talk it over, at least once, with us, and why was there no meeting of the parties, members of the Information Bureau, held at that time, in which the voice of our Party could also have been heard and we could have reported about the manoeuvres of the
Yugoslav revisionists, so that the other parties could have profited from this experience? Is this just a matter of form?! Why was the very important question of Poland solved in a bilateral way?

Our Party has taken a correct stand on all these situations; otherwise they would have attacked it directly. However, the attack came following the Bucharest Meeting. Up to that time the Soviet leaders had nothing bad to say about the line of our Party, except in connection with the stern attitude which we maintained toward the Yugoslav revisionists, that we were allegedly "hot-blooded", etc. But now our Party has become, according to them, "sectarian", and "narrowly nationalist." But we are neither sectarian, nor nationalist, nor dogmatic, but Marxists. The correct line of our Party has been tested by life, by our struggle; hence it enjoys the sympathy of all the communists throughout the world, and this encourages us to march forward.

These questions have been and remain clear. We shall make them more concrete, and will stress that nobody has any reason to accuse China, and that we are against the accusations that have been made against her. The opportunist and revisionist mistakes of the Soviet leaders and others will also emerge [. . .] .

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WE MUST GUARD AGAINST PROVOCATIONS AND DEFEND THE PARTY

(Discussion at the 18th Plenum of the CC of the PLA on the Hostile, Anti-Party Stand of Koço Tashko)

September 8, 1960

Quite correctly, the Plenum expressed itself unanimously in favor of the expulsion of Koço Tashko from the Party (1). Now there is no longer any doubt that we are dealing not only with an anti-Party element, but also with a provocateur, with a tool in the hands of others to disrupt the unity of our Party.

Koço Tashko has not acted on his own. The facts prove this. After the talk he had with me, I advised him to reflect and present his views in writing so that the Political Bureau and the Central Committee would be acquainted with these views and be able to pass judgment on them. For this purpose we gave him two to three days to think and write. But he refused, saying, "I shall not write, I said what I had to say."

At the Political Bureau he said nothing new, whereas at the Plenum, although he had refused to write, he came out with a written contribution to the discussion. Apparently his "friends" had not left him in the lurch. You saw that his contribution had been prepared by others (2). This shows clearly that, having

1) After examining the question of Koço Tashko, the Political Bureau of the CC of the PLA placed it before the Plenum of the CC and the Central Auditing Commission for discussion and proposed that he should be dismissed from the post of chairman of the Central Auditing Commission and be expelled from the ranks of this Commission for his anti-Party activity, his violation of the discipline, security, and organizational norms of the Party, for his distortion of the line of the Party, and because of the fact that he had long been and continued to be in opposition to the Party. The proposal was approved unanimously. The Plenum also expelled him from the Party.

2) In the course of his contribution, at the end of one sentence, Koço Tashko also read the punctuation mark "full stop." There was a burst of laughter from those in the room, and immediately he added "tochka," which means "full stop" in Russian. This ridiculous action of Koço Tashko
nothing to fasten on to against our Party in relation to its line and its correct stands, its close ties with Leninism and the Soviet people, they (the Soviet leaders) found a provocateur and set him in action. But we must guard against their provocations, we should be extremely careful about them.

The Soviet leaders want to accuse us of being anti-Soviet and are working to this end; therefore all Koço Tashko's theses are, first of all, their theses. See what depths they descend to in trying to achieve these Trotskyite aims through provocateurs! Therefore, we must wage a struggle with extraordinarily tightly closed ranks against provocateurs and we must strengthen our unity.

We know who Koço Tashko is (3), so there is no need to speak about him.

But Koço Tashko has received "assurances"; and this is obvious from his attitude. When I called him to a meeting, he was frightened to death, thinking that he might be arrested. He was shaken by the meeting of the Political Bureau, while here he behaves arrogantly, full of abuse and provocation. They have told him: "Go to the Central Committee and throw in these 'lofty' ideas there, because there might be people who, even if they are not with us now, ought to know our true line and who will think about the future." They want to feel the pulse of this or that one in order to split us. They will even try to leave us without bread. See what vile things these people are doing!

Comrades, our just cause will triumph, but there are difficulties and there will be difficulties in the future — these are inevitable. We shall try to salvage people, but people like Koço Tashko, although we should make efforts to save even them, should be thrown out of the Party immediately.

There is no doubt also that Ivanov and company are not doing these things on their own; they have orders from above and from none other than Khrushchev himself, because even for the grain that should be supplied to Albania, the order has been given by Khrushchev [to withhold it], although we pay for it in cash.

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made it quite evident that the text of his contribution had been dictated by an official of the Soviet Embassy and during the translation he had become confused, failing to distinguish between the text and the punctuation marks.

3) Several times on end he has been criticized by the Party for disruptive activity, careerism, long-standing discontent with the Party, for showing fear, distrust and arrogance toward it.
Knowing that these people want to harm our friendship with the peoples of the Soviet Union, we must keep cool, so that this friendship will not be harmed. There will be stormy seas, but the Albanian communists and the internationalist communists in the Soviet Union will overcome them. Therefore, we must guard the unity of the Party like the apple of our eye, we must be vigilant, strike immediately at any attempt against it and preserve our friendship with the peoples of the Soviet Union. This should be propagated among the people as usual.

By this I do not mean that we should not speak against the revisionist stand of the Soviet leaders, for the time will come when we shall speak out openly, but everything in its own time. Let us guard against provocations and strengthen the Party!

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RADIOGRAM
TO COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU IN NEW YORK

September 20, 1960

Dear Mehmet,

1) From the source you know, we received some wonderful material, which unfortunately we cannot send you to read, because you are far away. We have read it and think that it is enough to relieve you from the miseries of New York. The material is such as if we had written it ourselves. I think these explanations are sufficient to make everything there seem quite unimportant.

2) On any new proposal that might be made at the United Nations Organization which, in your opinion, is not in order — not only politically, but also ideologically, concerning either its immediate or long-term effect — do not rush to give immediate approval, merely to avoid being separated from the "flock." Therefore, keep us up to date as we decided, because we may possibly line ourselves up because of political eventualities; but at the same time convey our comments to our friends by word of mouth or in writing.

3) As for your formal speeches, while always maintaining diplomatic form and regardless of whether the others take a softer line, lock all the doors against U.S. imperialism, and so on

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and so forth, so that nobody will ever dare accuse us of having become soft. The other things you know yourself. Here everything is going well. We are preparing to send the delegation to Moscow.

Best regards,

Shpati (2)

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2) One of Comrade Enver Hoxha’s pseudonyms during the National Liberation War.
Comrade Mehmet,

We are receiving the radiograms. Keep sending them to us, for they are "entertaining."

1) The German official delegation has postponed its arrival until an unspecified date. It gives reasons, but they do not hold water. The reasons are those we know.

2) With those who show themselves approachable and have not changed their attitude toward us, get close to them and try to find a way to break their front and stir up their brains, for they are bound to vacillate.

3)...

4)...

5) After our request about which you know, the Soviets revised their decision on grain and accorded us a quantity payable through foreign exchange and in gold. We told them that we were still not satisfied but we would buy it. The Rumanians are giving us nothing.

6)...

7) Here with us everything goes smoothly, don't worry. Our Radio protested to the Soviets because Radio Moscow has said nothing in its Albanian language service about where you are, whether you have spoken or not, but instead it announces these things through its Arabic language service. We voiced our protest and told them that if they persisted in that perfidious stand, then we would no longer relay the broadcasts of Radio Moscow.
through Radio Tirana.

We are preparing to send the delegation (1). It has rained a lot these days. Everybody is doing well at home, the comrades are fine, and send their greetings.

Affectionately yours,

Shpati

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1) On September 27, 1960, the delegation of the PLA, comprising Comrade Hysni Kapo and Comrade Ramiz Alia, Secretary of the CC of the PLA, which was to take part in the Commission of the 26 parties for the preparation of the materials of the November meeting, left for Moscow.
RADIOGRAM
TO COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU IN NEW YORK

September 26, 1960

Comrade Mehmet,

1) Tomorrow our delegation is leaving for Moscow with Hysni, Ramiz, and some other people of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda. I will keep you up to date.

2) Tomorrow, too, a delegation is leaving for China for the Month of Albanian-Chinese Friendship. It will also take part in the celebrations.

3)...

4) The Soviets continue their provocations; they are behaving like this with the personnel of our navy as well. Our people gave them the reply they deserved. Don’t worry, their evil-doings will rebound against them. They will retreat with their tails between their legs.

5) Keep a cool head but hit back hard at all those who yap at you or try to provoke you. Stand firm on what we have decided.

6) We read the speeches. You did very well with the bit about the "King of Belgrade." (1) He showed once more that he is nothing but an agent of imperialism, which he did not mention once throughout his entire speech. Expose him mercilessly, not only to his admirers in our camp, but to the others as well.

7)...

Regards to Behar. We are waiting for your speech this evening.

Affectionately yours,

Shpati

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1) J. B. Tito.
RADIOGRAM
TO COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU IN NEW YORK

September 28, 1960

Dear Mehmet,

1) We liked your speech very much. TASS delayed its transmission, so we were unable to give it either on the radio or in the newspapers on the same day. We published it in the newspapers the next day and repeated it several times on the radio. The newspapers will come out with several articles based on your speech.

2) Castro's speech was a good one. We published as much of it as was transmitted by TASS. We have published nothing of the other friends' speeches. We will go about it on a reciprocal basis: we will publish as many lines from their speeches as they publish from yours.

3) Our Comrades Behar or Reiz should send us communiqués on talks and contacts you might have with the various leaders, in uncoded telegrams so the Albanian Telegraphic Agency can print them.

4) The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China handed us its letters in reply to the parties that had sent it letters, about which you know. It gives them hell, especially your neighbor at the United Nations, Zhivko.*

5) Pospyelov gave our Moscow delegation a very cool reception — only "How do you do," and nothing more. They took them to a hotel. All the other delegations were sent to the same place.

6) From Bulgaria we are informed that. . . .

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* Refers to T. Zhivkov of Bulgaria. Leaving off the "v" is an expression of contempt. [Ed.]
At the Plovdiv Fair, Kardelj's (1) latest book in Bulgarian is selling like hot-cakes.

7) On September 30 we have a meeting of the Political Bureau on education and the directives of the plan. We shall hold the Plenum on October 3 or 5.

8) We gave the Chinese document in an organized way to all the principal Party and State cadres so they could read it. They also read the Soviet document at the same time. Among all the cadres there is enthusiastic support for, and great confidence in, the correct line of the Party. The cadres are united and full of determination.

9) September 30 is the Chinese National Day [celebration]. I shall use this occasion (2) to fire the first "warning shots" so that the Soviet "friends" will get to hear of them.

10) Fiqret and the kids are doing fine. I keep her informed about you. All the comrades are well and send their greetings. I am awaiting your radiogram impatiently to learn how the famous dinner went.

Affectionately yours,

                        Shpati

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in the Central Archives of the Party.

1) A Yugoslav revisionist ideologist. In his book Socialism and War he falsifies the fundamental principles of Marxist-Leninist science, distorts the reality of socialism, and openly puts himself completely in the service of the instigators of predatory wars.

2) See this volume, p. 121.
Dear Mehmet,

1) We are carefully following the speeches of everybody and can describe them with Shakespeare's words: "much ado about nothing." In fact the "ado" is great, especially when the "self-ado," if we may adopt this term, is deafening. Long live the echoes and the variety shows, because that is all that will come out of it, and we are of the same mind as you, that it turned out as we had predicted. Of course, in the end, as a conclusion, it will be said that the meeting was positive and, as "Rrapo Lelo" (1) has already expressed it at lunch, "we did well to have come."

2) These close negotiations with the Belgrade arch-revisionist are shameful. Their continuous and open talks are certainly cooking up new actions disastrous to us. . . .

The influence of the Soviet Union, China and all our countries is being undermined. Here we should see, in particular, the undermining of the Chinese influence in the emerging states of the so-called "third world." With his great manoeuver "Rrapo Lelo" aims to deal China a blow ideologically and to undermine it politically. With these actions he assists the development of capitalism, strengthens imperialism, weakens our camp and our positions in the UNO. . . .

"Rrapo Lelo's" admirers and lick-spittles consider this terrible capitulation a great success. I think that with those who you think are worried about this situation, but who haven't the courage to speak up about it, you should tactfully let them know our views on these manoeuvers. Why should we keep our correct views so much to ourselves? Maybe one of them will tell "Rrapo Lelo" our views, but so what! "Rrapo" will understand that we do not talk with him about these questions, so let him jump up

1) An ironic reference to Khrushchev. Rrapo Lelo, a kulak from the Mallakastra region, was an enemy of the people.
and down if he likes.

3) In regard to Gomulka's speech, we have arrived at the same conclusions as you. In no way can we accept his proposal. The status quo in favor of the imperialists can never be accepted. You stick to the stand we decided, while as for Gomulka's proposals, not only do not accept them, but tell them that we shall denounce them at the plenary meeting of the communist and workers' parties in Moscow if they are included in the resolution.

4)...

5)...

6) Last night, I was with your family. I gave Fiqret your radiograms to read and she found them amusing. Your mother and children are well. Don't worry about them. Your little son's sword is broken, so when you come bring him a sword, I think you will find one there, because not all the swords will have been turned into ploughshares.

My regards to Behar. His boy is well. Tell him to look after Lukanov (2) well lest the breeze carry him away.

I embrace you,

Shpati

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Volume 19 according to the original in the Central Archives of the Party.

2) At that time Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, whom they were about to dismiss, as they did later.
Dear Comrades and friends,

It is a great joy for me, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Party, the Government, and the Presidium of the People's Assembly, to wholeheartedly congratulate the great heroic Chinese people, the glorious Communist Party of China, and the Chinese Government on the occasion of the 11th anniversary of the proclamation of the People's Republic of China, and to wish them ever greater successes in the construction of socialism and in the resolute struggle they are waging in defense of socialism and peace throughout the world!

The triumph of the People's Revolution and the proclamation of the People's Republic of China on the 1st of October 1949, is an event of great historic significance not only for the fraternal Chinese people but for the whole of mankind. After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, gloriously led by the Bolshevik Party and the great Lenin, the Chinese People's Revolution marks the most significant event in the history of this century. The proclamation of the People's Republic of China is the crowning of centuries of aspirations and struggles by the Chinese people for freedom and independence, for food and for peace; it is the outcome of the correct Marxist-Leninist leadership of the Communist Party of China, which led China to its greatest victory, to the proclamation of the People's Republic.

Under the leadership of the glorious Communist Party of China, with its great son Comrade Mao Tsetung at the head, the heroic Chinese people, 650 million-strong, the most numerous in the world, after a protracted revolutionary struggle under extremely difficult conditions, eleven years ago smashed and
overthrew forever the Japanese imperialists, the Chiang Kai-shek clique, the imperialist lackeys, the blood-sucking capitalists and landlords, and established their regime of people's democracy. With the birth of the new People's China, international imperialism suffered a very heavy blow and its detested colonial system began to collapse rapidly. This is a contribution of great world historic significance for the whole of mankind, for its national and social liberation. The revolutionary movement — not only in Asia, but throughout the world — took on a new impetus and based itself, and continues to base itself, on the results also of this colossal victory.

V. Lenin and J. V. Stalin made very high assessments of the great revolutionary potential of the Chinese people and of their powerful contribution to the liberation struggle of the peoples to free themselves from the clutches of imperialism. In the resolutions of the Prague Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, V. I. Lenin writes:

"The Conference . . . notes the world significance of the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people, which is bringing about the liberation of Asia and undermining the domination of the European bourgeoisie, it hails the Republican revolutionaries of China, and expresses the enthusiasm and complete sympathy with which the Russian proletariat are following the achievements of the revolutionary Chinese people. ..." (1)

J. V. Stalin has said:

"The forces of the revolutionary movement in China are very great. They have still not shown themselves properly. They will show themselves in the future. The rulers in the East and West who do not see these forces and do not duly take them into account will suffer the consequences. . . . Truth and justice here are entirely with the Chinese revolution. That is why we sympathize, and will continue to sympathize, with the Chinese revolution for the liberation of the Chinese people from the yoke of the imperialists and for the union of China into a single state. He who disregards this

1) V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 17, p. 548 (Alb. ed.).
force, and continues to disregard it in the future, will certainly suffer defeat." (2)

Internal Chinese reaction and the imperialists greatly underestimated the revolutionary forces of the Chinese people, who triumphed over them once and for all, and on the 1st of October 1949, proclaimed the People's Republic. The old China, under the domination of the imperialists and their stooges, the blood-thirsty reactionary rulers, was extremely backward from the economic point of view, although it was a country of colossal wealth and ancient culture, with a large area and the biggest population in the world. The barbarous exploitation by the colonialists and the ruling classes had strangled the inexhaustible energies of this highly gifted people of great creative abilities. Within the short period of eleven years after they took power in their hands, this great and valiant people demonstrated to the entire world their marvellous abilities and talents, and achieved successes unprecedented in the thousands of years of their history. They are quickly transforming their homeland into an advanced socialist country, and with their brilliant example are inspiring the other peoples of the world who have recently shaken off the colonial yoke of imperialism or who are still suffering under its savage exploitation.

During the post-Liberation years the Chinese national economy has developed at very rapid rates, a characteristic which is observed only in the socialist countries, where Marxist-Leninist parties are in the leadership.

Following its successful fulfillment of the First Five-year Plan in 1957, the People's Republic of China has achieved amazing successes in the years 1958 and 1959, by attaining the main indices of the Second Five-year Plan three years ahead of schedule. In the past year alone the total value of industrial production increased 39.3 percent over that of 1958; and that of agricultural production rose 16.7 percent. From a country where poverty and chronic hunger predominated, a country ruled by the landlords, the local capitalists, as well as the imperialists—ranging from the Japanese, British and French to the U.S. imperialists — great China is today being transformed day by day into an advanced socialist country, and the material and cultural

2) J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 7 pp. 296-297 (Alb. ed.).
level of the working masses is being steadily improved.

Gone forever is the time when the people of China enjoyed no rights. Only now can the broad masses of the people enjoy all the benefits of socialist democracy and take an active and extensive part in solving the existing problems of the country.

In multi-national People's China national oppression has been wiped out, along with the overthrow of the old state power, and today all the different nationalities live in harmony with each other as one big family; they enjoy equal rights, help one another in a fraternal way, and thus live in exemplary, complete unity.

The profound economic and social changes that have taken place during these eleven years in the fraternal People's Republic of China are due to the determined, correct and creative application of the principles of Marxism-Leninism by the Communist Party of China, to its close ties with the laboring masses, to the authority enjoyed by the Communist Party, and the ardent love the entire Chinese people have for the Communist Party, its Central Committee, and the great son of the people and the Party, Comrade Mao Tsetung. The constant and very great achievements of the talented Chinese people in the successful construction of socialism are also due to the correct, principled, and unwavering struggle of the Communist Party of China in defense of the purity of Marxist-Leninist principles, to its struggle against modern revisionism and against any other harmful anti-Marxist manifestation. The colossal achievements of these eleven years in the People's Republic of China have turned New China into a major world power, a resolute fighter for peace and socialism, which enjoys great and ever-increasing international authority.

In its foreign policy the Communist Party of China has been and is guided by the lofty principles of the Leninist policy of peace and friendship among nations, by the lofty principles of proletarian internationalism. This great and glorious party, in the ranks of which about 14 million members militate, is a tremendous force in the international communist movement and marches shoulder-to-shoulder in closed ranks with all the communist and workers' parties of the world, holding high and unsullied the banner of Marxism-Leninism. The great People's Republic of China, a member of the big family of the socialist camp, plays a major and important role in the international arena. It wages a constant struggle for the strengthening and steeling of the unity of the socialist camp and makes a very great
contribution to the struggle of all the peoples of the world for the defense of peace and for the just solution of all unresolved international problems. The Communist Party of China and the great Chinese people take a correct revolutionary view of the question of the liberation of the peoples enslaved by the imperialists and colonialists, and give them all possible help for their national liberation.

Precisely because of this just struggle, the People's Republic of China has won respect and sympathy not only on the continent of Asia, but throughout the whole world. Therefore, the efforts of the imperialist aggressors, especially the U.S. imperialists and their faithful lackeys, the Yugoslav revisionists, who slander China and concoct a thousand and one dirty lies to present it as a "country which wants not peace but war, which is against peaceful coexistence among countries of different social systems," etc., are in vain.

In order to undermine the great sympathy and influence which the People's Republic of China is steadily gaining in the international arena, the U.S. imperialists are struggling stubbornly to debar it from its legitimate place in the United Nations Organization or in the other international organizations. The rapacious U.S. imperialists have occupied the ancient Chinese territory of Taiwan and are struggling with every means to prevent China from participating in the solution of international problems. All these activities of the U.S. imperialists are part of their aggressive policy against the camp of socialism in general and against People's China in particular. Thus, the defense of the People's Republic of China against any attempts of the imperialists, and our insistence that it must gain all the rights that belong to it in the international arena, serve to strengthen the socialist camp and to ward off a new world war. To allow U.S. imperialism to continue its policy toward the People's Republic of China means to allow it to attack one of the soundest positions of our socialist camp, to strike a blow against peace and peaceful coexistence between the peoples. Any attempt, of whatever nature, on the part of the imperialists and their servants to harm great People's China will be answered with heavy blows from the camp of socialism, from all the communists of the world, and all progressive mankind. Great China will succeed in winning its legitimate rights over the imperialists and their stooges.

With the aim of deceiving the people and lulling them to sleep, the U.S. imperialists are loudly clamoring that allegedly
they stand for peaceful coexistence between states of different political-social systems, but their words are only a bluff. The attitude of the U.S. Government toward China, toward Albania and many other countries is the best proof of this. The government of the People's Republic of China has always striven sincerely to maintain peaceful relations with all states, irrespective of their regimes, and the numerous friendly ties of the People's Republic of China with a great number of states of Asia and Africa, with Cuba and others, confirm this. The trade and cultural relations which China maintains and is developing day by day with a great number of states confirms this. But the policy of the imperialists will suffer ignominious failure, as it has already.

As is known, the regular session of the United Nations Organization has opened in New York and its proceedings are continuing. There, the Chairman of the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, Comrade Mehmet Shehu, expressed the will of the Albanian people, of our Party and our Government for the preservation of peace in the world. He condemned colonialism. Comrade Mehmet Shehu defended China and insistently demanded that it be admitted to the United Nations Organization and the Chiang Kai-shek puppet regime be ousted, rightly emphasizing that no major international problem can find a correct and fair solution without the participation of China. Imperialism is in decay. However, Marxism-Leninism teaches us that as long as imperialism exists, the causes of predatory wars exist too. Therefore, we should always be vigilant toward the imperialists because only in this way shall we impose the will of peace-loving mankind on these imperialist beasts with human faces. This will be attained only in the revolutionary way, by making no concessions of principle to the imperialists, by always remaining vigilant against all their attempts to weaken our political, ideological, economic, and military positions. We should unite our efforts with the revolutionary liberation struggles of the colonial and dependent countries, as well as with all peace-loving and progressive forces in the world. The U.S. imperialists and their lackeys must be mercilessly denounced for their feverish preparations for war; both they and the Belgrade revisionists should be ruthlessly fought and exposed politically and ideologically, for this is the only way that we can properly serve the cause of genuine peace, the cause of coexistence, the cause of the liberation of peoples from the colonial yoke, the cause of the triumph of socialism and communism. Our Party has
been following this Marxist-Leninist road and will continue to do so undeviatingly.

Like the People's Republic of China, our People's Republic follows, and will consistently follow, a policy of peace and peaceful coexistence among peoples, just as the great Lenin defined it for us; namely, that parallel with the efforts to establish friendly relations among states, we must never give up the political and ideological struggle against the capitalists and against the traitors to Marxism-Leninism, the modern revisionists.

The Albanian people are bound to the great Chinese people by an unbreakable friendship, and they follow their struggle for peace and socialism with sympathy and admiration. Our Party and Government have supported, and will continue to support, the peaceful policy of the People's Republic of China and defend its rights in the international arena with might and main. Our people and Party rejoice that in the Chinese people they have a great and loyal friend, and they will rally all their forces to preserve and constantly strengthen the sound friendship based on Marxism-Leninism which links our two fraternal peoples.

At this gathering on the occasion of this glorious anniversary, I take the opportunity to express once more, on behalf of our Party and people, our deep gratitude and our most heartfelt thanks to the Communist Party of China, the Government of the People's Republic of China, and all the great Chinese people for the aid they have given and continue to give our country for the construction of socialism. In these moments of rejoicing for the friendly Chinese people, we send them our most ardent wishes for the realization of their aspirations, for the construction of socialism, and for the triumph of peace in the world!

Allow me, comrades and guests, to propose a toast:
To the great and gifted Chinese people!
To the glorious Communist Party of China with the distinguished Marxist-Leninist, Comrade Mao Tsetung, at the head!
To the Government of the People's Republic of China, headed by Comrade Chou En-lai!
To the everlasting friendship between our two peoples!
To peace in the world!
To your health, comrades and guests!

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Published according to Volume 19.
LETTER TO COMRADE HYSNI KAPO IN MOSCOW

October 1, 1960

Dear Comrade Hysni,

I received the letter and the material you sent me, yesterday, at the time when we were holding the meeting of the Political Bureau to examine the draft directives of the 3rd Five-year Plan presented to the 4th Congress of the Party, as well as the report on the reorganization of the schools. I had just received the material when your radiogram arrived, too, in which you told us that this material must be returned to you; therefore we handed it over to be printed. I am telling you all this so that you will understand that at the moment of writing, I have not started to read the material you sent me; therefore I have nothing to say about it at the moment. I shall give you an opinion by radiogram or in a longer letter, which I shall send you by air.

Associating myself with your view, I, too, think that the Soviet comrades are up to a dirty manoeuver for definite aims.

The material they have provided may be acceptable up to a point; likewise it is drafted and predisposed so that it could be corrected and made even stronger. They are not much concerned about this!! "If you like," they may say, "we can even make it much stronger, only there must not be any polemics, everything should go quietly and smoothly. As to carrying out what we put on paper, let us not worry about that — in a word, we shall carry on as before, we shall violate this Declaration, too, like that of Moscow [1957], and if you accuse us again, we shall convene a second Bucharest meeting and really fix you."

If the Soviet leaders have made some concessions or are prepared to see the Declaration made even stronger, this is not because they have changed their views, not because they recognize their mistakes, but because they make these alleged concessions to us in order to stop the discussion from going any further. They think that what we are seeking is declarations. But we have Marxism-Leninism. What we need and insist on is that the Soviet leaders must correct their opportunist mistakes. The Declaration must be the conclusion of these discussions. This is precisely
what frightens the Soviet leaders and does not frighten us.

The Soviet leaders are afraid of the discussions not only because of the shocks that ran through other parties after Bucharest, but because these upheavals will become ever stronger after November. So, to stave this off, they hand out this declaration: "And we can make it even stronger if you like," and thus, all their admirers shout and cheer: "Eureka! This is, has been, and will remain our line. We have never made mistakes. China reflected, reconsidered its mistakes and came back on the right road! Thus, Bucharest was very poljezno [useful (Russian)]. In our parties we condemned China and Albania as dogmatic, etc. With one stone we killed two birds: we exposed them, and we cured them, and we opened the way to say to the parties again tomorrow that the patients were not completely cured because they have had a relapse of the disease of dogmatism. Finally, we triumphed in both acts and carry on in our old way". This, I think, is more or less the reasoning of the Soviet leaders and their admirers. Nikita found the medicine for Zhivko and company.

We must not fall for the tricky manoeuvres of the Soviet revisionists. We must give the Soviet leaders and others to understand that we agree to work on this material, to remove from, or add to it, but this material will be put together as a conclusion of all-sided discussions in November and will show how the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the decisions of the Moscow meeting [1957] have been carried out, who has departed from, and who has implemented, them consistently. A reassessment of Bucharest will be made not only on the basis of the Soviet facts, but also on the basis of facts that the other parties, too, will bring up on this question.

The coming Moscow Meeting must not be a formal meeting, nor an unproductive polemical meeting, but a meeting of great constructive importance on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and Leninist norms. It will be not only a "pacifist," conciliatory meeting to gloss over grave mistakes, but a meeting to make a radical exposure of, and cure, the mistakes. There is no other way, and they should not expect any other way of solution from us. If these mistakes are not looked squarely in the eye, we are sure that the revisionists will rapidly go on with their destructive work. Therefore, there is only one road for us; struggle in defense of Marxism-Leninism, and not reconciliation with the opportunist and revisionist mistakes in ideology and politics, such as
Khrushchev and his group are making. I think that the struggle should be commenced in the commission, where the other parties, except that of China, have sent fourth-rate people, because, naturally, the Soviet leaders have reached agreement with them, have adopted one set of tactics, and are seeking to get easily over the ditch they themselves have dug by accusing China and us of a thousand things. But this does not go down with us.

There is no need to write any more, for you know the issues yourself. When I send you the remarks about the material, I may write at greater length.

Regards to Ramiz and the comrades.

I embrace you,

Enver

P. S. I am writing to you in haste because the plane is about to leave; therefore you will find it difficult to read. Yesterday we were at the Chinese comrades and in my speech I fired the first "warning shots."

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RADIOGRAM
TO COMRADE HYSNI KAPO IN MOSCOW

October 1, 1960

Comrade Hysni,

1) The problem should be raised like this: Which way should the international communist movement develop in the present situation, and what course has it followed from the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until now?

2) The Chinese and we think that grave tactical and strategic mistakes of principle have been committed by the Khrushchev group. This group has deviated from Marxist-Leninist principles and violated the Declaration of the Moscow Meeting of 1957. This group not only persisted in its mistakes, but also held the Bucharest Meeting and accused China directly, and us indirectly, of dogmatism, and so on. Thus the Chinese and we will fight so that our correct theses will be confirmed and accepted by all, and the grave mistake committed by the Soviet leadership at the Bucharest Meeting will be condemned by all.

3) The group of Khrushchev and those he has compromised defend the opposite thesis. In Bucharest he lined up almost all those present and made the leaders at least agree that "Khrushchev has not made mistakes, that the Chinese have made mistakes, that the Bucharest (Meeting) was necessary and correct."

4) In our opinion, all problems should be solved at the coming Moscow Meeting (1960), while the Khrushchev group has solved them for its purposes at Bucharest. So the Khrushchev group comes to the Moscow Meeting with the conviction that its road and actions have been correct, and we will have to adopt a Declaration that will say where the international communist movement should go. But as to who has deviated, who is guilty, and what the Bucharest Meeting represents, nothing is said, which means that China stays condemned.

5) Now let us suppose that the Declaration of the coming Moscow Meeting may be formulated appropriately and defines the correct road for the international communist movement.
Such a Declaration will be, more or less, a copy of that adopted at the Moscow Meeting of 1957. Likewise, let us suppose that the commission that meets there to prepare the Moscow Meeting formulates the Declaration, but without indicating in concrete terms who deviated and why China was condemned in Bucharest. Even if this is the case, our just aim will not be achieved.

6) Our aim and task do not consist in adding to the collection of declarations, but in condemning and correcting mistakes. This is important because only then will there be any assurance that either the Declaration of 1957 or the new one will be implemented correctly and in a Marxist-Leninist way.

7) To the Khrushchev group, Marxism-Leninism, the Declaration of the Moscow Meeting of 1957, and the new one that will emerge from the coming Moscow Meeting, are of no value. Thus, even if we try to make this a good one, it will be worthless without an analysis of the mistakes, and without the admission of these mistakes on their part. Therefore, your meeting should start the fight against the mistakes and not stick simply to the discussion of the Declaration. The Declaration should be discussed by means of the exposure of the mistakes of the Khrushchev group. Possibly, no conclusion will be reached until the conference is held. Thus their manoeuvre fails.

8) The new document has many weaknesses. We shall speak about it later. But the slight concessions by the Khrushchev group are aimed at lulling us to sleep and making us think that, with the amendment of the Declaration, any discussion about the group's mistakes is blocked.

9) At the Moscow Meeting we shall raise the problems just as we said above, since as far as we are concerned the entire problem remains unsolved. We have handed the Khrushchev group and all the parties a correct draft Declaration, on the basis of which we want the proceedings to develop. At the meeting we shall go beyond the limits of the Declaration, since we consider it as the conclusion of the debate that will take place. But the Khrushchev group looks at it differently; it aims at the opposite. The representatives of many other parties at this meeting are compromised in advance in one way or another and to various degrees; and faced with a Declaration well-prepared in advance by the commission, they will be taken aback by our correct contribution, by our severe but just criticism which the Khrushchev group will try to oppose, since they will be unable to stop
it; and finally the conclusion will be reached that we disagree with the Khrushchev group and its supporters, but do agree with the draft Declaration prepared beforehand.

10) On the one hand we end up in disagreement, since the Khrushchev group will never admit its mistakes, and on the other hand the Moscow Meeting will confront us with the dilemma of signing this Declaration, which is correct (but which fails to say who has committed the mistakes concerning the line, etc.) — or not to sign it. If we put our signature to a Declaration with such mistakes of principle and do not achieve our aim of having the mistakes of the Khrushchev group clearly brought out, then this group will triumph and China will remain condemned. If we refuse to sign it, we will give the Khrushchev group and its followers a weapon to accuse us of refusing to sign a correct Declaration.

This constitutes a well-thought-out tactic of the Khrushchev group. It must have been worked out by the entire pro-Soviet group with Zhivko and company, who have been informed about this material beforehand. Therefore, try to amend the Declaration according to our viewpoint. If this is not done, then we will be on the course I mentioned above, which is dangerous.

In the correctly worked — out Declaration, the mistakes of the Khrushchev group should be recognized and its aims at the Bucharest Meeting condemned. The Khrushchev group does not admit its mistakes, the document will remain in the air, and thus everything will be decided after the discussions in the meeting. In conclusion, these are only some preliminary ideas. You should ponder over them and act according to the correct line of our Party, according to the instructions the Political Bureau has given and will give you. Keep us constantly up to date.

We are working on our comments on the material, and we shall do everything we can to help you.

Regards to you, Ramiz, and all the comrades.

Enver

Published for the first time in Volume 19 according to the original in the Central Archives of the Party.
Dear Mehmet,

1) The Moscow Meeting (1) opens today. The delegations are very colorless, apart from the Chinese and ours, 50 people all told. We hear that the Bulgarian delegation will do what the Soviets tell them — to avoid stirring up polemics. This is the general watchword issued by the "friends" you have there.

2) The Soviets handed out a document in the form of a 36-page declaration, which is to be discussed in regard to adding to it or removing some bits. We have just translated and typed it, since it came only yesterday, and I have just given it a first quick reading. The real working meeting will start this Tuesday, October 4th, in Moscow.

3) The first impression of the material: A dirty manoeuvre by the revisionists, not in a polemical tone, but some devious and base insinuations, a lot of big gaps, smoothing over some angles dangerous to them, some tactical retreats to throw dust in people's eyes, some approaches to our theses, to the effect: "Look, we are making concessions to your stubbornness, and this in the face of a savage enemy; therefore take this Declaration, be content with it, worship it if you like." But it should be read again carefully, and I will make suggestions to Hysni about its essence.

4) What is the manoeuvre of the revisionists? In my opinion, they want to draw a veil over all their mistakes; and the veil is this Declaration. They think we are desperately concerned about declarations, as if we did not have our ideology, Marxism-Leninism. Hence, according to them, they are "fulfilling our desire" with a declaration in which room is left for amendments. Indeed, they are ready to make it much stronger. I believe they will make a few concessions and then say: "You see, this has been our line,

1) Of the preparatory commission of the 26 parties.
you made some additions, we agreed to them, and now there is nothing to divide us, hurrah! But who has deviated from Marxism-Leninism, who is revisionist or dogmatic, what occurred in Bucharest and how things went on later, and so on and so forth — all these matters have been decided, and decided correctly and unanimously; you slipped into dogmatism, we condemned you and we were right; we exposed you in our parties, this was useful to you; you reflected upon your mistakes and came here; we held a discussion and reached agreement, and even produced a declaration. Go home now, make self-criticism in your parties, and henceforth do not commit the mistake of criticizing us, because we shall bring you to a second Bucharest, and this time you will be 'recidivists'." This is approximately "Rrapo Lelo's" aim. This reasoning and tactic of "Rrapo's" is certainly extremely gratifying to Zhivkov and company, since, sooner or later, they will certainly have an earthquake under their feet, but with this manoeuver they think may avert the danger. This, of course, is their course, but not ours. Our course is that which we have decided on and which is correct.

5) I warned Hysni to begin the fight right in the commission and let them understand clearly that we can discuss the Declaration, removing or adding something, but that the Declaration should be the conclusion of a Marxist-Leninist debate about the problems under discussion: who has applied Marxism-Leninism and the Moscow Declaration [1957] correctly and who has betrayed it; who are the revisionists and who is not dogmatic; who organized Bucharest and for what purpose; who created this split and why. All the problems will be laid on the table and examined, not on the basis of the false facts of the Soviets, but on the basis of the arguments of the Chinese, ours, and anybody's else. We do not accept peace for the sake of peace, in the communist movement; we do not permit faults to be covered up. We cannot allow the Moscow meeting to be a "meeting of revisionists" and right-wing pacifists: we shall fight to make it a militant, constructive, Marxist meeting. There is no other way. In
this manner any illusions of the Khrushchevites will vanish, all their manoeuvres will fail, and things will be carried through to the end. I believe that the Chinese will act as we do.

So much for now. Write to us if you have any comment or suggestion.

Affectionately,

Shpati

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of the Party.
Dear Comrade Hysni,

I received your letter this morning and I understood your views. I agree with these views and the proposals you make, which, in general, conform with what I have written you.

Thus, I am stressing once more, as we discussed when you left Tirana, that you will press for the Declaration of the Moscow Meeting to be as strong as possible, with gunpowder and not cotton wool, and to contain questions formulated correctly, according to our view, and not equivocal, unclear views, such as the Soviet delegation, whose ideas are opportunist and revisionist, will try to put in.

There is one thing you must bear in mind, namely, that by means of the Declaration, not only must we express the correct Marxist-Leninist views of our Party about the problems, but when reading this document, every communist in the world should at once understand that in the "ideological conflict" which the Khrushchev group trumpeted inside and outside the camp, this group lost and their revisionist course was condemned. In the first place, the members of those parties where the questions were put forward in a distorted way, slandering the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labor of Albania, which were condemned unjustly and thrown mud at, must understand this fact when they read the Declaration. This is very important, for the slanderers have no intention of going back to their parties and making self-criticism. Therefore, much depends on your contribution to the discussion there, much depends on the formulation which you will propose.

Pay great attention to the formulations of the main issues. In these formulations, bear in mind not to stay within the limits of the Soviet text and the form they have given to the presentation
of the problem. By this I want to say: don't try to adjust the question on the phrasing put up by the Soviets or to avoid damaging the general or partial "framework" of the structure of the Soviet text. Such a manner of construction will hinder you from formulating the ideas as we conceive them, because the Soviets have built that text in conformity with their views, they have extended themselves in some places in order to introduce a bit of poison, or they have spread the poison in a whole "tirade" over which they have also sprinkled a coating of sugar. Therefore, don't worry about the Soviet structure, concern yourself about the key problems, cut out all the tittle-tattle and nonsense, then leave it to the Secretariat to correct the structure of the Declaration.

In my opinion, the Declaration stinks on the main questions, and is just what you think it is. I read it through carefully once and made notes alongside the text. Time did not permit me to sum up all these remarks and elaborate them. Thus, I decided to send you the text with the notes I have made. Don't think that every note on this text is a jewel. There are some unnecessary, hasty things, written in anger. Therefore have a look at them yourself; the aim is mostly to draw your attention to something which may not have struck your eye although it has struck mine, and vice versa. I am sure that you have gone over the Soviet material with a fine-tooth comb and have seen all the delicate questions; therefore my mind is at ease on that score. Anyway, although you will find it somehow difficult to read my notes, for I have scribbled them, I shall be satisfied if they are of any help to you.

If you have anything particular to consult me about, send a radiogram. As to the speech you will have to deliver, it will be best if you send us a copy because, as you yourself say, we may be able to help you with some comments either by radiogram or by returning the text with our remarks, if we have any, and if the time of the return of the plane permits.

... The Khrushchev group has lined up on its side a large number of parties, which it caught on the hop, and is taking advantage of their trust in and love for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It will be difficult for these parties and these communists to have the courage to adopt a clear-cut stand immediately. This is true. But it becomes very dangerous to leave this matter to drag out, because revisionism will do its own dreadful work, will compromise people and parties, will carry on
large-scale demagogy with propaganda and with large material funds. Within ten years the Tito clique completely disintegrated the party, and the genuine communists and patriots were thrown into jails or killed. Therefore, the most correct stand is that at this meeting we should carry the matter through to the end, as Marxists. It must come out nakedly who is on an anti-Marxist road, who is betraying Marxism-Leninism and violating the 1957 Moscow Declaration. This is the Khrushchev group. Therefore the meeting should dot the i's. The i's must be dotted about Bucharest, and those who have made mistakes must admit them at the meeting like Marxists and go back to their parties to correct them. The Khrushchev group does not want to admit its mistakes, it is responsible for splitting the ideological unity of the international communist movement. We are on a correct Marxist-Leninist road. The Khrushchev group has deviated into revisionism, therefore our struggle and time will expose them.

But there is one other thing, the threat of a split and the split itself will speed up the process of the bankruptcy of the Khrushchev group and its isolation from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the other parties, which will be shocked and reflect on the matter better and sooner. Otherwise, these parties pretend to be outside the conflict; indeed they consider it a success that it did not come to a split, and leave it to time to prove whether the Soviet line or ours is correct. The slogan, "Let time verify the line," as some advocate ... is to the liking of Khrushchev, and is an opportunist, revisionist and anti-Marxist slogan. It contains in itself the fear of taking things through to the end and radically curing the mistakes. This idea serves to preserve the Khrushchevite status quo with a bit of patching up which Khrushchev has not, does not, and will not take any notice of at all. This slogan helps the revisionists to go further, to spread revisionism. In a word, if this slogan is adopted, we can be sure that there are great dangers.

Revisionism is the main danger, it must be attacked, however big the "heads" that have this purulence within them. To clear up the abscess, the scalpel must be used. All those who say, "Let us leave it to time," understand the situation, but lack the revolutionary courage to put the finger on the sore spot and to use the effective means to clean it.

On the other hand, we should realize that the Khrushchev group is terrified of the situation, terrified of a split. They see
that their policy is suffering failures, that it has created a grave situation that is far from correct, that ideologically they are quite deliberately and hopelessly on the road to disaster. Thus, in this situation, is it permissible for us to allow this revisionist group to regain its breath, to get over this great chasm which it created? It seems to me that we must not allow this. If we do not expose the Khrushchev group, we shall be making a great mistake, for they will take advantage of this to do more harm to the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and international communism. Khrushchev is an exhibitionist clown. Look what he is doing at the UNO. This is why I sent you that long radiogram the evening before last.

But anyway, dear Hysni, carry on as you are doing. You are doing fine.

Vito is well. She is studying hard with Nexhmije.(1) Your Besnik is well, too. On Sunday he had lunch with us.

Every day I received "amusing" radiograms from Mehmet. Matters continue as before. No concrete results whatever. No disarmament, no reorganization of the UNO Secretariat, no meeting, not a damned thing. The only "success" has been the creation of the third force with Tito at the head and the blessing of dyadya (2) Khrushchev. . . .

Best regards to Ramiz and the comrades. The comrades here send their greetings.

I embrace you,

Enver

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1) At that time Comrades Vito Kapo and Nexhmije Hoxha were taking a correspondence course at the Faculty of History and Philology of Tirana University.

2) "Uncle" (Russian).
Comrade Mehmet,

I have received all the radiograms. We are following the UNO "fiasco."

1) The meeting in Moscow began on Saturday. Only the opening. Suslovka(1) opened it. Kozlovka, Andropovka, Muhit-dinovka and Posypelovka and others were present. Cold as ice. Time was allowed to study the material and today, Tuesday, at 14 hours, the meeting will open again. The representative of the Communist Party of China will speak before Hysni, who is expected to speak on Thursday or Friday.

2) I carefully studied the draft Declaration and sent all my comments to Hysni, together with the tactics he must pursue in the commission. The Declaration stinks. It is revisionist, hackneyed, repetitious, stringing out the issues in order to dilute the poison so we might swallow it, and in the process it has been sprinkled with icing sugar to sweeten the taste to us. It makes some "feints," alleged retreats, but that do not satisfy us at all; therefore I have put Hysni on his guard and instructed him how the questions must be formulated.

3) Hysni writes that he will send me the opening speech to have a look at. Hysni is completely competent and well armed as to the stands that must be maintained.

... At the meeting there are some who have the fear, which we do not share, of what might happen if the Khrushchev group does not come to its senses. We do not agree with them on this, but we must discuss and convince them, for we see it more correctly, more radically, and the Khrushchev group ought to fear what we think, while we have no need to fear them. We have our positions correct and strong. Theirs are revisionist and weak.

1) A familiar form of Suslov [not very respectful, ed.] Likewise with Kozlov, Andropov, etc.
Therefore we must strike the iron while it is hot, for if the acrobat gets away with this, he will be up to a thousand and one tricks, let alone within 10-15 years in which he will do terrible things. Anyway, this is the final stage; you will come back and we shall talk here before we go to Moscow.

4) Hysni wrote that Kozlovka invited him to lunch yesterday, but Hysni thanked him and did not go. Considering what he has done to us, this suited us fine, so that he will understand with whom he is dealing.

5) We hear from reliable sources that the Bucharest Meeting had been pre-arranged behind the backs of our Party and the Communist Party of China. Khrushchev had informed, discussed, and received the approval of all his boys about how the issues would be raised in Bucharest, what would be discussed and what should be decided. This is blatant - not a faction, but a plot. This was the whole aim of the struggle of Ivanov and Koço Tashko to get me to go on a vacation: to compromise me and drag me into the dirt. But they missed out.

6) ....

Fiqret and the children are well. I embrace you and we are eagerly awaiting your return.

Shpati

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RADIOGRAM TO COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU
IN NEW YORK

October 6, 1960

Comrade Mehmet,

1) You gave Vinogradov a good reply on the question of disarmament. "Rrapo Lelo" wants to cover up his failure at the United Nations Organization, to confuse the masses, and to mobilize the press to declare that there will be new "festivals" in the coming year. It is a good thing for public opinion to exert pressure on the Americans, since it means increased indignation and vigilance of the peoples, but he wants to be the "big man" himself, to take the initiative himself, to go everywhere himself, to be everything himself. Therefore, you acted correctly in not refuting it in principle. But we have plenty of time to declare ourselves. He will declare himself because he disregards our opinion. And this is because he is up to some mischief.

2) The commission met yesterday in Moscow. Five people or so spoke, obedient delegates, who had adopted the watchword: "No word about the contradictions," as if nothing had happened. They mentioned neither the Soviet Union nor China. General expressions and approval of the Soviet draft Declaration. The Finn, the Hungarian, the West German, the Mongolian, and the Italian spoke. The Chinese will speak today.

3) ....

4) There is nothing new on the internal front. The ploughing is under way; the sugar-beet is being lifted but it is very poor. A small earthquake shook the Kardhiq area, but nobody was injured; only some houses were wrecked. The situation is not alarming. The census of the population was taken properly. Spiro Koleka (1) has shut himself up and is working on the report.

I called on your mother again today and gave her the news of your return. She was pleased. Fiqret and the children are fine,

1) Member of the Political Bureau of the PLA, and Vice President of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania.
and send their greetings. The comrades and Nexhmije also send their regards. My regards to Behar, Reiz and the other comrades.

Yours,

Shpati

Published for the first time in Volume 19 according to the original in the Central Archives of the Party.
Dear Comrade Hysni,

Today we opened the Plenum, things are going well, the discussions about the school reform are continuing. The contributions to the discussion are good. We shall discuss this problem tomorrow, too, and then we shall examine the draft-directives of the Five-year Plan.

Today at noon I received the parcel with the material you sent me. You will understand that I have very little time, but I have glanced rapidly through your letter, your speech, and the reformulations and amendments you are going to make of the draft Declaration.

In regard to your speech, I liked it. The problems were dealt with well and its tone was correct. If the opportunity presents itself, either to you in the plenary meeting, or to Ramiz in the commission, you should defend the Communist Party of China more strongly, since the main assault is against it, the main batteries are aimed at it. They hate us just as much as the Chinese, and there is no doubt that they will attack us, but the main attack will be concentrated on the Communist Party of China, since they think, and with reason, that the greatest potential danger to them is the Communist Party of China, and they think: "If we can defeat them, the Albanians will be no problem."

Therefore, for the time being, our positions are not being attacked, but we will be attacked, especially when we hit Khrushchev with some hard facts; they will accuse us, too, of being "dogmatic" because we take the side of China. We must show the Soviet representatives and their supporters that ours is a Marxist-Leninist line, that we defend the Communist Party of China only because it upholds a correct Marxist-Leninist line, that we are fighting the revisionist and right-opportunist viewpoints as well as the slanderers and falsifiers.
From these positions we attack all those who dare to attack us, either openly or in an underhand way.

Apart from those parties that we know have taken wrong positions, don't attack those that hesitate, that lack the courage to say what they think, those that say nothing about our Party or only something of no consequence. Don't push them into open conflict with us — manoeuvre. The attack should be concentrated on the main enemy, on those who have caused the opportunist deviation and who attack our correct line. Apart from the Soviets, Bulgarians, Poles and some others, if these parties make some half-hearted attack on the Communist Party of China, because they cannot do otherwise, don't put the pressure on them. Leave it to the Chinese to judge the best tactic to follow.

2)...

In my opinion, the Soviet leaders want to close the matter, to cover up their rottenness, because for the time being it is not in their interests to deepen the contradictions. They are ready to make some concessions simply to get over the river without wetting their feet; to make the amendments demanded in one way or another, and then tell us: "There is no reason to hold a discussion or debate." "We agree." "Go home!"

I may be mistaken in my assessment of what the Soviets are up to. I told you at the start that I had had only a quick glance through [the material you sent]. Your speech deprives the Soviets of this possibility, because it comes out clearly that "we have accounts to settle." Initially, our speeches may be like a "prelude" but later they must burst out like Beethoven's symphonies; we are not for "serenades and nocturnes."

3) I also read the formulations of the amendments to the draft Declaration. They seem good. Consult and collaborate with the Chinese comrades. Why should the Soviets and others coordinate their activities, and not we?

I want you to re-examine the formulation about the "transition to socialism" once again so that the spirit of our point of view comes out better. I remind you once again of the question of the "cult," which should be formulated in another way, because in November we are going to take it up in connection with Stalin and the attitude of Khrushchev. There is a passage about "factions"; have another look at it to see whether it has been put there as a trap. One last remark: on page 27, in the 2nd paragraph of the draft Declaration typed in Tirana, or on page 14
of your text, Lenin's idea should be brought out more clearly: "... as long as the bourgeoisie does not impede the workers' movement and its vanguard in its ideological, political, and economic struggle. ..." (this is a quotation from Lenin). But the idea that the Soviets have introduced subsequently should be made more precise, because there they mean Nehru and others, in order to justify the aid they give them.

4) It is difficult to say what you should slap back in their faces, and what you should not. It depends on the circumstances. You must go by the principle, defend the Party and its line fearlessly, without hesitating, "Should I say this or hold back?" As you judge it. You should expose your opponent by means of fair arguments and crush him. A single fact used at the right time and place can be enough to make your opponent fall flat on his face in the mud. Therefore don't tie yourself down and don't worry too much about making some mistake.

The question is simply that we should keep some things for the Moscow Meeting instead of throwing them in at the commission, because if the Soviets were to learn of them they would work out their tactics for a counter-attack.

Do not hesitate to give the Bulgarians and Poles their due, for they are hand in glove with the Soviets. The others, too, are not much different, but see what you can do. You should go easy on the Czechs if they do not attack us. I am telling you this because in New York Novotny behaved toward Mehmet as usual, as if nothing had happened. The Hungarians, too, to our knowledge, are not very active, regardless of their speech there.

As long as they hesitate, the French should be told in various forms: "Which way are you going? We have a feeling that you understand where the mistakes lie and you should help to avoid even more serious mistakes, etc." Make an effort in this direction.

A diplomat of a country of people's democracy told one of our comrades in Rome that the leaders of the communist and workers' parties of our camp, with the exception of the Party of Labor of Albania and the Communist Party of China, knew what was to be put forward at Bucharest, because Khrushchev had consulted them previously. Hence, the Bucharest Meeting was organized beforehand behind the scenes as an international faction (we shall use this argument at the Moscow Meeting).

I have nothing else to add but to wish you success. I know that you are working hard and suffering from the "icy" atmo-
sphere, but we can do nothing about it. The struggle for justice is no bed of roses. When you fight for the Party, for the people and communism, there is neither tiredness nor boredom.

The comrades went to the priyem given by the Germans. I did not, as I wanted to write you this letter and send it tomorrow by plane. I did not go to the Germans' reception also for the reason that I wanted to make them realize that we did not take it kindly that their delegation did not return our official visit, although they had decided the date and the composition of the delegation. The reasons they gave for not coming were unconvincing, but the real ones are those we know and over which you are fighting there.

"Fiasco" in the UNO! With a capital F. Mehmet leaves New York on the 11th of October and arrives in Tirana on the 20th or 21st.

On the 25th of October we are convening the People's Assembly, and on this occasion Mehmet will speak on the "triumph" of disarmament and "Rrapo Lelo's" coexistence in the UNO. My best regards to Ramiz.

Yours affectionately
Enver

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RADIOGRAM TO COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU
IN NEW YORK

October 9, 1960

Comrade Mehmet,

The fight has warmed up, so things are going well. Uncover the manure for good. All those who have spoken have attacked both China and us, with the exception of the Japanese, the Korean and the Vietnamese, who made no mention either of us or the Soviets, but their opinions on the draft Declaration are very close to ours on nearly all questions, including those against modern revisionism and Yugoslav revisionism.

Bagdash, (1) in particular, attacked China and us. Regarding us he said: "We don't understand what kind of communism the Albanians are after." But up to now it is the Rumanian, and especially Suslovka, who have made the filthiest attacks. Suslov alleged that we are against coexistence and equated us with the bourgeois parties and Kerensky. (2)

On Monday they will be dealt some blows both from us and the Chinese. To our knowledge the Bulgarian and the Czech haven't spoken as yet.

We are waiting for you. Look after yourself.

Shpati

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of the Party.

1) Secretary General of the CC of the CP of Syria, who is living permanently in Moscow.

2) In the radiogram dated October 9, 1960, addressed to Comrade Hysni Kapo in Moscow, Comrade Enver Hoxha instructed him, "Say this to Suslov, too: 'It will be difficult for the falsifiers to accuse the Albanian communists of failing to understand and being against coexistence. They have been and will always be for coexistence, as Lenin and Stalin teach us. But it will be even more difficult for the supporters of the fascist
RADIOGRAM
TO COMRADE HYSNI KAPO IN MOSCOW

October 11, 1960

Comrade Hysni,

I agree with you. Do not waste your major arguments at such a meeting. Content yourself with some warning thrusts at all those who deserve them. In November the "Front" they have created will be knocked about worse than it is now. Bravo to the Indonesian! It is very important that the Soviet leaders and their lackeys see that not everybody is a lamb. In the commission, Ramiz should smack the noses of the provocateurs and slanderers. The plane arrives today.

Greetings,
Enver

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LETTER TO COMRADE HYSNI KAPO
IN MOSCOW

October 13, 1960

Dear Hysni,

... We are not of the same opinion as those who are trying to smooth out the problems by means of phrases in resolutions or declarations.

We do not support the view, "Mend what can be mended, and time will mend the rest." We are for carrying the matter through to the end.

If this is not understood, it means that the danger which the Khrushchev group represents for the world communist movement is not understood.

It does not depend on us whether this group should continue in power or not, but it is essential that we should expose this group with Khrushchev at the head, as they deserve.

We can see that this dangerous group of revisionists has very weak positions, both ideologically and politically.

The impression and the atmosphere that may be created among the delegates of the commission, or later at the Moscow Meeting, is not what worries us.

We must not leave the Soviet leaders a free field in which to browse at will.

... I agree that we must make a good declaration, but is this sufficient? We cannot be satisfied just with this. Should we be satisfied simply to defend ourselves or should we attack? ... The dyed-in-the-wool revisionist does not change his ways. The revisionists will not admit any of their mistakes. Compromise with them does not serve our cause. Just as the revisionist Tito "helped" us by going from betrayal to betrayal day by day, so too will these new revisionists.

... I am preparing the speech for the Moscow Meeting, as we have decided.... At this meeting, apart from the Chinese comrades, our stand will be unique. The majority will be angry with us, they will abuse us, but we are right and time will prove us so. At the meeting you can be sure that people will not dare to
side with us.... But we shall do our duty, we shall defend Marxism-Leninism. The Khrushchev group have committed sins. If you do not put the finger on the sinners and sort out right from wrong, then your hands are tied, and you will do harm. No, we shall not allow ourselves to be impressed by those who say: "How can one attack the glorious Soviet Union or the great Communist Party of Lenin for the faults of a few rascals?" We say: Precisely to defend the Soviet Union and the Party of Lenin, these "rascals" must be exposed, and there must be no toning down of criticism or covering up of the deviationists. In this case, irrespective of the fact that you gave birth to a declaration otlichno, (1) the danger remains — indeed it becomes more threatening, both to our camp and to the entire communist and workers' movement.

But we shall see, and "god grant," as Khrushchev says, I am mistaken in my judgements. Would you tell us when the first act is expected to end, for it is going on almost three weeks?!

Here we have nothing new (there are plenty of the usual things connected with the Soviet representatives here). Mehmet left New York on the 11th and will arrive in Tirana about October 20th or 21st.

Best regards to you and Ramiz from Nexhmije and me.

Enver

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Central Archives of the Party.

1) "Excellent" (Russian).
EVEN IF WE HAVE TO GO WITHOUT BREAD, WE ALBANIANS DO NOT VIOLATE PRINCIPLES, WE DO NOT BETRAY MARXISM-LENINISM

(Contribution to the Discussion at the Meeting of the Political Bureau of the CC of the PLA) (1)

October 31, 1960

The Plenum of the Central Committee of our Party charged us to prepare the draft of the speech which will be delivered at the Moscow Meeting. This draft has been prepared and distributed to you for examination and discussion. As you see, a great deal is said there about the Soviet leadership. In our opinion this is correct, for the Soviet leaders have deviated from Marxism-Leninism and have fallen into opportunism and revisionism.

We think that at the Moscow Meeting, which will be held in November, there may not be any other speech like ours. As we have been informed, the speech of the Chinese comrades will not be sugared either; the opportunist line of the Soviet leadership will be exposed in it. The Chinese comrades will deal at length with the theoretical questions over which they have been unjustly accused by the Soviet leadership, with Khrushchev at the head. Theirs will not be an academic speech, but will have concrete facts, which will illustrate the grave errors of the Soviet leaders.

Our speech, too, does not rest only on dry facts, but these facts are linked with theoretical problems and conclusions. Our facts argue that the Soviet leaders have violated the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the joint decisions. But we do not treat these problems according to the structure of the draft Declara-

1) At this meeting the speech of the CC of the PLA to be delivered at the Moscow Meeting of the communist and workers' parties of November 1960 was approved. This speech was also put before the 20th Plenum of the CC of the PLA (November 1, 1960), which approved it unanimously. The Plenum likewise appointed the delegation headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha, along with Comrades Mehmet Shehu, Hysni Kapo, and Ramiz Alia, which would take part in the proceedings of that meeting.
tion of the Moscow Meeting prepared by the commission.

Why do we think we should act in this way? We keep in mind the fact that previously, during J.V. Stalin's lifetime, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union always defended our Party, but this is not so today. The present actions of the Soviet leaders toward our Party must be considered as negative. The present-day leaders of the Soviet Union are opposed to us, because we criticize them straight and hard. They, however, do not accept our criticism, they are arrogant, and the main thing is that they have deviated from Marxism-Leninism. About this we must have no illusions whatever. This is an entire line of Khrushchev and company; therefore their attitude toward us will not be correct.

During all our activity the Soviet leaders have seen where the contradictions between us and them lie. One of these is the opposite attitudes we and they adopt with respect to modern revisionism, particularly the Yugoslav variety. On many other questions of principle relating to foreign policy we have been in opposition to them. They have understood that we do not agree, either, with the attitude they maintain toward Stalin. But our greatest political and ideological contradictions with them have been especially on the question of the attitude toward revisionism. After the Bucharest Meeting, the Soviet leadership began disgraceful hostile attacks on us. They have gone even further, even so far as to tell the Chinese delegation that "we shall treat Albania in the same way as Yugoslavia."

Thus it is important, for the present and the future of our Party, that we maintain a Marxist-Leninist attitude. Therefore, we must be conscious of the resolute policy we are pursuing and the difficulties that we shall encounter on our course. In these directions we must mobilize all our forces, organize our struggle and resistance, for things will not go smoothly.

We have been and remain encircled. Now a difficult situation is being created for us even with the countries of people's democracy, as well as with the Soviet Union. Such a situation will become steadily worse, with the aim of completely isolating our country politically and economically. This situation which is being created does not pass without being noticed by imperialism which, together with the revisionists, will try to attack our sincere ties with China, for we have unity of views with it and with a series of other countries, both in Asia and in Latin America. The imperialist and revisionist enemies will make
extensive preparations to attack us, but we shall fight invincibly through to the end, consistently defending Marxism-Leninism, our Homeland and socialism.

The Central Committee, the Political Bureau, our entire Party have had their say since the preliminary information was discussed over what went on at the Bucharest Meeting — that we shall remain firm on the Marxist-Leninist line and shall make no concession whatever on principles. Let us not fear to criticize anyone who distorts these principles, as the leadership of the Soviet Union and the leaderships of some other parties are doing at present. The correctness of our line will win, Marxism-Leninism will triumph.

The just, principled struggle of our Party against revisionism has demonstrated, and continues to demonstrate, the correctness of its line. Several years have gone by, changes have been made, and situations have been created even in favor of revisionism, but everything has confirmed the correctness of our line. We do not withdraw from this correct course. The personal spite and the vengeance of Khrushchev and other leaders who follow him do not frighten us. We shall defend the Marxist-Leninist principles, and we are convinced that they are on a wrong course. Khrushchev and his followers bear a great responsibility toward our camp and Marxism-Leninism; with their stand they have caused splits in the ranks of our camp. And now they think that these things can be glossed over by issuing from the Moscow Meeting a Declaration with a few general phrases that are neither one thing nor the other.

From all the data it is clear that the Soviet leadership is taking no step forward, but is insisting on its own views. There may be some phrases against imperialism in the Declaration, but it is a fact that in essence the Soviet leadership is not changing its attitude; indeed, it has taken a great step backward between the meeting with the Chinese comrades in September and the meeting of the editorial commission for the draft Declaration of the Moscow Meeting, in which they say that they have allegedly made no mistakes. This is not a Marxist-Leninist stand. Therefore our speech at the Moscow Meeting in November will meet strong opposition from the Soviet leadership. We must bear this in mind.

Of course, there will be leaderships of other parties who will back the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and these will not be few. There will be also some who will sit on
Some parties continue to live with the myth of the infallibility of the Soviet leadership. They are at the stage in which we were previously, too. In Stalin's lifetime we were fully convinced spiritually and morally that the road of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was correct; therefore we backed it with absolute faith. But time will bring to light the dirty linen of the current Soviet leaders, these present-day revisionists. Until now we have defended the principles, but without casting the stone at the Soviet leadership. Today, however, the time has come to put the finger on the sore spot. The problem is that we must root out the evil completely. This will not be an easy task; the struggle will be protracted.

Revisionism must be fought from the theoretical viewpoint, otherwise it will become a gangrenous wound. In recent years the Yugoslav revisionists have strengthened their positions, aided by the soft treatment and the policy of appeasement pursued toward them by the Soviet leaders with Khrushchev at the head. Therefore, if we do not fight them, they will become still more dangerous. Likewise, since we are convinced that the Soviet leaders are on a revisionist road, then we must be resolute in the struggle against them, for only through a principled and consistent struggle can real unity be attained, and not through phrases which hide the truth. Therefore, if the draft Declaration of the Moscow Meeting is going to speak of unity when there is no unity, this will mean deceiving the parties and peoples.

The situation of the Soviet leadership will get worse, and it will snowball. In its domestic and foreign policies the mistakes will be deepened, and this it will strive to cover up. Tito has come out openly as a demagogue and agent of imperialism, and he is constantly using demagogy, while Khrushchev and others have begun to make approaches to him, to such an extent that they work on his speeches at the party school. We understand how difficult it is to expose the present Soviet leadership, which has in its hands such mighty economic and propaganda potential; but we are not going to reconcile ourselves to it, and we shall win because we are right. N.S. Khrushchev is greatly discredited, but he can win renown by making some adventurous gesture — for example, like threatening the Americans who may interfere in Cuba and demanding their withdrawal. With such actions the struggle against Khrushchev on an international scale becomes more difficult, for he hands out a lump of sugar and then twenty
poisons for communism.

We have no pretensions that we shall change the balance of forces, but we shall have our say, and whoever so desires may listen and judge it dispassionately. There will also be those who will call our principled stand "madness." But it does not matter. Those who think so today will change their opinion tomorrow, for they will see how correct is the stand of our Party. Time will prove this. These things we must bear in mind, too.

By our word and deed we must give all the other parties to understand that the Party of Labor of Albania seeks unity, but unity only on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and on no other basis. We must defend Marxism-Leninism and the individuality of our Party without wavering. Our Party also disagrees with the point of view of Kozlov, who posed the question: "Either with the Soviet Union, or with China." There will be people who will draw conclusions in this spirit, and will think that Albania broke with the Soviet Union and went with China. This is a distortion of principle. We are opposed to whoever violates the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and defend whoever guards these principles.

Even if we have to go without bread, we Albanians do not violate principles, we do not betray Marxism-Leninism. Let this be clear to all, friends and enemies.

Our Party has won its correct, Marxist-Leninist individuality with undaunted struggle in defense of principles, with revolutionary work, withstanding the tests of time, especially now that revisionist stands have been openly manifested in the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Time and the struggle have given our Party an ever greater maturity; hence it understands the problems very much better today. Our Party was in a position to understand the hostile attitudes not only in our Party, but also in the other parties; therefore our Party has demonstrated its own individuality on many questions, in opposition also to the present line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

We must bring this out at this time. We say without reservation that all the evils that are apparent in the socialist camp today have their source in the errors of the present Soviet leadership. This is our view, which they cannot make us change, even with the threats that will be made toward us to the effect that "Albania is an encircled country, it has economic needs," etc. But let those gentlemen who speak in this way know that
Albania and the Albanian communists do not sell themselves either for rubles, for wheat, or for dollars. Whoever wants unity with us, let him build the relations only on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. As to aid, those who are Marxists and friends of our people must give it to us. We, too, must honor our commitments to real friends. As to the pseudo-friends who dishonor their pledges, they harm themselves in the first place, while the prestige of our Party grows.

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of the PLA in the Central Archives
of the Party.
WHETHER ALBANIA IS A SOCIALIST COUNTRY OR NOT DOES NOT DEPEND ON KHRUSHCHEV, BUT IT HAS BEEN DECIDED BY THE ALBANIAN PEOPLE THROUGH THE WARS THEY HAVE FOUGHT AND THE BLOOD THEY HAVE SHED

(From a Conversation with Y. Andropov in Moscow)

November 8, 1960

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: I was informed today that Khrushchev had expressed the wish to meet me tomorrow at 11 a.m. I read the Soviet document in which Albania does not figure as a socialist country.

Y. ANDROPOV: What document is this, I do not understand you, tell me concretely what material you mean, where this has been said?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: This is the material of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union addressed to the Communist Party of China.(1)

Y. ANDROPOV: But why should you be concerned about it? This is a letter to China. What has China to do with Albania?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: And this made my meeting with Khrushchev definitely impossible.

Y. ANDROPOV: I do not understand you. What is said about you in that material?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Read it and you will see.

Y. ANDROPOV: I have read it and am very familiar with its content, since I myself participated in drawing it up. But your statement, Comrade Enver, is a very serious one.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Yes, it is serious. Tell Khrushchev that whether Albania is a socialist country or not does not

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1) The 125-page letter of November 1960, which the CC of the CPSU sent to the CC of the CP of China, in which besides the accusations which the CC of the CPSU brought against the CPC, it ignored the existence of the PR of Albania as a socialist country and maligned the Party of Labor of Albania.
depend on Khrushchev, but has been decided by the Albanian people themselves through the wars they have fought and the blood they have shed. This has been decided by the Party of Labor of Albania, which has marched, and will always march, on the Marxist-Leninist road.

Y. ANDROPOV: I do not understand you, Comrade Enver; that material is meant for China. What has it to do with Albania?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: I speak on behalf of my homeland, my people, my country.

Y. ANDROPOV: This is a very serious statement, and I can only express my regret over it.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: We shall have the meeting of the parties, and there our Party will express its opinion. That's all! Goodbye!

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A. Mikoyan is the first to speak. Expressing his "regret" over the disagreements that have arisen between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Party of Labor of Albania, he accuses our Party of allegedly being the cause of these disagreements, of "not having the same trust as before. . ." in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He complains of our officers' having allegedly completely changed their attitude toward the Soviet officers at the naval base of Vlora, and asks: "Do you want to leave the Warsaw Treaty?. . .", etc. He claims that the Soviet leadership allegedly stands for the clearing up of these "misunderstandings" in the best way. "Tell us," he went on, "where our mistakes are, we shall not get angry. We get angry only when you talk behind our backs."

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Tell us when and where we have said anything against you behind your backs. With us Albanians, it is not the custom to talk behind someone's back.

What you said concerning the military base of Vlora is not true. There is a close friendship between the Albanian and Soviet officers and men there. This was the case until the Bucharest Meeting, and it will continue to be so as far as we are concerned. The Central Committee of the Party has instructed our men at the Vlora base to maintain a correct attitude toward the Soviet
personnel. But some of your sailors have attacked ours. It has also issued instructions that these matters should be settled through the party basic organization. An incident took place between an officer of our navy and a Soviet rear-admiral who came from Sevastopol on an inspection and who was addicted to drink. Quite improperly he got hold of one of our officers, a good comrade who had studied in the Soviet Union, and demanded that he tell him what was decided at the 18th Plenum of the Central Committee, because, he said, "he would be giving lectures on this matter in Sevastopol and would be asked about it." Our officer replied that the communiqué on the Plenum of the Central Committee had been published in the newspaper (2) so what more did he want? He took his hat and left and reported the matter to his commander. Your comrades had the rear-admiral on the mat, he begged our pardon, and the incident was closed.

Concerning the delivery of the submarines: Our seamen were trained for two and a half years in Sevastopol, and they had distinguished themselves in firing practice. Our Staff and our seamen had prepared themselves to receive the submarines in a solemn manner. There is a Soviet rear-admiral in our Staff. We do not know exactly what he is, but a rear-admiral he certainly is not. He said, "The submarines cannot be handed over to you because you are not trained." The comrades of our Ministry of Defense questioned the validity of this statement. Were it necessary for our military men to study for some months longer, they should have been informed about it. But the Soviet Staff itself had said that the Albanian crews had completed their training.

Then they told us that winter had come, that seas were stormy. Our comrades came here, to your admiralty, stated their case and received the reply that "the submarines would be handed over to them." But again came the order from your people not to give them to us. When we were in Tirana, our Ministry of Defense sent a letter to Gorshkov, (3) explained the matter in comradely terms, just as I put it to you. The letter said that if several more months were needed to train our seamen,

2) Zeri i Popullit, September 9, 1960.

3) Sergey Gorshkov, Soviet admiral, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR.
you could tell us so. But the reason does not lie here.

A. MIKOYAN: And where does it lie?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: It is up to you to tell us this. But this is not the main problem. . . . Let us come now to the question of our leaving the Warsaw Treaty, since you mentioned this at the start. . . .

A. MIKOYAN: We did not, but such was the impression created.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: How can such an impression be created — on the basis of what a certain rear-admiral says? Let us consider this question, for there are more serious things in it.

A. MIKOYAN: Really? We know nothing of them.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: How is it that you know nothing of them? If this is the case, it is not right that your Central Committee does not know about them. Do you know that we have been threatened with expulsion from the Warsaw Treaty? Grechko (4) made such a threat.

A. MIKOYAN: We know nothing about it. Tell us.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: We shall tell you all right, for it is a matter of principle. Two of your marshals, Malinovsky and Grechko, have said such a thing. You must know this.

COMRADE HYSNI KAPO: On October 22nd I informed Polyansky of this.

A. MIKOYAN: You may not believe me, but I do not know.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Since you put the matter in this way, that you know nothing about it, we must remind you that four months ago we wrote you a letter concerning your ambassador. Why did you not follow the Leninist practice of your Party and reply to us?

F. KOZLOV: We shall send you another ambassador.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: You say so now, but why have you not written to us? We wrote to you four months ago but have received no answer.

A. MIKOYAN: We did well not to answer you. And this is why: for 15 years now our ambassadors have been going to the party committees to ask for information. This has been so in Albania, too. Is it interference on the part of our ambassador to

4) Marshal Grechko, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty.
ask the Chairman of the Central Auditing Commission (5) about what went on at the Plenum? (6)

**COMRADE ENVER HOXHA:** Yes, it is interference and entirely impermissible. I can say that in our country nothing has been hidden from the Soviet personnel. For 16 years we have followed the practice of informing you about all important documents and decisions of the Central Committee of our Party and Government. Why have we done this? Because we have been sincere and frank with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. You have no right to accuse our Party of bad behavior toward the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We have been very closely linked with the Soviet comrades, from the ambassador to the ordinary specialist. All doors have been open to them.

**A. MIKOYAN, M. SUSLOV:** Precisely, that is so.

**COMRADE ENVER HOXHA:** We think that perhaps no other Party has behaved in this way toward the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Why have we done this? Because we have considered the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the Party which, under Lenin's leadership, carried out the Great Socialist Revolution and was the first to open the way to socialism and communism.

We have had disagreements prior to the Bucharest Meeting, and we shall tell you them. For example, on the question of Yugoslav revisionism. But we have gone about it in such a way that nothing has leaked out. Why have our relations deteriorated after Bucharest? What did we say at Bucharest? We expressed our attitude, stressing that the disagreements which were presented by Khrushchev at the Bucharest Meeting were over matters concerning the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, and that the Party of Labor of Albania reserved the right to voice its opinion about them at the Moscow Meeting. Why, then, was our Party attacked?

We do not agree with the Bucharest Meeting, but we did nothing to make you change your attitude toward us one hundred percent. First of all, your ambassador behaved in a

5) Koço Tashko.

6) The 17th Plenum of the CC of the PLA (July 11-12, 1960), which approved the activity of the delegation of the PLA to the Bucharest Meeting.
despicable manner toward us. We liked him. After the Bucharest Meeting, and especially after his return from Moscow, he began to attack us and behave contemptuously toward us.

A. MIKOYAN: I have never thought he would go as far as that.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: That means you do not believe us. Do not forget that I am the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor. I have been and am a friend of the Soviet Union. You can fail to believe me, but you believe your chinovniks. (7) What interest has the Party of Labor of Albania in creating disagreements and saying false things about the ambassador of the Soviet Union?

A. MIKOYAN: I believe that you are not interested in this. The ambassador has spoken no ill of you. Personally, he is a good man.

M. SUSLOV: But not very bright, especially politically.

A. MIKOYAN: Tell us, what should we do to improve our relations? We shall replace the ambassador.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Things are not as simple as that. We do not maintain only diplomatic relations but also inter-party links, and these must be on a Marxist-Leninist basis. For example, Ambassador Ivanov had contact with me. Why should he meet the Chairman of the Auditing Commission?

I am the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. Have I asked you why you expelled Zhukov? (8) Up to now I know nothing. The Soviet ambassador has always come to ask me about the Plenums of our Party, and I have informed him about them. He came and asked me about the proceedings of this Plenum. I told him what was to be told. Since the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party told him that much, he should have gone home to bed. Otherwise, if your ambassador is going to get hold of one and the other, he and his friends are not diplomats and representatives of a socialist country, but intelli-

7) Chinovniks (Russian)-professional officials of Tsarist Russia. Such bureaucratic officials were also cultivated by revisionism in the USSR.

8) Member of the CC of the CPSU, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Minister of Defense of the USSR. While he was on a visit to the PR of Albania, the Khrushchev group discharged him from all functions and informed him of this as soon as he landed in Moscow upon his return from Tirana.
gence agents. The staff of the embassy, through Bespalov, got hold of the Chairman of the Auditing Commission and "worked" on him in two sessions. Then, for the third session, he was invited to dinner in the name of the ambassador, at the residence of the first secretary of the embassy. There were three of them: the ambassador, the counsellor and the secretary. And there our comrade, who 15 days before had agreed with the decision of the Plenum, with the line of our Central Committee, was opposed to the line of the Party. Now I ask you: can an ambassador be allowed to act in this manner and on his own responsibility?

We think that all these actions were aimed at creating disruption in our Party. Your ambassador went even further. At the airport, alluding to the Bucharest events, he asked our generals, "With whom will the army side?"

A. MIKOYAN, F. KOZLOV: He is a fool.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: I respect you, but we cannot swallow such "excuses," although we lack your experience.

The question of the invitation Khrushchev sent me is very important. First I decided to accept it. But when I read your material, the letter addressed to the Chinese comrades on November 5th, I saw that Albania was not included in the socialist camp. All the countries of people's democracy of Europe are mentioned there with the exception of Albania.

M. SUSLOV: Neither is the Soviet Union mentioned there.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: What are you trying to tell us!? Were I in your place, I would admit that it is wrong. Ivanov has acted in this way, Grechko likewise, such things are written in the document, Khrushchev has told the Chinese delegation disgraceful things about Albania, but you admit nothing, whereas we have always been sincere with you. Kosygin did not behave well toward me in a conversation we had, either. He behaved as if he were an overlord. He said: "In your Party there are enemies that want to split us."

This year, because of very unfavorable natural conditions, we were badly in need of bread grain. We had bread for only 15 days. We asked you for 50 thousand tons of wheat. We waited for 45 days but received no reply. Then we bought it in France with convertible currency. The French merchant came immediately to Albania to size up the situation. He asked, "How is such a thing possible? Albania has never bought grain from the Western countries. The Soviet Union is selling grain everywhere." In order to dispel his doubts we told him, "The Soviet Union has
given us grain as well as maize, but we use it to feed pigs." We know where you sell your grain, where the Rumanians, the Germans sell theirs: in England and elsewhere. You put conditions on us, and we were obliged to offer you gold to buy the grain we needed.

A. MIKOYAN: We have not refused to supply you with grain. I know that grain has been shipped to you every month. You proposed to our people to pay in gold, and they accepted. Why should we want your currency?!

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Comrade Pospyelov, when you were in Albania, you have seen what love our people nurture for the Soviet Union. But now you seek this love from Koço Tashko and Liri Belishova, and not from us.

The tactic you are following is completely wrong. You should have talked with me before you wrote those things in the letter I mentioned. But when you accuse our Party and its leadership of being anti-Soviet, of being criminals, and, as you say, of resorting to "Stalinist methods," and after you have made all these public accusations, you want to talk with me, this I can never accept.

A. MIKOYAN: We invited you to talk earlier but you refused.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Things are not as you say. I had taken some days off. It was only partly a vacation, because I was working on the report for the Party Congress. (9) Comrade Hysni told me that Ivanov had informed him that if he wished, Comrade Enver could go to rest in the Soviet Union. But he did not tell me anything about the meeting with Khrushchev.

COMRADE HYSNI KAPO: In regard to your letter in which you invited us to hold talks, it was quite clear what we were going to talk about.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: The letter said that we should meet to discuss the question of China.

A. MIKOYAN: Not the question of China. The word "China" is not even mentioned there. (10) You refused to meet us.

9) The 4th Congress of the Party, which it had been decided to hold in November 1960. Later, due to the Meeting of the 81 communist and workers' parties in Moscow, it was postponed until February 1961.

10) A downright lie on the part of A. Mikoyan. The letter of August 13th that the CC of the CPSU sent to the CC of the PLA said expressly:
COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU: How can such a thing be denied! How can you behave in such a way toward our country! Shame on you, Comrade Kozlov, that you allow yourself to present small Albania with an ultimatum: "Either with us or with China!"

F. KOZLOV: When your delegation passed through here, I said only that I was surprised at Comrade Kapo's position. Your stand was different from that of other parties. We have treated you so very well. When Comrade Enver spoke in Leningrad, he said that the Albanian people feel that they are not one million but 201 million.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: I still say it, too, but not if you do not think of China. Both you and we should be for the unity of our camp, for a billion-strong camp. We love the Soviet Union but we have a great love for the Chinese people and the Communist Party of China, too. Why is it, Comrade Kozlov, that since Bucharest you speak of "zigzags" by our Party and ask with whom we will side, "with the 200 or the 600 million?" At a meeting at which the ambassadors of other countries were present, you said that a single bomb would be enough to turn Albania into dust and ashes.

COMRADE HYSNI KAPO: You said that we allegedly talk behind your backs. But on October 22nd, Khrushchev told the Chinese representative that from then on he would maintain the same stand with respect to Albania as to Yugoslavia.

Y. ANDROPOV: That is how things stood: in a conversation we had with the Chinese comrades, Comrade Khrushchev said that some Albanian leaders are dissatisfied because the question of Berlin is not yet settled.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: And I am the one who said it. After Khrushchev returned from Paris, Ivanov asked me about the Berlin question. I answered: In my personal opinion, imperialism is badly shaken, our positions are strong, and in America there is a favorable political situation that could be utilized for the settlement of the Berlin question. This was my personal opinion.

"The Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties held in Bucharest showed that between the Communist Party of China and the other sister parties there is a different understanding of a series of important problems of the international situation and the tactics of the communists parties. . . ." (See also p. 85.)
A. MIKOYAN: There is nothing wrong with that, but not as someone who offended us put it, saying to our officers: ". . . Berlin scared you, you did not keep your word, etc. . . ."

Y. ANDROPOV: It is in connection with these words that Khrushchev said that we have had good relations with the Albanians, but now, as things stand, we cannot trust them. We lost Albania. . . .

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Even in these terms, this is not in the least comradely. What has the Bolshevik Party taught us? All these things have a source. Marxism-Leninism does not recognize that events can develop spontaneously. Hence you should go thoroughly into these matters. What are the reasons things came to this state after the Bucharest Meeting? We think it is up to you to tell us.

A. MIKOYAN: We may be wicked, but we are not fools. Why should we want our relations with you to become worse?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: We have asked this question, too. Apart from the fact that we have not been wrong, but even if we had, why did the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which has seen many things, not show a little patience with us Albanians; why did not its leadership say: "Well, the Albanians have made a mistake, but let us see what they have to say tomorrow, after they have thought things over."

You should know, comrades, that we are grieved when we see all these things which are occurring in the attitude of the leaders and other Soviet officials toward Albania and our Party of Labor. We say to you that the unhealthy spirit that exists among your people in Albania should be completely changed. Since the Bucharest Meeting, seeing what Ivanov and company are doing, I have not met and will not meet your people in Tirana.

A. MIKOYAN: Your cadres have changed their attitude toward us. The Central Committee of our Party is not mentioned. Khrushchev is mentioned only as a blunderer.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: I must tell you in a comradely way that Khrushchev often accused us of being "hot-headed." But Khrushchev himself should keep his tongue in leash, because every state, every person has his dignity. He has said that you will treat Albania the same as Yugoslavia.

P. POSPYELOV: With his sharp replies at the Bucharest Meeting, Comrade Kapo was not in order, either.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Even now we do not agree
with the Bucharest Meeting, as you organized it.

A. MIKOYAN: The Bucharest Meeting is another issue. Now the question is whether our relations should be improved or not. Comrade Khrushchev said today in his speech that we shall maintain friendship even with those parties with which we have differences. We must meet and talk things over.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: We are not against meetings. But we ask the comrades of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to be more careful, because to distribute among 80 and more parties a document in which Albania is excluded from the socialist countries, and then invite us to "come and talk," is completely unacceptable.

M. SUSLOV, A. MIKOYAN: Let's meet and talk about how we can improve our relations.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: We, too, seek to improve our relations.

M. SUSLOV: But not in that tone.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: I want to give you a piece of advice: Put out of your mind that we are hot-headed. When Marxism-Leninism and the interests of our people are at stake, we shall defend them ardently.

Published for the first time in Volume 19 according to the minutes of this meeting in the Central Archives of the Party.
WE HAVE FOUGHT EMPTY-BELLIED AND BARE-FOOTED, 
BUT HAVE NEVER KOWTOWED TO ANYBODY

(Conversation of the Delegation of the PLA Headed by 
Comrade Enver Hoxha, at a Meeting with N. S. Khrushchev 
in the Kremlin, Moscow) (1)

November 12, 1960

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: You have the floor, we are listening.
COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: You have invited us. The host 
should speak first.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: We accept the Albanians' terms. I do 
not understand what has happened since my visit to Albania in 
1959! Had you been dissatisfied with us even then, I must have 
been a blockhead and very naive not to have realized this. At that 
time we had nothing but nice words to say, apart from some 
jokes, like the one I made with Comrade Mehmet Shehu about 
the poplars. (2)

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: If this is intended to open up 
conversation, it is another matter. The joke about the poplars is 
out of place here.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: What other reason could there be 
then, why you have changed your attitudes towards us?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: It is not we who have 
changed our attitude, but you. We have had disagreements on 
previous occasions, as for example, over the stand to be taken 
toward the Yugoslav revisionists. But this change of attitude 
occurred after the Bucharest Meeting, and precisely on your part.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: I want to get one thing clear. I 
thought that we had no disagreements over Yugoslavia. You have

1) On November 12, 1960, the delegation of the PLA agreed to meet the 
representatives of the CPSU once more. Also present from the Soviet side at 
this meeting were A. Mikoyan, F. Kozlov, and Y. Andropov.

2) The sole criticism N. Khrushchev found it possible to make during his 
stay in Albania in May 1959 was that the poplars along our roads should be 
replaced with figtrees and plums!
spoken more than we have about this problem. We, too, have written about it, but dispassionately. We have stressed that the more said against them, the more their value would be increased. And that is what happened.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: In our opinion, that is not so.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: I speak for us. But I want to ask you: in what tone shall we speak? If you do not want our friendship, then tell us so.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: We want to be friends always. We want to talk in a friendly way. But this does not mean that we should see eye to eye with you on all matters.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: Three times we have invited you to talks. Do you want to break off relations with us?!

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: It is you who caused the deterioration of our relations after the Bucharest Meeting. We have pointed out many facts to your comrades. They should have told you.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: I do not quite understand this. I had no conflict with Comrade Hysni Kapo at the Bucharest Meeting. He said that he was not authorized by the CC of the PLA to take a definite stand on the questions under discussion.

COMRADE HYSNI KAPO: At Bucharest I expressed our Party's opinion that the Bucharest Meeting was premature and held in contravention of the Leninist organizational norms; that the disagreements discussed there were disagreements between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, and that the Party of Labor of Albania would express its opinion at a future meeting. Thereupon you said that you were amazed at the stand taken by the Party of Labor of Albania. You said this both at the meeting of the 12 parties of the socialist countries and at the broader meeting of 50 and more parties. In reality, we had told you our stand before we spoke at the meeting of the 12 parties. I had spoken with Andropov about this. After he informed you of our talk, you told him to tell the Albanians that they must think things over and change their stand.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: The Central Committee of our Party has never accepted the Bucharest Meeting. From the very beginning, I was fully informed of all that was going on at Bucharest.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: This is of no great importance. The point is that even before the Bucharest Meeting you were not in
agreement with us, but you said nothing about this to us. And we
considered you as friends. I am to blame for having trusted you
so much.

COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU: I ask Comrade Khrushchev
to recall our talks of 1957. We spoke to you with open hearts
about all the problems, including that of the activity of the
Yugoslav revisionists. You listened to us, then after a telling reply
to you by Comrade Enver, you rose to your feet and said, "Do
you want to put us back on Stalin's road?" That means that you
knew long ago that we thought about the Yugoslav revisionists
differently from you. You knew this at least as early as April
1957. But you should also remember that in 1955, when you
were about to go to Yugoslavia, we replied to your letter in
which you suggested changing the attitude that should be main­
tained toward the Yugoslav revisionists, that the problem should
first be analyzed by the Information Bureau which should make
the decision.

A. MIKOYAN: Yes, that is what happened.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: You say that new people with little
experience have come to power in the Soviet Union. Do you
want to teach us?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: No, there is no need. This is
an internal question of yours. But do you know what your
ambassador has said? Other things apart, I shall tell you only one
fact that has to do with the army. He has asked to whom the
Albanian Army will be loyal. This question he addressed to our
generals at the airport, in the presence of one of your generals.
Our officers replied that our army would be loyal to Marxism-
Leninism, to the Party of Labor and socialism.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: If our ambassador said such a thing,
he was foolish.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Yes, but this is political
foolishness.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: This is every sort of foolishness.

A. MIKOYAN: Do you think that such behavior by our
ambassador expresses our line?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: A fool's foolishness, even of a
political character, may be excused once, but when it is repeated
many times over, then this is a line.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: Yes, that is true.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Your ambassador has been a
friend of our Party, and ours personally. He was no fool.
committed this "foolishness" following the Bucharest Meeting. Why did he not display such "foolishness" prior to the Bucharest Meeting, during the three consecutive years he stayed in Albania? That is astonishing.

A. MIKOYAN: It is not astonishing, but previously he used to receive information from you regularly and had not noticed such behavior on your part.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: It seems to me that you said that he did not know that there were disagreements between us....

A. MIKOYAN: Comrade Enver told us that previously he used to tell Ivanov everything, but later he did not. Hence the changes in the behavior of the ambassador. We have discussed these things.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: If we have discussed these things, as Mikoyan says, then why are we sitting here? If, after discussing matters, we say that we do not agree with you, you can then say to us, "We have discussed these things."

A. MIKOYAN: But we recalled our ambassador. Why do you harp on this question?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: All right, we will leave the ambassador aside, but what you have written about Albania and the Party of Labor in your letter to the Chinese comrades is monstrous.

A. MIKOYAN: We have expressed our opinion.

COMRADE RAMIZ ALIA: You publicly accuse us of anti-Sovietism. (He reads page 46 of the letter.)

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: This is our opinion. You must not get angry.

COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU: You attack us, and we should not get angry.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: We are sorry about what happened with these people. (3) You do not agree. I have not known Koço Tashko. I may perhaps have seen him, but even if you were to show me his photo, I would not remember him.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: If you want his photo, we may send it to you.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: I know Belishova less than you do. I know that she was a member of the Bureau. She told us about

3) Liri Belishova and Koço Tashko.
the talks she had in China. Kosygin told Comrade Mehmet this when Mehmet was in Moscow, and when he heard it he went white with rage. She is a courageous woman; she told us openly what she felt. This is a tragedy; you expelled her because she stood for friendship with us! That is why we wrote about this in the document.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: That is to say, you consider what has been written here, in your material, to be correct?

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: Yes, we do.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: There are two points here. First, you say that we expelled a member of the Bureau in an undemocratic way. Who told you that this was done not according to democratic rules and Leninist norms, but according to "Stalinist methods", as you call them?! Second, you say that we expelled her for pro-Sovietism, and that implies that we are anti-Soviet. Can you explain this to us?

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: If you have come here intending to disagree with us and break off relations, say so openly and we won't waste time.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: You did not answer our question. And you have distributed this material to all the parties.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: To those parties to which the Chinese have distributed their material.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: And we have our point of view which does not coincide with yours. Two or three times you have raised the question of whether we are for friendship or for breaking off relations. We came here to strengthen our friendship. But you admit none of your mistakes. You have made criticism of us, and so have we of you. You have criticized on the quiet and publicly, before all. You may have other criticisms. Tell us, and we shall tell you ours, so that our central committees may know them. The Central Committee of our Party has sent us here to strengthen our friendship.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: One of your comrades told our army-men that Khrushchev was not a Marxist.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: In connection with the question of the militarymen, we have talked with your comrades. How could it be in our interest to have our militarymen quarrel at the Vlora base?! Yet you produce "documents" to the effect that one of our comrades has allegedly said this and that. Have a
good look at your militarymen. I told Mikoyan that your rear-admiral at the Vlora naval base is not a rear-admiral.

**N. S. KHRUSHCHEV:** We can dismantle the base if you like.

**COMRADE ENVER HOXHA:** Then what Malinovsky and Grechko have said turns out to be true. Are you trying to threaten us? If the Soviet people hear that you want to dismantle the Vlora base, at a time when it is serving the defense of Albania and the other socialist countries of Europe, they will not forgive you for this. . . .

**N. S. KHRUSHCHEV:** Comrade Enver, don't raise your voice!

**COMRADE ENVER HOXHA:** If you dismantle the base you will be making a big mistake. We have fought empty-bellied and bare-footed, but have never kowtowed to anybody.

**N. S. KHRUSHCHEV:** The submarines are ours.

**COMRADE ENVER HOXHA:** Yours and ours, we are fighting for socialism. The territory of the base is ours. About the submarines we have signed agreements which recognize the rights of the Albanian State. I defend the interests of my country.

**A. MIKOYAN:** Your tone is such as if Khrushchev has given you nothing. We have talked among ourselves about the base. Khrushchev was not for dismantling it. I said to him, if our officers go on quarrelling with the Albanians, why should we keep the base?

**COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU:** You have treated us as enemies. Even here in Moscow you have carried out intelligence activities against us. You know this very well. (4)

**COMRADE ENVER HOXHA:** As the question was put here, we might just as well discuss it at the Warsaw Treaty. I want to say that while such a thing has occurred to you, it has never crossed our minds. And then, to say, "We shall dismantle it if you like!" Relations between the Albanians and the Soviet personnel at the Vlora base have always been good. Only since the Bucharest Meeting have some incidents taken place, and they were caused by your officers who were not in order. If you insist, we can call together the Warsaw Treaty. But the Vlora base is ours and will remain ours.

4) The reference is to the listening devices installed secretly by the Soviet revisionists both at the residence of the delegation of the PLA in Zarechye of Moscow and in the offices of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of Albania in Moscow.
N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: You flare up in anger. You spat on me; no one can talk to you.

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: You always say that we are hot-headed.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: You distort my words. Does your interpreter know Russian?

COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Don’t carp at the interpreter. He knows Russian very well. I respect you and you should respect me.

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: That is just how MacMillan wanted to talk to me.

COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU AND HYSNI KAPO: Comrade Enver is not MacMillan, so take that back!

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV: But where shall I put it?

COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU: Put it in your pocket.

COMRADE HYSNI KAPO (addressing the comrades of our delegation): I do not agree that the talks should be conducted like this.

Comrade Enver Hoxha and the other comrades rise and leave the room.

Published for the first time in abridged form in Volume 19 according to the minutes of the talk in the Central Archives of the Party.
Dear Comrades,

This meeting of the communist and workers' parties is of historic importance to the international communist movement, for it is making a detailed analysis of the international political situation, drawing up a balance sheet of the successes and mistakes that may have been observed along our course, helping us see more clearly the line we should pursue henceforth in order to score further successes to the benefit of socialism, communism and peace.

The existence of the socialist camp, headed by the Soviet Union, is already an accomplished fact in the world. The communist movement in general has been enlarged, strengthened and tempered. The communist and workers' parties throughout the world have become a colossal force which is leading mankind forward toward socialism, toward peace.

As the draft statement which has been prepared emphasizes, our socialist camp is very much stronger than that of the imperialists. Socialism is growing stronger and attaining new heights day by day, while imperialism is growing weaker and decaying. We should make use of all our means and forces to speed up this process. This will come about if we remain unwaveringly loyal to Marxism-Leninism and apply it correctly. Otherwise, we will retard this process, for we are faced with a ruthless enemy — imperialism, headed by US imperialism, which we must defeat and destroy.

1) The meeting of the 81 Communist and Workers' Parties was held in Moscow from the 10th of November to the 1st of December 1960. It was held in an extremely complicated situation of the international communist movement as a result of the spread of modern revisionism and the disruptive anti-Marxist activity of the Soviet leadership with Khrushchev at the head. The delegation of the PLA was headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha.
We want peace, while imperialism does not want peace and is preparing for a third world war. We must fight with all our might to avert a world war and to bring about the triumph of a just and democratic peace in the world. This will be achieved when we have forced imperialism to disarm. Imperialism will not give up its arms of its own free will. To believe anything of the kind is merely to deceive oneself and others. Therefore we should confront imperialism with the colossal economic, military, moral, political and ideological strength of the socialist camp, as well as with the combined strength of the peoples throughout the world, to sabotage in every way the war which the imperialists are preparing.

The Party of Labor of Albania has never hidden this situation and the threat with which imperialism is menacing peace-loving mankind, nor will it ever do so. We can assure you that the Albanian people, who detest war, have not been intimidated by this correct action of their Party. They have not become pessimistic, nor have they been marking time as far as socialist construction is concerned. They have a clear vision of their future and have set to work with full confidence, always vigilant, keeping the pick in one hand and the rifle in the other.

Our view is that imperialism, headed by American imperialism, should be mercilessly exposed, politically and ideologically, and at no time should we permit flattery, prettification or softness toward imperialism. No concessions of principle should be made to imperialism. The tactics and compromises which are permissible on our part should help our cause, not that of the enemy.

Facing a ruthless enemy, the guarantee for the triumph of our cause lies in our complete unity, which will be secured by eliminating the deep ideological differences which have been manifested, and by building this unity on the foundations of Marxism-Leninism, on equality, on brotherhood, on the spirit of comradeship and proletarian internationalism. Our Party believes that not only should we not have any ideological split, but we should maintain a unified political stand on all issues. Our tactics and strategy toward the enemy should be worked out by all our parties, based on Marxist-Leninist principles and on correct political criteria in accordance with the concrete existing situations.

All the peoples of the world aspire to, and fight for, freedom,
These sacred aspirations of theirs have been and are being suppressed by the capitalists, the feudal lords and the imperialists. Hence it is natural that the struggle of these peoples should be waged with great severity against the capitalists, feudal lords, and imperialists. It is also natural for the peoples of the world to seek allies in this battle for life, which they are waging against their executioners.

Therefore, in the struggle for peace, disarmament and social progress in the world, the socialist camp is not alone in facing the imperialist camp but is in close alliance with all the progressive peoples of the world, while the imperialists remain alone facing the socialist camp.

We are living at a time when we are witnessing the total destruction of colonialism, the elimination of this plague that has wiped peoples from the face of the earth. New states are springing up in Africa and Asia. The states where capital, the scourge, and the bullet reigned supreme, are putting an end to the yoke of bondage, and the people are taking their destiny into their own hands. This has been and is still being achieved thanks to the struggle of these peoples and the moral support given them by the Soviet Union, People's China, and the other countries of the socialist camp.

Traitors to Marxism-Leninism, agents of imperialism and intriguers, like Josip Broz Tito, are trying in a thousand ways, by hatching up diabolical schemes, to mislead the peoples and the newly formed states, to detach them from their natural allies, to link them directly with US imperialism. We should exert all our strength to defeat the schemes of these lackeys of imperialism.

We are witnessing the disintegration of imperialism, its decomposition, its final agony. We are living and fighting in the epoch which is characterized by the irresistible transition from capitalism to socialism. All the brilliant teachings of Karl Marx and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, which have never become outdated, as the revisionists claim, are being confirmed in practice.

World imperialism is being dealt heavy blows which clearly show that it is no longer in its "golden age," when it made the law as and when it wanted. The initiative has slipped from its hands, and this was not because of its own wish or desire. The initiative was wrested from it, not by mere words and discourses, but after a long process of bloody battles and revolutions which capitalism itself provoked against the proletariat, against the
strength of the peoples who were rising to smash the world of hunger and misery, the world of slavery. This glorious page was opened by the Great October Socialist Revolution, by the great Soviet Union, by great Lenin.

Even now, when it sees its approaching doom, when it has strong and determined opponents such as the socialist camp and its great alliance with all the peoples of the world, world imperialism, headed by US imperialism, is mustering, organizing, and arming its assault forces. It is preparing for war. He who fails to see this is blind. He who sees it but covers it up is a traitor in the service of imperialism.

The Party of Labor of Albania is of the opinion that in spite of the major difficulties we encounter on our way to establish peace in the world, to bring about disarmament and settle the other international problems, there is no reason to be pessimistic. It is only our enemies, who are suffering losses, that are and should be pessimistic. We have won, we are winning and shall continue to win. That is why we are convinced that our efforts will be crowned with success.

But we think that exaggerated, unrealistic optimism is not only not good, but is even harmful. He who denies, belittles, who has no faith in our great economic, political, military and moral strength, is a defeatist and does not deserve to be called a communist. On the other hand, he who, intoxicated by our potential, disregards the strength of the opponents, thinking that the enemy has lost all hope, has become harmless, and is entirely at our mercy — he is not a realist. He bluff's, lulls mankind to sleep in the face of all these complicated and very dangerous situations which demand very great vigilance from us all, which demand the heightening of the revolutionary drive of the masses, not its slackening, its disintegration, decomposition and relaxation. "Waters sleep, but not the enemy," is a wise saying of our long-suffering people.

Let us look facts straight in the eye. World imperialism, headed by its most aggressive detachment, US imperialism, is directing the course of its economy toward preparations for war. It is arming itself to the teeth. US imperialism is rearming Bonn's Germany, Japan, and all its allies and satellites with all kinds of weapons. It has set up and perfected aggressive military organizations, it has established, and continues to establish, military bases all around the socialist camp. It is accumulating stocks of nuclear
ENVER HOXHA

weapons and refuses to disarm, to stop testing nuclear weapons, and is feverishly engaged in inventing new means of mass extermination. Why is it doing all this? To go to a wedding party? No, to go to war against us, to do away with socialism and communism, to enslave the peoples.

The Party of Labor of Albania is of the opinion that if we were to say and think otherwise, we would be deceiving ourselves and others. We would not call ourselves communists if we were afraid of the vicissitudes of life. We communists detest war. We communists will fight to the end to smash the diabolical plans for war which the US imperialists are preparing, but if they declare war on us, we should deal them a mortal blow that will wipe imperialism from the face of the earth, once and for all.

Faced with the threats of atomic war by the US-led world imperialists, we should be fully prepared economically, politically and morally, as well as militarily, to cope with any eventuality.

We should prevent a world war, it is not absolutely inevitable. But no one will ever excuse us if we live in a dream and let the enemy catch us unawares, for it has never happened that the enemy is to be trusted, otherwise he would not be called an enemy. The enemy is and remains an enemy, and a perfidious one at that. He who puts his trust in the enemy will sooner or later lose his case. . . .

The peaceful policy of the countries of the socialist camp has exerted a major influence in exposing the aggressive aims of imperialism, in mobilizing the people against the war-mongers, in promoting their glorious struggle against the imperialist oppressors and their tools. . . .

But in spite of all this, many concrete problems which have been laid on the table, like the proposals for disarmament, the summit conference, etc., have not yet been resolved and are being systematically sabotaged by the US imperialists.

What conclusions should we draw from all this? The Party of Labor of Albania thinks that imperialism — and, first and foremost, US imperialism — has not changed its hide, its hair or its nature. It is aggressive, and will remain aggressive as long as it has a single tooth left in its mouth. And being aggressive, it may plunge the world into a war. Therefore, as we emphasized at the meeting of the Editorial Committee, we insist that it should be brought home clearly to all the peoples that there is no absolute guarantee against world war until socialism has triumphed.
throughout the world, or at least in the majority of countries. The US imperialists make no secret of their refusal to disarm. They are increasing their armaments, preparing for war; therefore we should be on our guard.

We should make no concessions of principle to the enemy, we should entertain no illusions about imperialism. Despite our good intentions, we would make things infinitely worse. In addition to rearming and preparing war against us, the enemy is carrying on unbridled propaganda to poison the spirit and benumb the minds of the people. They spend millions of dollars to recruit agents and spies, millions of dollars to organize acts of espionage, diversion and murder in our countries. US imperialism has given and is giving thousands of million of dollars to its loyal agents, the treacherous Tito gang. It is doing all this to weaken our internal front, to split us, to weaken and disorganize our rear areas.

A lot is said about peaceful coexistence. Some even go so far as to assert such absurdities as that People's China and Albania are allegedly opposed to peaceful coexistence. Obviously, such harmful and erroneous views should be refuted once and for all. There can be no socialist state, there can be no communist, who is opposed to peaceful coexistence, who is a war-monger. Great Lenin was the first to put forward the principle of peaceful coexistence among states of different social orders as an objective necessity, as long as socialist and capitalist states exist side by side in the world. Standing loyal to this great principle of Lenin's, our Party of Labor has always held, and still holds, that the policy of peaceful coexistence corresponds to the fundamental interests of all the peoples, to the purpose of the further strengthening of the positions of socialism. Therefore, this principle of Lenin's is the basis of the foreign policy of our people's state.

Peaceful coexistence between two opposing systems does not imply, as the modern revisionists claim, that we should give up the class struggle. On the contrary, the class struggle must continue, the political and ideological struggle against imperialism, against bourgeois and revisionist ideology, should become ever more intense. While struggling consistently to establish Leninist peaceful coexistence, while making no concessions on principles to imperialism, we should develop the class struggle in the capitalist countries, as well as the national liberation movement of the peoples of colonial and dependent countries.
In our view, the communist and workers' parties in the capitalist countries should strive to establish peaceful coexistence between their countries, which are still under the capitalist system, and our socialist countries. . . . But their task does not end there. In these countries it is necessary to promote, intensify and strengthen the class struggle. The working masses, led by the proletariat of the country headed by the communist party, and in alliance with the proletariat of the whole world, should make life impossible for imperialism, should crush its military and economic potential, should wrest from its hands its economic and political power, and proceed to the destruction of the old power and the establishment of the new power of the people. Will they do this by violence, or in the peaceful parliamentary way?

This question has been clear, and it was not necessary for Comrade Khrushchev to confuse it in the 20th Congress, and to do so in such a way as to please the opportunists. Why was it necessary to make all those parodies of Lenin's clear theses and of the lessons of the October Socialist Revolution? The Party of Labor of Albania is quite clear about, and does not shift from, Lenin's teachings on this matter. So far, no people, no proletariat and no communist or workers' party has assumed power without bloodshed and without violence.

It is incorrect for some comrades to claim that they assumed power without bloodshed, for they forget that the glorious Soviet Army poured out rivers of blood for them during the Second World War.

Our Party thinks that, in regard to this matter, we should be prepared for both eventualities, and we should be well prepared, especially, for taking power by violence, for if we are well prepared for this, the other possibility has more chance of success. The bourgeoisie may allow you to sing psalms, but then it deals you a fascist blow on the head and crushes you, because you have not trained the necessary cadres to attack, or done illegal work, you have not prepared a place where you can protect yourself and still work, or the means with which to fight. We should forestall this tragic eventuality.

The Party of Labor of Albania is and will be for peace and peaceful coexistence, and will fight for them in a Marxist-Leninist way, as Lenin taught us, and on the basis of the Moscow Declaration. It has been, is, and will be striving actively for general disarmament. On no occasion, not for one moment, will
the Party of Labor of Albania cease waging a political and ideological struggle against the activities of the imperialists and capitalists and against bourgeois ideology. It will not cease waging a stern, ceaseless and uncompromising struggle against modern revisionism, and in particular, against Yugoslav Titoite revisionism. There may be comrades who reproach us Albanians with being stubborn, hot-headed, sectarian, dogmatic, and whatever you like, but we reject all these false accusations and tell them that we do not deviate from these positions, for they are Marxist-Leninist positions.

They say that we are in favor of war and against coexistence. Comrade Kozlov has even put this alternative to us Albanians: either coexistence, as he conceives it, or an atomic bomb from the imperialists, which would turn Albania to ashes and leave no Albanian alive. Until now no representative of US imperialism has made such atomic threat against the Albanian people. But here it is, and from a Member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and to whom? To a small heroic country, to a people who have fought for centuries against countless savage enemies and who have never bent the knee, to a small country and a people who have fought with unprecedented heroism against the Hitlerites and Italian fascists, to a party which stands loyal and consistent to the end to Marxism-Leninism. But Comrade Frol Kozlov, you have the wrong address. You cannot frighten us into submitting to your mistaken wishes, and we never confuse the glorious Party of Lenin with you, who behaves so badly, with such shamelessness, toward the Albanian people and the Party of Labor of Albania. The Party of Labor of Albania will strive for, and support, all the correct and peaceful proposals of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp, as well as of other peace-loving countries.

The Party of Labor of Albania will exert all its strength, use all its rights and carry out all its obligations, to strengthen the unity of the socialist camp, a Marxist-Leninist unity. It is absurd to think that small socialist Albania wants to break away and live outside the socialist camp, outside our fraternity of socialist peoples. Albania is indebted to no one for its presence within the ranks of the socialist camp; the Albanian people themselves and the Party of Labor of Albania have placed it there with their blood and sweat, their work and sacrifices, with the system of government which they have established, and with the Marxist-
Leninist line they pursue. But let no one even think that because Albania is a small country, because the Party of Labor of Albania is a small party, it should do what someone else says when it is convinced that that someone is mistaken.

As I said earlier, the Party of Labor of Albania thinks that our socialist camp, which has one common aim and which is guided by Marxism-Leninism, should also have its own strategy and tactics, and these should be worked out together by our parties and states of the socialist camp. Within the ranks of our camp we have set up certain forms of organization of work, but the truth is that these have remained somewhat formal, or, to put it better, they do not function in a collective way — for instance, the organs of the Warsaw Treaty and the Council for Mutual Economic Aid. (2) Let me make it quite clear. This is not a question of whether we, too, should be consulted or not. Of course, no one denies us the right to be consulted, but we should hold meetings for consultation. We raise this problem on principle and say that these forms of organization should function at regular intervals, problems should be taken up for discussion, decisions should be adopted, and there should be a check-up on the implementation of these decisions.

The development and further strengthening of the economies of our socialist countries has been, and always is, the main concern of our parties and governments, and constitutes one of the decisive factors of the unconquerable strength of the socialist camp.

The construction of socialism and communism is proceeding at a rapid rate in our countries. This is due to the great efforts of our peoples and to the reciprocal aid they render one another.

So far, the People's Republic of Albania has given economic aid to no one, first, because we are poor, and, second, because no one stands in need of our economic aid. But within proper norms, we have made, and continue to make, every effort to give the countries which are our friends and brothers some little help through our exports. We have been aided by our friends, first and

2) Set up in January 1949. At the end of February of the same year the PR of Albania became one of its members. From an institution for reciprocal aid, with the coming to power of the Khrushchev revisionist clique in the Soviet Union, COMECON degenerated, too, becoming an instrument for the achievement of the social-imperialist aims of this clique.
The Party of Labor and the Government of the People's Republic of Albania have utilized this aid of the Soviet Union and the other people's democracies as well as they could to the best advantage of our people. Our people are forever grateful to the Soviet people, and to the peoples of the people's democracies for this aid. We have always considered, and will continue to consider this aid not as charity but as fraternal, internationalist aid.

Our people, who have been in dire poverty, who have fought with heroism, who have been murdered and burnt out, had a duty to seek the aid of their friends and brothers who are bigger and economically better off than they. And it was and still is the internationalist duty of their friends to give this aid. Therefore, it is necessary to reject any sinister and anti-Marxist view that anyone may hold about the nature and purpose of this aid. Economic pressures on the Party of Labor of Albania, on the Albanian Government, and on our people will never be of any avail.

I wish to propose here that the aid of the economically stronger countries for the economically weaker ones, such as ours, should be greater. The Albanian people have no intention of folding their arms and opening their mouths to be fed by others. That is not their custom. Nor do our people expect the standard of living in our country to be raised at once to the standard of living in many other countries of people's democracy, but greater aid should be given our country to further develop its productive forces. We think that the economically stronger countries of the socialist camp should also accord credits to neutral capitalist countries and to peoples recently liberated from colonialism, provided the leaders of these capitalist countries are opposed to imperialism, support the peaceful policy of the socialist camp, and do not hinder or oppose the legitimate struggle of the revolutionary forces; but first of all, the needs of the countries of the socialist camp should be looked into more carefully and be fulfilled. Of course, India stands in need of iron and steel, but socialist Albania stands in greater and more urgent need of them. Egypt needs irrigation and electric power, but socialist Albania has greater and more urgent need for them.

On many political issues of first-rate importance, our socialist camp has held, and continues to hold, identical views. But since
collective consultations have not been held regularly, on many occasions it has been noted that states from our socialist camp take political initiatives (not that we are opposed in principle to taking initiatives), which very often affect other states of the socialist camp as well. Some of these initiatives are not correct, especially when they are not taken collectively by the members of the Warsaw Treaty.

An initiative of this kind is that of the Bulgarian Government which, with total disregard for Albania, informed the Greek Government that the Balkan countries of people's democracy agree to disarm if the Greek Government is prepared to do so, too. From our point of view, this initiative was wrong; for even if the Greek Government had endorsed it, the Albanian Government would not have accepted it. Albania is in agreement with the Soviet proposal made by Nikita Khrushchev in May, 1959, (3) but not with the Bulgarian proposal, which wants the Balkan countries to disarm while leaving Italy unaffected. Or have the Bulgarian comrades forgotten that bourgeois and fascist Italy has attacked Albania a number of times during this century?

On the other hand, can it be permitted that without any consultation at all with the Albanian Government, with which they are bound by a defense treaty, the Bulgarian comrades should propose a treaty of friendship and non-aggression to the Greek Government, at a time when Greece maintains a state of war with Albania and is making territorial claims against our country? It seems to us that it is dangerous to take such unilateral actions.

From this correct and legitimate opposition of ours, perhaps the Bulgarian comrades may have arrived at the conclusion that we Albanians do not properly understand coexistence, that we want war, and so forth. These views are erroneous.

Similar gestures have also been made by the Polish comrades at the United Nations, when Comrade Gomulka stated in a unilateral way at the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization that Poland proposes that the status quo on the

3) Through this proposal and the notes of the Soviet Government addressed on May 25, 1959, to the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Greece, Italy, France, Britain and the USA, it proposed the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons and missiles in the Balkans and the Adriatic region.
stationing of military forces in the world should be preserved and, concretely, that no more military bases should be created, but those that have been set up already should remain, that no more missiles should be installed but the existing ones should remain, that those states that have the secret of the atomic bomb should keep it and not give it to other states. In our opinion, such a proposal is contrary to the interests of our camp. No more missiles to be installed, but by whom and where? All the NATO members, including Italy, West Germany and Greece, have been equipped with missiles. Not to give the secret of the atomic bomb, to whom? Britain, France and West Germany have it. It is clear that a proposal of this kind will oblige us, the countries of people's democracy, not to install missiles, or any other country of the socialist camp, except the Soviet Union, not to have the atomic bomb.

We pose the question: Why should communist China not have the atomic bomb? We think that China should have it, and when it has the bomb and missiles, then we shall see in what terms US imperialism will speak, we shall see whether they will continue to deny China its rights in the international arena, we shall see whether the US imperialists will dare brandish their weapons as they are doing at present.

Someone may pose the question: Will China win its rights over the United States of America by possessing and dropping the bomb? No, China will never use the bomb unless we are attacked by those who have aggression and war in their very blood. If the Soviet Union did not possess the bomb, the imperialists would have been talking in a different tone. We will never attack with the bomb, we are opposed to war, we are ready to destroy the bomb, but we must keep it to defend ourselves. "It is fear that guards the vineyard," our people say. The imperialists should be afraid of us, and terribly afraid at that.

Based on Marxism-Leninism and on the Moscow Declaration and the Manifesto on Peace, the Party of Labor of Albania has pursued a correct Marxist-Leninist line in matters of international policy and in the important problems of socialist construction. In international relations, the line of our Party has been in accord with the policy of the socialist camp.

The major problems of the time have concerned both the Party of Labor of Albania and our small people. Our People's Republic has been and is surrounded geographically by capitalist states and the Yugoslav revisionists. We have had to be highly
vigilant and tie down people and considerable funds to defend our borders, to defend the freedom and sovereignty of our country from the innumerable attempts of the imperialists and their satellites and lackeys.

We are a small country and a small people who have suffered to an extraordinary degree, but who have also fought very hard. We are not indebted to anyone for the freedom we enjoy today, for we have won it with our own blood. We are continually aware, day and night, of our imperialist enemies, of their manoeuvres against the socialist camp and our country in particular. Therefore we have never had, nor will ever entertain, illusions about their changing their nature and their intentions toward the peoples, toward our camp, and toward socialist Albania in particular. . . .

The US and British imperialists have accused us Albanians of being "savage and warlike." This is understandable, for the Albanian people have dealt telling blows at their repeated attempts to put us under bondage, and have smashed the hands of their agents who have conspired against the Party of Labor of Albania and our regime of people's democracy. . . .

We do not think we need prove at this meeting that war is alien to the socialist countries, to our Marxist-Leninist parties, but the question remains: Why do the imperialists and their agents accuse China and Albania of being "warlike" and allegedly opposed to peaceful coexistence?

Let us take the question of Albania. Against whom would Albania make war, and why? It would be ridiculous to waste our time in answering this question. But those who accuse us of this are trying to cover up their aggressive intentions toward Albania.

Rankovich wants us to turn our borders into a roadhouse with two gates through which Yugoslav, Italian and Greek agents and weapons could go in and out freely, without visas, in order to bring us their "culture of cut-throats," so that Tito may realize his dream of turning Albania into the 7th Republic of Yugoslavia, so that the reactionary Italian bourgeoisie may put into action for the third time their predatory intentions toward Albania, or so that the Greek monarcho-fascists may realize their crazy dream of grabbing Southern Albania. Because we have not permitted, and will never permit, such a thing, we are "warmongers." They know very well that if they violate our borders they will have to fight us and the whole socialist camp.

Their aim, therefore, has been, and continues to be, to isolate
us from the camp and from our friends, to accuse us of being "war-mongers and savage" because we do not open our borders for them to graze freely, to accuse us of allegedly being opposed to peaceful coexistence. But the irony of fate is that there are comrades who believe this game of the revisionists and these slanders against the Party of Labor of Albania. Of course, we are opposed to any coexistence for the sake of which we Albanians should make territorial and political concessions to Sophocles Venizelos. No, the time has gone forever when the territory of Albania could be treated as a token to be bartered. We are opposed to such a coexistence with the Yugoslav state which implies that we should give up our ideological and political struggle against the Yugoslav revisionists, these agents of international imperialism, these traitors to Marxism-Leninism. We are opposed to such coexistence with the British or the US imperialists for the sake of which we should recognize, as they demand, the old political, diplomatic and trading concessions King Zog's regime had granted them.

As a general conclusion, the Party of Labor of Albania is absolutely convinced that our great cause, the victory of socialism and peace, will triumph. Through determined action, the combined forces of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union, of the international communist and workers' movement, and of all the peace-loving peoples have the possibility of compelling the imperialists to accept peaceful coexistence, of averting a world war. But, at the same time we will intensify our revolutionary vigilance more and more so that the enemy may never take us by surprise. We are convinced that victory will be ours in this noble struggle for world peace and socialism. The Albanian people and the Party of Labor of Albania, just as heretofore, will spare nothing to assist the triumph of our common cause with all their might. As always, we shall march forward in steel-like unity with the whole socialist camp, with the Soviet Union, and with the whole international communist and workers' movement.

Dear Comrades,

The unity of the international communist and workers' movement is the decisive factor in realizing the noble aims of the triumph of peace, democracy, national independence and socialism. This question is especially emphasized in the 1957 Moscow
Declaration and in the draft statement prepared for our meeting. The 1957 Declaration stresses the following:

"... the communist and workers' parties bear an exceptionally serious historic responsibility for the fate of the world socialist system and the international communist movement. The communist and workers' parties taking part in the Meeting declare that they will spare no effort to strengthen their unity and comradely collaboration in the interest of the further unity of the family of socialist states, in the interest of the international workers' movement, in the interest of the cause of peace and socialism." (4)

It must be said that, especially in recent times, in the international communist movement and in the relations among certain parties, profound ideological and political disagreements have arisen, the deepening of which can bring nothing but damage to our great cause. Therefore, the Party of Labor of Albania thinks that in order to go forward together toward fresh victories, it is necessary to condemn the mistakes and negative manifestations which have appeared so far, and to correct them.

We want to refer here to the Bucharest Meeting at which our Party, as you know, refrained from expressing its opinion concerning the differences which have arisen between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, but reserved the right to do so at this meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties. At that time the Party of Labor of Albania was accused by the Soviet comrades, and by some comrades of the other fraternal parties, of everything imaginable, but no one took the trouble to think for a moment why this party maintained such a stand against all this current, why this party, which has stood loyal to the end to Marxism-Leninism and the Moscow Declaration, is unexpectedly accused of allegedly "opposing Marxism-Leninism and the Moscow Declaration," why this party, so closely bound to the Soviet Union and to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, suddenly comes out in opposition to the leadership of the Soviet Union.

Now that all the comrades have in their hands both the

4) "Declaration of the Meeting of the Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries," Tirana, 1958, p. 24.
Soviet information material as well as that of the Communist Party of China, let them reflect on it themselves. We have read and studied both the Soviet and the Chinese materials, we have discussed them carefully with the Party activists, and come to this meeting with the unanimous view of our whole Party.

As we all know, on June 24 this year, on the occasion of the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party, the Bucharest Meeting was organized unexpectedly and without any previous warning, at least as far as our Party was concerned, on the initiative of the comrades of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Instead of "exchanging opinions" and setting the date for this meeting we are holding today, which was agreed upon by the letters of June 2 and 7, it took up another topic, namely, the ideological and political accusation directed against the Communist Party of China, on the basis of the "Soviet information" material. On the basis of this material, entirely unknown up to a few hours before the meeting of the conference, the delegates of the fraternal communist and workers' parties were supposed to pronounce themselves in favor of the views of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at a time when they had come to Bucharest for another purpose and had no mandate (at least as regards the delegation of our Party), from their parties to discuss, let alone decide, such an important issue of international communism. Nor could a serious discussion be thought of about this material, which contained such gross accusations against another Marxist-Leninist party, when not only the delegates, but especially the leaderships of the communist and workers' parties, were not allowed to study it from all angles, and without allowing the necessary time for the accused party to submit its views in all the forms which the accusing party had used. The fact is that the overriding concern of the Soviet leadership was to have its accusation against the Communist Party of China passed upon quickly, and to have the Communist Party of China condemned at all costs.

This was the concern of Comrade Khrushchev and other Soviet comrades in Bucharest, and not at all the international political issues worrying our camp and the world as a whole after the failure of the summit conference in Paris.

Our Party would have been in full agreement with an international meeting of communist and workers' parties, with whatever other meeting and whatever agenda that might be set,
provided that these meetings were in order, had the approval of all the parties, had a clear agenda set in advance, provided the communist and workers' parties were given the necessary materials and allowed enough time to study these materials so that they could prepare themselves and receive the approval of the political bureaus of their parties and, if necessary, of the plenums of their central committees, regarding the decisions that might eventually be taken at these conferences. The meetings should be conducted according to the norms governing the relations among communist and workers' parties. They should be conducted in complete equality among parties, in a comradely, communist and internationalist spirit, and with lofty communist morality.

The Bucharest Meeting did not comply with these norms; therefore although it took part in it, our Party denounces and denounces that Meeting as out-of-order and in violation of the Leninist norms.

We think that the Bucharest Meeting did a great disservice to the cause of the international communist movement, to the cause of the international solidarity of the workers, to the cause of strengthening the unity of the socialist camp, to the cause of setting a Marxist-Leninist example in settling ideological, political and organizational disputes that may arise within the ranks of the communist and workers' parties and which damage Marxism-Leninism. The blame for this falls on the comrades of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union who organized that Meeting, who conceived those forms, and who applied those non-Marxist norms in this matter.

The aim was to have the Communist Party of China condemned by the international communist movement for faults and mistakes which do not exist and are baseless. The Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania is fully convinced of this on the basis of its study of the facts and the Soviet and Chinese materials which the Party of Labor of Albania now has at its disposal, based on a detailed analysis which the Party of Labor of Albania has made of the international situation and of the official stands of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China.

The entire Party of Labor of Albania holds the unanimous view that the Soviet comrades made a grave mistake in Bucharest. They unjustly condemned the Communist Party of China for having allegedly deviated from Marxism-Leninism, for having allegedly violated and abandoned the 1957 Moscow Declaration.
They have accused the Communist Party of China of being "dogmatic," "sectarian," of being "in favor of war," of being "opposed to peaceful coexistence," of "wanting a privileged position in the camp and in the international communist movement," etc.

The Soviet comrades made a grave mistake also when, taking advantage of the great love and trust which the communists have for the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, they tried to impose their incorrect views toward the Communist Party of China on the other communist and workers' parties.

Right from the start, when the Soviet comrades began their feverish and impermissible work of inveigling the comrades of our delegation in Bucharest, it became clear to the Party of Labor of Albania that the Soviet comrades, resorting to groundless arguments and pressure, wished to lead the delegation of the Party of Labor of Albania into the trap they had prepared, to bring them into line with the distorted views of the Soviet comrades.

What was of importance to Comrade Khrushchev (and Comrade Andropov said as much to Comrade Hysni Kapo) was whether we would "line up with the Soviet side or not." Comrade Khrushchev expressed this opinion in other ways also, in his interjections against our Party at the Bucharest Meeting. This was corroborated also by many unjust and unfriendly gestures by the comrades of the Soviet leadership and the employees of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana after the Bucharest Meeting, to which I shall refer later. What was important for the comrades of the Soviet leadership was not the views of a Marxist-Leninist party such as ours, but only that we should maintain the same attitude in Bucharest as the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

No warning was given to the Party of Labor of Albania by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which organized the Bucharest Meeting, that, on the occasion of the Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party, accusations would be brought against the Communist Party of China for alleged grave mistakes of line. This came as a complete surprise to the Party of Labor of Albania. Yet now we hear that, with the exception of the Party of Labor of Albania, the Communist Party of China, the Korean Workers' Party, and the Vietnam Workers' Party, other parties of the camp were cognizant of the fact that a conference would be
organized in Bucharest to accuse China. If this is so, then it is very clear that the question becomes very much more serious and assumes the form of a faction of an international character.

Nevertheless, our Party was not taken unawares and it did not lack vigilance, and this happened because it always observes the Leninist norms in relations with the other parties, because it has great Marxist respect for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of China, and all the other communist and workers' parties, because it respects the feeling of-equality among parties, an equality which the other parties should respect toward the Party of Labor of Albania, regardless of its being small in numbers.

Right from the beginning, our Party saw that these norms were being violated at the Bucharest Meeting, and that is why it took the stand you all know, a stand which it considered and still considers as the only correct one to maintain toward the events as they developed.

Some leaders of fraternal parties dubbed us "neutralists," some others reproached us with "departing from the correct Marxist-Leninist line," and these leaders went so far as to try to discredit us before their own parties. We scornfully reject all these things because they are slanders, they are dishonest, and they are incompatible with communist morality.

We pose these questions to those who undertook such despicable acts against the Party of Labor of Albania: Has a party the right to express its opinions freely on matters and how it sees them? What opinion did the Party of Labor of Albania express in Bucharest? We expressed our loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, and this is corroborated by the entire life and struggle of the Party of Labor of Albania. We expressed our loyalty to the decisions of the 1957 Moscow Declaration and Manifesto on Peace, and this is corroborated by the line consistently pursued by the Party of Labor of Albania. We expressed our loyalty to the decisions of the 1957 Moscow Declaration and Manifesto on Peace, and this is corroborated by the line consistently pursued by the Party of Labor of Albania. We expressed our loyalty to, and defended, the unity of the socialist camp, and this is corroborated by the whole struggle of the Party of Labor of Albania. We expressed our affection for, and loyalty to, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to the Soviet peoples, and this is corroborated by the whole life of the Party of Labor of Albania. We did not agree "to pass judgement" on the "mistakes" of the Communist Party of China and, even less, "to condemn" the Communist Party of China without taking into account the views of the Communist Party of China on the charges raised against it in such a distorted,
hasty and anti-Marxist way. We counseled caution, coolheadedness and a comradely spirit in treating this matter so vital and exceptionally serious for international communism. This was the whole "crime" for which stones were thrown at us. But we think that the stones which were picked up to strike us fell back on the heads of those who threw them. The passage of time is confirming the correctness of the stand maintained by the Party of Labor of Albania.

Why were Comrade Khrushchev and the other Soviet comrades in such a great hurry to accuse the Communist Party of China groundlessly and without facts? Is it permissible for communists, and especially for the principal leaders of so great a party as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to perpetrate such an ugly act? Let them answer this question themselves, but the Party of Labor of Albania also has the full right to express its opinion on the matter.

The Party of Labor of Albania is of the opinion that the Bucharest Meeting was not only a great mistake but also a mistake that was deliberately aggravated. In no way should the Bucharest Meeting be left in oblivion; rather, it should be severely condemned as a black stain on the international communist movement.

There is not the least doubt that the ideological differences have been and are grave, and that these have arisen and have been developed between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. These should have been settled in due time and in a Marxist-Leninist way between the two parties concerned.

According to the Chinese document, the Communist Party of China says that these differences of principle were raised by the Chinese comrades immediately following the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Some of these matters have been taken into consideration by the Soviet comrades, while others have been rejected.

The Party of Labor of Albania thinks that if these differences could not be settled between the two parties concerned, a meeting should have been sought of the communist and workers' parties at which these matters could be brought up, discussed, and a stand taken toward them. It is not right that these matters should have been left unsettled, and the blame for this must fall on the Soviet comrades who had knowledge of these differences but disregarded them, because they were dead certain of their
line and its "inviolability," and this, we think, is an idealist and metaphysical approach.

If the Soviet comrades were convinced of the correctness of their Une and their tactics, why did they not organize such a meeting in due time and have these differences settled? Were the matters raised so trivial — for example, the condemnation of J.V. Stalin, the major question of the Hungarian counter-revolution, that of the ways of taking power, not to speak of many other very important problems that emerged later? No, they were not trivial at all. We all have our own views on these problems, because as communists we are all interested in them, because all our parties are responsible to their peoples, but they are also responsible to international communism as well.

In order to condemn the Communist Party of China for imaginary faults and sins, Comrade Khrushchev and the other Soviet leaders were very concerned to present the case as if the differences existed between China and the whole international communist movement; but when it came to problems like those I just mentioned, judgement on them has been passed by Khrushchev and the comrades around him alone, thinking that there was no need for them to be discussed collectively at a meeting of the representatives of all the parties, although these were major problems of an international character.

The Hungarian counter-revolution occurred, but matters were hushed up. Why this tactic of hushing things up when they are not to their advantage, while for things which are to their advantage the Soviet comrades not only call meetings like that of Bucharest, but do their utmost to force on others the view that "China is in opposition to the line of all the communist and workers' parties of the world"?

The Soviet comrades made a similar attempt toward us also. In August of this year, the Soviet leadership sent a letter to our Party in which it proposed that, "with a view to preventing the spark of differences from flaring up," the representatives of our two parties should meet so that our Party would align itself with the Soviet Union against the Communist Party of China, and that our two parties should present a united front at this present meeting. Of course, the Central Committee of our Party refused such a thing, and in its official reply described this as something quite un-Marxist, a factional act directed against a third fraternal party, against the Communist Party of China. Of course, this correct principled stand of our Party was not to the liking of the
leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

There is no doubt that these matters are of first-rate importance. There is no doubt that they concern us all, but neither is there any doubt for the Party of Labor of Albania that the matters as they were raised in Bucharest against China, were tendentious and aimed at condemning the Communist Party of China and isolating it from the whole international communist movement.

For the Party of Labor of Albania this was dreadful and unacceptable, not only because it was not convinced of the truth of these allegations, but also because it rightly suspected that a non-Marxist action was being organized against a great and glorious fraternal party like the Communist Party of China, that under the guise of an accusation of dogmatism against China, an attack was being launched against Marxism-Leninism.

At the meeting the Communist Party of China was accused of many faults. This should have figured in the Communiqué. Why was it not done? If the accusations were well founded, why all this hesitation and why issue a communiqué which did not correspond to the purpose for which the meeting was called? Why was there no reference in it to the "great danger of dogmatism" allegedly threatening international communism?

No, comrades, the Bucharest Meeting cannot be justified. It was not based on principle. It was a biased one to achieve certain objectives, of which the main one, in the opinion of the Party of Labor of Albania, was, by accusing the Communist Party of China of dogmatism, to cover up some grave mistakes of line which the Soviet leading comrades have allowed themselves to make.

The Soviet comrades stood in need of the support of the other parties on this matter. Therefore, they blatantly tried to take them by surprise. That is how the Soviet comrades achieved half their aim and won the right to put forward the condemnation of China in these parties as the outcome of an "international conference of communism." In the communist and workers' parties, with the exception of the Party of Labor of Albania and certain other communist and workers' parties, the question was raised of "the grave errors of policy committed by the Communist Party of China," the "unanimous" condemnation of China in Bucharest was reported, in an effort to create opinion in the parties and among the people in this direction. The Party of Labor of Albania was also condemned at some of these party
After the Bucharest Meeting the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania decided, and decided rightly, to discuss in the Party only the Communiqué, to tell the Party that there existed divergences of principle between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China which should be taken up and settled at the coming meeting which would be held in Moscow in November. And this is what was done.

But this stand of our Party did not please the leading comrades of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and we were very soon made aware of this. Immediately following the Bucharest Meeting, an unexpected, unprincipled attack was launched, and brutal intervention and all-round pressure was undertaken against our Party and its central Committee. The attack was begun by Comrade Khrushchev in Bucharest and was continued by Comrade Kozlov in Moscow. The comrades of our Political Bureau who happened to pass through Moscow were worked upon with a view to turning them against the leadership of our Party, putting forward that "the leadership of the Party of Labor of Albania had betrayed the friendship with the Soviet Union," that "the line pursued by the leadership of the Party of Labor of Albania is characterized by 'zigzags',' that "Albania must decide to go either with the 200 million (with the Soviet Union), or with the 650 million (with People's China)," and finally that "an isolated Albania is in danger, for it would take only one atomic bomb dropped by the Americans to wipe out Albania and all its population completely," and other threats of the kind. It is absolutely clear that the aim was to sow discord in the leadership of our Party, to remove from the leadership of the Party of Labor of Albania those elements who, the Soviet leaders thought, stood in the way of their crooked and dishonest undertaking.

What came out of this divisive work was that Liri Belishova, ex-Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, capitulated to the cajolery of the Soviet leaders, to their blackmail and intimidation, and took a stand in open opposition to the line of the Party.

The attempt of the Soviet comrades, in their letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, to present this question as if the friends of the Soviet Union in Albania are being persecuted is a falsehood. Life-long friends of the Soviet
peoples are the million and a half Albanians and the Party of Labor of Albania, which has forged and steeled this friendship, tempered in blood, and not the various capitulators, splitters and deviationists.

But attempts to arouse doubts about the correct stand of our Party in Bucharest were not confined just to Moscow. They were made, with even more fervor, in Tirana by the employees of the Soviet Embassy headed by the Soviet Ambassador to Tirana himself.

As I said before, prior to the Bucharest Meeting, one could not imagine closer, more sincere, more fraternal relations than those between us and the Soviet comrades. We kept nothing hidden from the Soviet comrades, neither party nor state secrets. This was the decision of our Central Committee. These relations reflected the Albanian people's great love for, and loyalty to, the Soviet peoples, sentiments which our Party had tempered in blood.

Over these sacred sentiments of the Party of Labor of Albania and our people certain sickly elements, with the Soviet Ambassador at the head, trampled roughshod. Taking advantage of our friendly relations, taking advantage of the good faith of our cadres, they began feverishly and intensively to attack the Marxist-Leninist line of the Party of Labor of Albania, to split the Party, to create panic and confusion in its ranks, and to alienate the leadership from the Party. The Soviet Ambassador to Tirana went so far as to attempt to incite the generals of our army to raise the People's Army against the leadership of the Party of Labor of Albania and the Albanian state. But the saw struck a nail because the unity of our Party is steel-like. Our cadres, tempered in the National Liberation War and in the bitter life-and-death struggle with the Yugoslav revisionists, defended their heroic Party in a Marxist way. They know very well how to draw the line between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of Lenin and the splitters. And in fact they put these denigrators in their place.

Nevertheless, the employees of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana, headed by the Ambassador, through impermissible anti-Marxist methods managed to make the Chairman of the Control Commission of the Party of Labor of Albania, who 15 days earlier had expressed his solidarity with the line pursued by the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania in Bucharest, fall into the clutches of these intriguers and go completely off the
rails of Marxism-Leninism, so that he came out in flagrant opposition to the line of the Party. It is clear that these despicable efforts of these Soviet comrades were aimed at splitting the leadership of the Party of Labor of Albania, at alienating it from the mass of the Party. And this as a punishment for the "crime" we had committed in Bucharest, by having the courage to express our views freely, as we saw fit.

The functionaries of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana went even further. They turned to the Albanians who had studied in the Soviet Union with a view to inciting them against the Albanian leadership, thinking that they would be a contingent suitable to their crooked aims. But the Albanians, whether those who had completed their studies in the Soviet Union or those who are still in the course of their studies, know that such base methods as those used by the employees of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana are altogether alien to Marxism-Leninism. The Albanians are the sons and daughters of their own people and of their own Party. They are Marxist-Leninists and internationalists.

We could list many other examples, but so as not to take up so much time at this important meeting, I will mention only two other typical cases. The pressure on our Party continued, even during the days when the commission was meeting here in Moscow, to draw up the draft statement which has been submitted to us, when the Soviet comrades told us that we should look ahead and not back. During those days in Moscow, a Member of the Central Committee and Minister of the Soviet Union, Marshal Malinovsky, launched an open attack on the Albanian people, on the Party of Labor of Albania, on the Albanian Government, and on our leadership at an enlarged meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the Warsaw Treaty countries. This unfriendly and public attack has much in common with the diversionist attack of the Soviet Ambassador to Tirana, who tried to incite our People’s Army against the leadership of our Party and our state. But like the Soviet Ambassador, Marshal Malinovsky, too, is making a grave mistake. No one can achieve this aim, and even less that of breaking up the friendship of our people with the peoples of the Soviet Union. The just struggle of the Party of Labor of Albania against these subversive acts strengthens the sincere friendship of our people with the peoples of the Soviet Union. Nor can this friendship be broken up by the astonishing statements of Marshal Grechko, Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Treaty, who not only told our military delegation
that it was difficult for him to meet the requirements of our army for some very essential armaments, for the supply of which contracts have been signed, but said bluntly, "You are in the Warsaw Treaty only for the time being," implying that Marshal Grechko seems to have decided to throw us out. But, fortunately, it is not up to the Comrade Marshal to make such a decision.

In October of this year, Comrade Khrushchev declared solemnly to the Chinese comrades, "We shall treat Albania like Yugoslavia." We say this at this meeting of international communism so that all may see how far things have gone and what attitude is being maintained toward a small socialist country. What "crime" has the Party of Labor of Albania committed for our country to be treated like Tito's Yugoslavia? Can it be said we have betrayed Marxism-Leninism, as the Tito clique has done? Or did we break away from the socialist camp and hitch up with US imperialism, as the Yugoslav revisionists have done? No, and all the international communist movement, all the concrete political, ideological and economic activity of our Party and our state during the whole period of the National Liberation War, and during these 16 years since the liberation of the country, bear witness to this.

This is borne out also by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union itself, which, in its letter of August 13, 1960, to the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, stressed: "The relations between the Party of Labor of Albania and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, based on the principles of proletarian internationalism, have always been truly fraternal. The friendship between our parties and peoples has never at any time been obscured by any misunderstanding or deviation. The positions of the Party of Labor of Albania and that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on all the most important issues of the international communist and workers' movement and of foreign policy have been identical." Of what, then, are we guilty?

Our only "crime" is that in Bucharest we did not agree that a fraternal communist party like the Communist Party of China should be unjustly condemned; our only "crime" is that we had the courage to oppose openly, at an international communist meeting (and not in the market-place), the unjust action of Comrade Khrushchev; our only "crime" is that we are a small Party of a small and poor country, which, according to Comrade
Khrushchev, should merely applaud and approve but express no opinion of its own. But this is neither Marxist nor acceptable. Marxism-Leninism has granted us the right to have our say, and no one can take this from us, either by means of political and economic pressure, or by means of threats and the names they might call us.

On this occasion we would like to ask Comrade Khrushchev why he did not make such a statement to us instead of to a representative of a third party. Or does Comrade Khrushchev think that the Party of Labor of Albania has no views of its own, but has made common cause with the Communist Party of China in an unprincipled manner, and that therefore, on matters pertaining to our Party, one can talk with the Chinese comrades? No, Comrade Khrushchev, you continue to blunder and hold very wrong opinions about our Party. The Party of Labor of Albania has its own views and will answer for them both to its own people, as well as to the international communist and workers' movement.

We are obliged to inform this meeting that the Soviet leaders have, in fact, passed from threats of treating Albania in the same way as Titoite Yugoslavia, to concrete acts. This year our country has suffered many natural calamities. There was a big earthquake, the flood in October, and especially the drought, which was terrible, with not a drop of rain for 120 days in succession. Nearly all the grain was lost. The people were threatened with starvation. The very limited reserves were consumed. Our Government urgently sought to buy grain from the Soviet Union, explaining the very critical situation we were faced with. This happened after the Bucharest Meeting. We waited 45 days for a reply from the Soviet Government while we had only 15 days' bread for the people. After 45 days and after repeated official requests, instead of 50,000 tons, the Soviet Government accorded us only 10,000 tons, that is, enough to last us 15 days, and this grain was to be delivered during the months of September and October. This was open pressure on our Party to submit to the wishes of the Soviet comrades.

During those critical days we got wise to many things. Did the Soviet Union, which sells grain to the whole world, not have 50,000 tons to give the Albanian people, who are loyal brothers of the Soviet people, loyal to Marxism-Leninism and to the socialist camp, at a time when, through no fault of their own, they were threatened with starvation? Comrade Khrushchev had
once said to us, "Don't worry about grain, for all that you consume in a whole year is eaten by mice in our country." The mice in the Soviet Union might eat, but the Albanian people could be left to die of starvation until the leadership of the Party of Labor of Albania submits to the will of the Soviet leaders. This is terrible, comrades, but it is true. If they hear about it, the Soviet people will never forgive them, for it is neither Marxist-Leninist, internationalist, nor comradely. Nor is it a friendly act not to accept our currency for buying grain from the Soviet Union, but to oblige us to draw the limited gold reserve from our National Bank in order to buy maize for the people's bread from the Soviet Union.

These acts are linked with one another, they are not just accidental. Particularly in recent days, Comrade Khrushchev's attacks on our Party of Labor have reached their climax. Comrade Khrushchev, on November 6, you declared that "the Albanians behave toward us just like Tito." You said to the Chinese comrades, "We lost an Albania and you Chinese won an Albania." And, finally, you declared that "the Party of Labor of Albania is our weak link."

What are all these monstrous accusations, this behaving like a "dealer" toward our Party, our people, and a socialist country, which was allegedly lost and won as in a gamble? What appraisal is this of a fraternal party which, according to you, is allegedly the weak link in the international communist movement? For us it is clear, and we understand only too well, that our correct and principled Marxist-Leninist stand, that our courage to disagree with you and condemn those acts of yours which are wrong, impel you to attack our Party, to resort to all kinds of pressure against it, to pronounce the most extreme monstrosities against our Party. But there is nothing comradely, nothing communist in this. You liken us to the Yugoslav revisionists. But everybody knows how our Party has fought, and continues to fight, the Yugoslav revisionists. It is not we who behave like the Yugoslavs but you, Comrade Khrushchev, who are using methods alien to Marxism-Leninism against our Party. You consider Albania as a market commodity which can be gained by one or lost by another. There was a time when Albania was considered a medium of exchange, when others thought it depended on them whether Albania should or should not exist, but that time came to an end with the triumph of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism in our country. You are repeating the same thing when you arrive at
the conclusion that you have "lost" Albania, or that someone else has "won" it, or that Albania is no longer a socialist country, as it turns out from the letter you handed us on November 8, in which our country is not mentioned as a socialist country.

The fact that Albania is marching on the road of socialism and that it is a member of the socialist camp is not determined by you, Comrade Khrushchev. It does not depend on your wishes. The Albanian people, led by their Party of Labor, decided this through their struggle, and there is no force capable of turning them from that course.

As regards your claim that our Party of Labor is the weakest link in the socialist camp and the international communist movement, we say that the twenty-year history of our Party, the heroic struggle of our people and our Party against the fascist invaders, and the sixteen years that have elapsed from the liberation of the country to this day, during which our Party and our people have faced up to all the storms, demonstrate the opposite. Surrounded by enemies, like an island amidst the waves, the People's Republic of Albania has courageously withstood all the assaults and provocations of the imperialists and their lackeys. Like a granite rock, it has kept, and continues to keep aloft the banner of socialism behind the enemy lines. You, Comrade Khrushchev, raised your hand against a small country and its Party, but we are convinced that the Soviet people, who shed their blood for the freedom of our people too, and the great Party of Lenin, will not be in agreement with this activity of yours. We have complete faith in Marxism-Leninism. We are certain that the fraternal parties which have sent their delegates to this meeting will examine and pass judgement on this issue with Marxist-Leninist justice.

Our Party has always called the Communist Party of the Soviet Union a mother party, and has said this because it is the oldest party, the glorious party of the Bolsheviks, because of its universal experience, its great maturity. But our Party has never accepted, and will never accept, that some Soviet leader may impose on it his views which it considers erroneous.

The Soviet leadership viewed this matter of principled importance utterly incorrectly, in an idealist and metaphysical way. It has become swell-headed over the colossal successes attained by the Soviet peoples and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and is violating Marxist-Leninist principles, considers itself infallible, considers every decision, every action, every word
and gesture it makes to be infallible and irrevocable. Others may err, others may be condemned, while it is above such reproach. "Our decisions are sacred, they are inviolable." "We can make no concession to, no compromise with, the Communist Party of China," the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union told our people. Then why did they call us together in Bucharest? Of course, to vote with our eyes closed for the views of the Soviet leaders. Is this Marxist? Is this normal?

Is it permissible for one party to engage in subversive acts, to cause a split, to overthrow the leadership of another party or another state? Never! The Soviet leaders accused Comrade Stalin of allegedly interfering in other parties, of imposing the views of the Bolshevik Party upon others. We can testify that at no time did Comrade Stalin do such a thing to us, to the Albanian people and the Party of Labor of Albania. He always behaved as a great Marxist, as an outstanding internationalist, as a comrade, brother, and sincere friend of the Albanian people. In 1945, when our people were threatened with starvation, Comrade Stalin diverted the ships loaded with grain destined for the Soviet people, who were also in a very bad way for food at that time, and sent the grain at once to the Albanian people. But the present Soviet leaders permit themselves these ugly deeds.

Are such economic pressures permissible; is it permissible to threaten the Albanian people, as the Soviet leaders did after the Bucharest Meeting? In no way whatsoever.... We know that the aid is an internationalist aid given our small people who, before the war, suffered great, all-round misery. The Second World War burned and devastated our country, though never downing the Albanian people, who under the leadership of the glorious Party of Labor of Albania fought with great heroism and liberated themselves.

But why did the Soviet leadership change its attitude toward us after the Bucharest Meeting to the point that it let the Albanian people suffer from hunger? The Rumanian leadership did the same thing, too, when it refused to sell a single ear of wheat to the Albanian people on an exchange basis, at a time when Rumania was trading in grain with the capitalist countries, while we were obliged to buy maize from French farmers, paying in foreign currency.

Some months before the Bucharest Meeting, Comrade Dej (5) invited a delegation of our Party for the specific purpose of conducting talks on the future development of Albania. This was
a laudable and Marxist concern on his part. Comrade Dej said to our Party, "We, the other countries of people's democracy, should no longer discuss how much credit should be accorded to Albania, but we should decide to build in Albania such and such factories, to raise the means of production to a higher level, regardless of how many million rubles it will cost — that is of no importance." Comrade Dej added, "We have talked this over with Comrade Khrushchev, too, and we were in agreement."

But then came the Bucharest Meeting and our Party maintained the stand you all know. The Rumanian comrades forgot what they had previously said and chose the course of leaving the Albanian people to suffer from hunger.

We have made these things officially known to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union before. We have not submitted them to public discussion, nor have we whispered them from ear to ear, but we are revealing them here for the first time at a party meeting, like this one here today. Why are we raising these matters? We do so, proceeding from the desire to put an end to these negative manifestations which do not strengthen but weaken our unity. We proceed from the desire to strengthen the relations and Marxist-Leninist bonds among communist and workers' parties, among socialist states, rejecting any bad manifestations that have arisen up to now. We are optimistic, and we are fully convinced and have unshaken confidence that the Soviet and other comrades will understand our criticisms in the proper way. They are severe, but frank and sincere, and aim at strengthening our relations. Notwithstanding these unjust and harmful attitudes which are maintained toward us, but which we believe will be stopped in the future, our Party and our people will consolidate still further their unbounded love for, and loyalty to, the Soviet people, to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to all the peoples and communist and workers' parties of the socialist camp, always on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist teachings.

To our Party, friendship means justice and mutual respect on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. This is what the 1957 Moscow Declaration says, and what is stressed in the draft statement that has been submitted to us. We declare in all earnestness that the

5) Georghe Georgiu-Dej, First Secretary of the CC of the Rumanian Workers' Party.
Party of Labor of Albania and the Albanian people will be, as always, determined fighters for the strengthening of relations and unity in the socialist camp and the international communist movement.

The Albanian people will go through fire for their true friends. And these are not empty words of mine. I am expressing here the sentiments of our people and of our Party, and let no one ever think that we love the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the sake of someone's beautiful eyes, or to please some individual.

Dear Comrades,

In the 1957 Moscow Declaration, as well as in the draft statement submitted to us, it is pointed out that revisionism constitutes the main danger in the international communist and workers' movement today. In the 1957 Moscow Declaration it is rightly stressed that the existence of bourgeois influence is the internal source of revisionism, while capitulation to the pressure of imperialism is its external source. Experience has fully corroborated that, disguised under pseudo-Marxist and pseudo-revolutionary slogans, modern revisionism has tried with every means to discredit our great doctrine, Marxism-Leninism, which it has dubbed as "outdated" and no longer responding to social development. Hiding behind the slogan of "creative Marxism," of "new conditions," the revisionists have striven, on the one hand, to deprive Marxism of its revolutionary spirit and to undermine the belief of the working class and the working people in socialism, and on the other hand, to use all the means in their power to prettify imperialism, describing it as moderate and peaceful. During the three years that have elapsed since the Moscow Conference, it has been fully confirmed that the modern revisionists are nothing but splitters of the communist movement and the socialist camp, loyal lackeys of imperialism, avowed enemies of socialism and of the working class.

Life itself has demonstrated that until now the standard-bearers of modern revisionism, its most aggressive and dangerous representatives, are the Yugoslav revisionists, the traitor clique of Tito and company. At the time when the Moscow Declaration was approved, this hostile group, agents of US imperialism, were not publicly denounced, although, in our opinion, there were
enough facts and information to warrant such a thing. Not only that, but later on, when the danger it presented became more evident, the fight against Yugoslav revisionism, the consistent and ceaseless fight to smash it ideologically and politically, was not conducted with the proper intensity. On the contrary. This has been, and continues to be, the source of many evils and much damage to our international communist and workers' movement. In the opinion of our Party, the reason for the failure to carry out the total exposure of the revisionist Tito group, for the raising of false "hopes" about an alleged "improvement" and positive "change" in this group of traitors, is the influence of the trend to conciliation, the mistaken views, and the incorrect assessment of the danger of this group on the part of Comrade Khrushchev and certain other Soviet leaders.

It has been said that J. V. Stalin was mistaken in assessing the Yugoslav revisionists and in sharpening the attitude toward them. Our Party has never endorsed such a view, because time and experience have proved the contrary. Stalin made a very correct assessment of the danger of the Yugoslav revisionists; he tried to settle this affair at the proper moment and in a Marxist way. The Information Bureau, as a collective organ, was called together at that time, and after the Titoite group was exposed, a merciless struggle was waged against it. Time has proven over and over again that such a thing was necessary and correct.

The Party of Labor of Albania has always held the opinion and is convinced that the Tito group are traitors to Marxism-Leninism, agents of imperialism, dangerous enemies of the socialist camp and of the entire international communist and workers' movement. Therefore, a merciless struggle should be waged against them. On our part, we have waged and continue to wage this battle as internationalist communists, and also because we have felt and continue to feel on our own backs the burden of the hostile activity of the revisionist Tito clique against our Party and our country. But this stand of our Party has never been to the liking of Comrade Khrushchev and certain other comrades.

The Titoite group has been a group of Trotskyites and renegades for a very long time. For the Party of Labor of Albania at least, they have been such since 1942, that is, since 18 years ago.

As far back as 1942, when there was a great upsurge in the struggle of the Albanian people, the Belgrade Trotskyite group, disguising themselves as friends and abusing our trust in them,
tried their utmost to hinder the development of our armed struggle, to hamper the creation of powerful Albanian partisan fighting detachments; and since it was impossible to stop them, they sought to take direct political and military control of these detachments. They attempted to make everything dependent on Belgrade, and our Party and our partisan army mere appendages of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav National Liberation Army.

While preserving its friendship with the Yugoslav partisans, our Party successfully resisted these diabolical aims. It was at that time that the Titoite group tried to lay the foundations of the Balkan Federation under the direction of the Belgrade Titoites, to hitch the Communist Parties of the Balkan countries to the chariot of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to place the partisan armies of the Balkan peoples under the Titoite Yugoslav staff. It was to this end that, in agreement with the British, they tried to set up the Balkan Staff and to place it, that is to say, to place the Balkan armies under the direction of the Anglo-Americans. Our Party successfully resisted these diabolical schemes. And when the banner of liberation was hoisted in Tirana, the Titoite gang in Belgrade issued orders to their agents in Albania to discredit the success of the Communist Party of Albania and to organize a putsch(6) to overthrow the leadership of our Party, the leadership which had organized the Party, guided the National Liberation War, and led the Albanian people to victory. The first putsch was organized by Tito through his secret agents within our Party. But the Communist Party of Albania smashed this plot of Tito's.

The Belgrade plotters did not lay down their arms, and together with their agent in our Party, the traitor Koçi Xoxe, continued the reorganization of their plot against new Albania in other forms, new forms. Their intention was to turn Albania into the 7th Republic of Yugoslavia.

At a time when our country had been devastated and laid

6) At the 2nd Plenum of the CC of the CPA held in Berat in November 1944, the delegate of the CC of the CPY cooked up a behind-the-scenes plot against the CPA with the participation of the anti-party elements, Sejfulla Malëshova, Koçi Xoxe, and Pandi Kristo. The main objective of this conspiracy was to overthrow the leadership of the Party headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha, and replace it with a leadership in the pay of the Yugoslavs.
waste and needed to be completely rebuilt, when our people were without food and shelter, but with high morale, when our people and army, weapons in hand, kept vigilant watch against the plots of reaction organized by the Anglo-American military missions which were threatening new Albania with a new invasion, when a large part of the Albanian partisan army had crossed the border and had gone to the aid of the Yugoslav brothers, fighting shoulder to shoulder with them and together liberating Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Kosova and Metohia, and Macedonia, the Belgrade plotters were hatching up schemes to enslave Albania.

But our Party offered heroic resistance to these secret agents who posed as communists. When the Belgrade Trotskyites realized that they had lost their case, that our Party was smashing their plots, they tried their last card, namely, to invade Albania with their army, to overwhelm all resistance, to arrest the leaders of the Party of Labor of Albania and the Albanian state, and to proclaim Albania the 7th Republic of Yugoslavia. Our Party smashed this diabolic plan of theirs too. The aid and intervention of J. V. Stalin at these moments were decisive for our Party and for the freedom of the Albanian people.

Precisely at this time the Information Bureau exposed the Tito clique.

The Information Bureau brought about the defeat of the conspiracies of the Tito clique, not only in Albania but also in the other people's democracies. Posing as communists, the renegade and agent of imperialism, Tito, and his gang, tried to alienate the people's democracies in the Balkans and Central Europe from the friendship and wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, to destroy the communist and workers' parties of our countries, and to turn our states into reserves of Anglo-American imperialism.

Who was there who did not know about and see in action the hostile schemes of imperialism and its loyal servant Tito? Everybody knew, everybody learned, and all unanimously approved the correct decisions of the Information Bureau. Everyone, without exception, approved the Resolutions of the Information Bureau, which, in our opinion, were and still are correct without exception.

Those who did not want to see and understand these acts of this gang had a second chance to do so in the Hungarian counter-revolution and in the unceasing plots against Albania.
The wolf may change his coat, but he remains a wolf. Tito and his gang may resort to trickery, may try to disguise themselves, but they are traitors, and agents of imperialism. They are the murderers of the heroic Yugoslav internationalist communists; and this is what they will be, and how they will act, until they are wiped out.

The Party of Labor of Albania considers the decisions taken against the renegade Tito group by the Information Bureau not as decisions taken by Comrade Stalin personally, but as decisions taken by all the parties that took part in the Information Bureau. And not only by these parties alone, but also by the communist and workers' parties which did not take part in it. Since this was a matter that concerned all the communist and workers' parties, it also concerned the Party of Labor of Albania, which, having received and studied a copy of the letter Comrades Stalin and Molotov had written to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, endorsed in full both the letter and the decisions of the Information Bureau.

Why, then, was the "change of attitude" toward the Yugoslav revisionists, adopted by Comrade Khrushchev and the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1955, not made an issue for consultation in the normal way with the other communist and workers' parties, but was conceived and carried out in such a hostile and unilateral way? This was a matter that concerned us all. The Yugoslav revisionists had either opposed Marxism-Leninism and the communist and workers' parties of the world, or they had not; either they were wrong, or we were wrong in regard to them, and not just Stalin. This thing could not be resolved by Comrade Khrushchev at his own discretion, and it is impermissible for him to try to do so. But in fact that is what he did, and this change of attitude in the relations with the Yugoslav revisionists is connected with his visit to Belgrade. This was a bomb-shell to the Party of Labor of Albania, which immediately opposed it categorically. Before Comrade Khrushchev set out for Belgrade in May 1955, the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania sent a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union expressing the opposition of our Party to his going to Belgrade, stressing that the Yugoslav issue could not be settled in a unilateral way, but that a meeting of the Information Bureau should be called to which it asked that the Party of Labor of Albania also should be invited. It is there that this matter should have been settled after a correct and
lengthy discussion.

Of course, formally we had no right to decide whether Comrade Khrushchev should or should not go to Belgrade, and we backed down on this, but in essence we were right, and time has confirmed that the Yugoslav issue should not be settled in this precipitate way.

The slogan of "overriding interests" was launched, the 2nd Resolution of the Information Bureau was speedily revoked, the "epoch of reconciliation" with "the Yugoslav comrades" began, the conspirators, wherever they were, re-examined and rehabilitated, and the "Yugoslav comrades" came off unscathed, strutted like peacocks, trumpeted abroad that their "just cause" had triumphed, that the "criminal Stalin" had trumped up all these things, and a situation was created in which whoever refused to take this course was dubbed a "Stalinist" who should be done away with.

Our Party refused to take such a conciliatory and opportunist course. It stood fast on the correct Marxist-Leninist ideological position, on the position of the ideological and political struggle against the Yugoslav revisionists. The Party of Labor of Albania remained unshaken in its views that the Titoite group were traitors, renegades, Trotskyites, subversionists, and agents of the US imperialists, that the Party of Labor of Albania had not been mistaken about them.

The Party of Labor of Albania remained unshaken in its view that Comrade Stalin had made no mistake in this matter, that, with their line of betrayal, the revisionists had attempted to enslave Albania, to destroy the Party of Labor of Albania, and by cooking up a number of international plots with the Anglo-American imperialists, they had tried to embroil Albania in international conflicts.

On the other hand, the Party of Labor of Albania was in favor of establishing state relations of good neighborliness, trade and cultural relations with the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, provided that the norms of peaceful coexistence between states of different regimes were observed, because as far as the Party of Labor of Albania is concerned, Titoite Yugoslavia has not been, is not, and never will be a socialist country, as long as it is headed by a group of renegades and agents of imperialism.

No open or disguised attempt will make the Party of Labor of Albania waver from this correct stand. It was futile for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
to try to persuade us, through Comrade Suslov, to eliminate the question of Koçi Xoxe from the report submitted at our 3rd Congress in May 1956, because that would mean negating our struggle and our principled stand.

In Albania, the Titoite saw struck a nail, or, as Tito says, "Albania was a thorn in his foot," and, of course, the Titoite traitor group continued their struggle against the Party of Labor of Albania, thinking that they were exposing us by dubbing us "Stalinists."

The Belgrade group did not confine their fight against us to propaganda alone, but they continued their espionage, subversion, plots, dispatching armed bands into our country, more intensively than in 1948. These are all facts. But the tragedy is that, while the Party of Labor of Albania, on the one hand, was defending itself against the bitter and unceasing attacks by the Yugoslav revisionists, on the other hand, its unwavering, principled, Marxist-Leninist stand was in opposition to the conciliatory stand of the Soviet leaders and of certain other communist and workers' parties toward the Yugoslav revisionists.

At that time it was loudly proclaimed and written that "Yugoslavia is a socialist country, and this is a fact," that "the Yugoslav communists possess a great experience and great merits," that "the Yugoslav experience is worthy of greater interest and more attentive study," that "the period of disputes and misunderstandings had not been caused by Yugoslavia," and that "great injustice had been done to it," and so on and so forth. This, of course, gave heart to the Tito clique, who thought they had won everything, except that there still remained one "thorn in their foot" which they intended to isolate and later liquidate. However, not only could our Party not be isolated, much less liquidated, but on the contrary, time proved that the views of our Party were correct.

A great deal of pressure has been exerted on our Party over this stand. The Albanian leaders were considered "hot-blooded" and "stubborn," "exaggerating" matters with Yugoslavia, "unjustly harassing" the Yugoslavs, etc. The attack against our Party in this direction has been led by Comrade Khrushchev.

So far, I have mentioned in brief what the Yugoslav revisionists have done against our Party and our country during and after the war, after 1948, but I shall also dwell a little on the events prior to the Hungarian counter-revolution, which is the work of Yugoslav agents. The Belgrade traitor group began to organize a
counter-revolution in Albania also. Had our Party made the mistake of joining in the "conciliation waltz" with the Yugoslav revisionists, as was preached after 1955, then the people's democracy in Albania would have gone down the drain. We, Albanians, would not have been here in this hall, but would have been still fighting in our mountains.

Firmly united by steel-like bonds, our Party and people remained extremely vigilant, and discovered and unmasked Tito's spies in our Central Committee who worked in collusion with the Yugoslav legation in Tirana. Tito sent word to these traitors, saying that they had precipitated things, that they should have waited for his orders. These spies and traitors also wrote to Comrade Khrushchev asking him to intervene against the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania. These are documented facts. Tito's aim was that the counter-revolution in Albania should be coordinated with that of Hungary.

Our 3rd Congress was to be held following the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Yugoslav agents thought that the time had come to overthrow the "obstinate and Stalinist" Albanian leadership, and organized a plot which was discovered and crushed at the Party Conference of the city of Tirana in April 1956. The plotters received the stern punishment they deserved.

Tito's other dangerous agents in Albania, Dali Ndreu and Liri Gega, received orders from Tito to flee to Yugoslavia, because "they were in danger" and because activities against the Party of Labor "had to be organized from Yugoslav territory." Our Party was fully aware of Tito's activity and secret orders. It was wide awake and caught the traitors right on the border when they were trying to flee. The traitors were brought to trial and were executed. All the Yugoslav agents who were preparing the counter-revolution in Albania were detected and wiped out. To our amazement, Comrade Khrushchev came out against us in defense of these traitors and Yugoslav agents. He accused us of having shot the Yugoslav agent, the traitress Liri Gega, allegedly "when she was pregnant, a thing which had not happened even at the time of the Czar, and this had made a bad impression on world opinion." These were slanders trumped up by the Yugoslavs in whom Comrade Khrushchev had more faith than in us. We, of course, denied all these insinuations made by Comrade Khrushchev.

But Comrade Khrushchev's incorrect, unprincipled and hos-
tile stand toward our Party and its leadership did not stop there. The other Yugoslav agent and traitor to the Party of Labor of Albania and to the Albanian people, Panajot Plaku, fled to Yugoslavia and placed himself in the service of the Yugoslavs. He organized hostile broadcasts from the so-called "Socialist Albania" radio station. This traitor wrote to the renegade Tito and to Comrade Khrushchev, asking the latter to use his authority to eliminate the leadership of Albania, headed by Enver Hoxha, under the pretext that we were "anti-Marxists and Stalinists." Far from being indignant at this traitor's letter, Comrade Khrushchev expressed the opinion that Panajot Plaku could return to Albania on condition that we do nothing to him, or he could find political asylum in the Soviet Union. We felt as if the walls of the Kremlin had dropped on our heads, for we could never imagine that the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union could go so far as to support Tito's agents and traitors to our Party against our Party and our people.

But the culmination of our principled opposition over the Yugoslav issue with Comrade Khrushchev was reached when, faced with our principled insistence on the exposure of the Belgrade Titoite agency, he was so enraged that, during the official talks between the two delegations in April 1957, he said to us angrily, "We are breaking off the talks. We cannot come to terms with you. You are seeking to lead us to the road of Stalin."

We were disgusted at such an unfriendly stand by Comrade Khrushchev, who wanted to break off the talks, which would mean an aggravation of relations with the Albanian Party and state over the question of the betrayers of Marxism-Leninism, the Tito group. We could never have agreed on this matter, but we, who had been accused of being hot-blooded, kept calm, for we were convinced that we were in the right, and not Comrade Khrushchev, that the line we were pursuing was the correct one, and not that of Comrade Khrushchev, that our line would be confirmed again by experience, as it has been confirmed many times over.

In our opinion, the counter-revolution in Hungary was mainly the work of the Titoites. In Tito and the Belgrade renegades, the US imperialists had their best weapon to destroy the people's democracy in Hungary.

After Comrade Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade in 1955, no more was said about Tito's subversive activity. The counter-
revolution in Hungary did not break out unexpectedly. It was prepared, we may say, quite openly, and it would be futile for anyone to try to convince us that this counter-revolution was prepared in great secrecy. This counter-revolution was prepared by the agents of the Tito gang in collusion with the traitor Imre Nagy, in collusion with the Hungarian fascists, and all of them acted openly under the direction of the Americans.

The scheme of the Titoites, who were the leaders, was for Hungary to be detached from our socialist camp, to be turned into a second Yugoslavia, to be linked with the NATO alliance through Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, to receive aid from the USA and, together with Yugoslavia and under the direction of the imperialists, to continue the struggle against the socialist camp.

The counter-revolutionaries worked openly in Hungary. But how is it that their activities attracted no attention? We cannot understand how it was possible for Tito and the Horthyite bands to have worked so freely in a fraternal country of people's democracy like Hungary where the party was in power and the weapons of dictatorship were in its hands, where the Soviet army was present.

We think that the stand taken by Comrade Khrushchev and the other Soviet comrades toward Hungary was not clear, because the greatly mistaken views which they held about the Belgrade gang did not allow them to see the situation correctly.

The Soviet comrades trusted Imre Nagy, Tito's man. We do not say this for nothing or without good grounds. Before the counter-revolution broke out and when things were boiling up at the "Petőfi Club," I went through to Moscow and, in a conversation with Comrade Suslov, told him what I had seen on my way in Budapest. I told him, too, that revisionist Imre Nagy was raising his head and was organizing the counter-revolution at the "Petőfi Club." Comrade Suslov categorically opposed my view, and in order to prove to me that Imre Nagy was a good man, pulled out of his drawer Imre Nagy's fresh "self-criticism." Nevertheless, I told Comrade Suslov that Imre Nagy was a traitor.

We wonder, and we pose the legitimate question: Why did Comrade Khrushchev and the Soviet comrades go many times to Brioni to talk with the renegade Tito about the question of Hungary? If the Soviet comrades knew that the Titoites were preparing the counter-revolution in a country of our camp, is it permissible for the leaders of the Soviet Union to go and talk
with an enemy who organizes plots and counter-revolutions in the socialist countries?

As a communist party, as a state of people's democracy, as a member of the Warsaw Treaty and the socialist camp, we must ask Comrade Khrushchev and the Soviet comrades to tell us why so many meetings with Tito at Brioni in 1956, with this traitor to Marxism-Leninism, and not a single meeting with our countries, not a single meeting of the members of the Warsaw Treaty?

Whether to intervene or not to intervene with arms in Hungary, is, we think, not within the competence of one person alone; seeing that we have set up the Warsaw Treaty, we should decide jointly, because otherwise it is of no use to speak of alliance, of the collective spirit and collaboration among the parties. The Hungarian counter-revolution cost our camp blood, it cost Hungary and the Soviet Union blood.

Why was this bloodshed permitted and no steps taken to prevent it? We are of the opinion that no preliminary steps could be taken so long as Comrade Khrushchev placed his trust in the organizer of the Hungarian counter-revolution, the traitor Tito, and the Soviet comrades so seriously underestimated the absolutely necessary regular meetings with their friends and allies, so long as they considered their unilateral decisions on matters that concern us all as the only correct ones, and so long as they attached no importance whatsoever to collective work and collective decisions.

The Party of Labor of Albania is not at all clear about this matter, how things developed and how decisions were taken. At a time when the Titoites are conducting talks at Brioni with the Soviet comrades, on the one hand, and feverishly organizing counter-revolutions in Hungary and Albania, on the other, the Soviet comrades make not the slightest effort to inform our leadership, at least as a matter of form since we are allies, about what is happening or about what measures they intend to take. But this is not a formal matter. The Soviet comrades know only too well what the Belgrade gang thought of Albania and what their aims were. In fact, not only is this stand of the Soviet comrades to be condemned, but it is also incomprehensible.

Hungary was a great lesson for us in regard to what was done and in regard to the drama that was played on the stage and behind the scenes there. We believed that after the Hungarian counter-revolution the betrayal of Tito and his gang was more than clear. We know that many documents, that expose the
barbarous activity of the Tito group in the Hungarian events are kept locked away and are not brought to light. Why this should happen, we do not understand. What interests are hidden behind these documents which are not brought to light, but are kept under lock and key? After the death of Stalin, the most trifling items were searched out to condemn him, while the documents that expose a vile traitor like Tito are locked away in a drawer.

But even after the Hungarian counter-revolution, the political and ideological fight against the Titoite gang, instead of becoming more intense, as Marxism-Leninism demands, was played down, leading to reconciliation, smiles, contacts, moderation, and almost to kisses. In fact, thanks to this opportunist attitude, the Titoites got out of this predicament too.

The Party of Labor of Albania was opposed to the line followed by Comrade Khrushchev and the other comrades toward the Yugoslav revisionists. Our Party’s battle against the revisionists continued with even more fury. Since it was impossible to attack our correct line, many friends and comrades, particularly the Soviet and Bulgarian comrades, ridiculed us, had an ironical smile on their faces, and with their friendly contacts with the Titoites, isolated our people everywhere.

We had hoped that, after the 7th Titoite Congress, even the blind, let alone the Marxists, would see with whom they were dealing and what they should do. Unfortunately, things did not turn out that way. Not long after the 7th Titoite Congress, the exposure of revisionism was toned down. The Soviet theoretical publications spoke of every kind of revisionism, even of revisionism in Honolulu, but had very little to say about Yugoslav revisionism. This is like saying, "Don't see the wolf before your eyes but look for its tracks." Slogans were put out: "Don't speak any more of Tito and his group, for that will fan their vanity," "Don't speak any more of Tito and his group, for that would harm the Yugoslav people," "Don't speak about the Titoite renegades, for Tito makes use of what we say to mobilize the Yugoslav people against our camp," etc. Many parties adopted these slogans, but not our Party, and we think we acted correctly.

Such a situation was created that the press of friendly countries accepted articles from Albanian writers only provided they made no mention of the Yugoslav revisionists. Everywhere in the countries of people's democracy in Europe, except in Czechoslovakia, where in general, the Czechoslovak comrades
assessed our activities correctly, (7) our ambassadors were isolated in a roundabout way, because the diplomats of friendly countries preferred to converse with the Titoite diplomats while they hated our diplomats and did not even want to set eyes on them.

And matters went so far that Comrade Khrushchev made his coming to Albania in May 1959, at the head of the Soviet Party and Government Delegation, conditional on the Yugoslav issue. The first thing Comrade Khrushchev said, at the beginning of talks in Tirana, was to inform everybody at the meeting that he would not talk against the Yugoslav revisionists, a thing which no one could compel him to do, but such a statement was intended to show quite openly that he disagreed with the Party of Labor of Albania on this issue.

We respected the wishes of our guest during the whole time he stayed in Albania, regardless of the fact that the Titoite press was highly elated and did not fail to write that Khrushchev had shut the mouths of the Albanians. This, in fact, corresponded to reality, but Comrade Khrushchev was too far from convincing us on this matter, and the Titoites learned that quite clearly, because after our guest's departure from our country, the Party of Labor of Albania no longer felt bound by the conditions put upon us by our guest and continued on its own Marxist-Leninist course.

In his talks with Vukmanovich-Tempo, (8) among other things, Comrade Khrushchev has compared our stand, as far as its tone is concerned, with that of the Yugoslavs, and has said that he did not agree with the tone of the Albanians. We consider that Comrade Khrushchev's statement to Vukmanovich-Tempo, to this enemy of Marxism-Leninism, the socialist camp and Albania, is wrong and should be condemned. We hold that one should get what he deserves, and we, on our part, disagree with Comrade Khrushchev's conciliatory tone toward the revisionists. Our people say that when facing the enemy you raise your voice, when facing your loved one you speak in honeyed tones.

Some comrades have the mistaken idea that we maintain this attitude toward the Titoites because we allegedly want to be the

7) This stand was maintained only in the beginning.
8) One of the Yugoslav revisionist leaders who, as early as 1943, brought slanderous accusations against the CC of the Communist Party of Albania (today the Party of Labor of Albania).
standard-bearers of the fight against revisionism, or because we view this problem from a narrow angle, from a purely national angle. Therefore, they claim, we have embarked on a "chauvinist course," if not totally, at least on that of "narrow nationalism." The Party of Labor of Albania has always viewed the question of Yugoslav revisionism through the prism of Marxism-Leninism, it has always viewed and fought it as the main danger to the international communist movement, as a danger to the unity of the socialist camp.

But while being internationalists, we are at the same time communists of a specific country, of Albania. We, Albanian communists would not be called communists if we failed to defend the freedom of our sacred country consistently and resolutely from the plots and diversionist attacks of the revisionist Tito clique, which are aimed at the invasion of Albania, a fact that is already known to everyone. Could we Albanian communists possibly permit our country to become the prey of Tito, of the US imperialists, of the Greeks, or of the Italians? No, never!

Some others advise us not to speak against the Yugoslavs, saying, "Why are you afraid? You are defended by the Soviet Union." We have told these comrades, and we tell them again, that we are afraid neither of the Yugoslav Trotskyites nor of any one else. We have said, and say it again, that, as Marxist-Leninists, not for one moment should we diminish the struggle against the revisionists and imperialists until we wipe them out. Because if the Soviet Union is to defend you, you must first defend yourself.

The Yugoslavs accuse us of allegedly "being chauvinists, of interfering in their internal affairs, and of demanding a rectification of the Albanian-Yugoslav borders." A number of our friends think and imply that we Albanian communists swim in such waters. We tell our friends who think thus that they are grossly mistaken. We are not chauvinists, we have neither demanded nor demand rectification of borders. But what we demand, and will continually demand, from the Titoites — and we will expose them to the end for this — is that they give up perpetrating the crime of genocide against the Albanian population in Kosova and Metohia, that they give up the white terror against the Albanians of Kosova, that they give up driving the Albanians from their native soil and deporting them en masse to Turkey. We demand that the rights of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia should be recog-
nized according to the Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Is this chauvinist or Marxist?

This is our attitude on these matters. But if the Titoites speak of peaceful coexistence, of peace, of good-neighborly relations, and on the other hand organize plots, an army of mercenaries and fascists in Yugoslavia for the purpose of attacking our borders and chopping up socialist Albania together with the Greek monarcho-fascists, then you may be certain that not only the Albanians in new Albania, but also the one million Albanians living under Titoite bondage, will rise, arms in hand, to stay the hand of the criminals. And this is Marxist, and if anything happens, this is what will be done. The Party of Labor of Albania does not permit anyone to play at politics with the rights of the Albanian people.

We do not interfere in the internal affairs of others, but when, as a result of the slackening of the fight against Yugoslav revisionism, things go so far that in a friendly country like Bulgaria a map of the Balkans is printed in which Albania is included within the boundaries of Federal Yugoslavia, we cannot remain silent. We are told that this happened due to a technical error of an employee, but why had this not happened before?

But this is not an isolated case. At a meeting in Sremska Mitrovica, the bandit Rankovich attacked Albania as usual, calling it "a hell where barbed wire and the boots of the frontier guards reign supreme," and saying that the democracy of the Italian neo-fascists was more advanced than ours.

Rankovich's words would be of no significance to us except that the Soviet and Bulgarian ambassadors to Belgrade, who attended this meeting, listened to these words with the greatest serenity, without making the slightest protest. We protested this in a comradely way to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Bulgarian Communist Party.

In his letter of reply to the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, Comrade Zhivkov dared to reject our protest and called the speech of the bandit Rankovich a positive one. We could never have imagined that the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party could describe as positive the speech of a bandit like Rankovich, who so grossly insults socialist Albania, likening it to hell. We not only reject with contempt this impermissible insult by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, but we are dead certain that the Bulgarian Communist
Party and the heroic Bulgarian people would be utterly revolted if they came to hear of this. Things will not go any too well if we allow such gross mistakes toward each other.

We can never, never agree with Comrade Khrushchev, and we protested to him at that time about the talks he had with Sophocles Venizelos in connection with the Greek minority in Albania. Comrade Khrushchev is well aware that the borders of Albania are inviolable and sacred, and that anyone who touches them is an aggressor. The Albanian people will fight to the last drop of their blood if anyone touches their borders. Comrade Khrushchev was gravely mistaken when he told Venizelos that he had seen Greeks and Albanians working together as brothers in Korça. In Korça, there is no Greek minority whatsoever, but for centuries the Greeks have coveted the Korça district as they do all Albania. There is a very small Greek minority in Gjirokastra. Comrade Khrushchev knows that they enjoy all the rights, use their own language, have their own schools, in addition to all the rights that the other Albanian citizens enjoy.

The claims of the Greeks, among them, those of Sophocles Venizelos — the son of Eleutherios Venizelos who murdered Albanians and put whole districts of Southern Albania to the torch, the most rabid Greek chauvinist and father of the idea of Great Greece — of the partitioning of Albania and annexing it under the slogan of autonomy, are very well known. Comrade Khrushchev is well aware of the attitude of the Party of Labor of Albania, the Albanian government and people on this question. Then, to fail to give Sophocles Venizelos the answer he deserves, to leave hopes and illusions, and to say that he will transmit to the Albanian comrades the desires of a British agent, a chauvinist — this is unacceptable to us and deserves condemnation.

Comrade Khrushchev, we have given our reply to Sophocles Venizelos, and we believe you have learned of this through the press. We are not opposed to your politicizing with Sophocles Venizelos, but refrain from politicizing with our boundaries and our rights, for we have not allowed, nor will we allow, such a thing. And it is not as nationalists but as internationalists that we do this.

Some may consider these things I am telling you as out of place, as statements inappropriate to the level of this meeting. It would not have been hard for me to have put together a speech in an allegedly theoretical tone, to have spoken in generalizations and quotations, to have submitted a report in general terms in
order to please you and pass my turn. But to the Party of Labor of Albania it seems that this is not the occasion. What I have said may appear to some as attacks, but these are criticisms which have followed their proper course, which have been made before, when and where necessary, within Leninist norms. But seeing that one error follows another, it would be a mistake to keep silent, because attitudes, deeds and practice confirm, enrich, and create theory.

How quickly the Bucharest Meeting was organized and how quickly the Communist Party of China was condemned for "dogmatism"! But why has a conference to condemn revisionism not been organized with the same speed?

Has revisionism been totally exposed, as the Soviet comrades claim? No, in no way whatsoever! Revisionism has been, and continues to be, the main danger. Yugoslav revisionism has not been liquidated, and the way it is being dealt with is leaving it a clear field for all forms of action.

And can it be said that there are no disturbing manifestations of modern revisionism in other parties? Anyone who says "no" is closing his eyes to this danger, and one fine day we will wake to see that unexpected things have happened to us. We are Marxists, and should analyze our work just as Lenin did and taught us to do. He was not afraid of mistakes, he looked them in the eye and corrected them. This is the way the Bolshevik Party was tempered, and this is the way our parties have been tempered.

But what is happening in the ranks of our parties? What is happening in our camp since the 20th Congress? Comrade Suslov may feel optimistic, and he expressed this feeling at the October Committee meeting when he reproached the head of the Delegation of the Party of Labor of Albania, Hysni Kapo, for pessimism in his view of events. We, Albanian communists, have not been pessimistic even at the blackest moments of the history of our party and people, and never shall be, but we shall always be realists.

Much has been said about our unity. This is essential, and we should fight to strengthen and temper it. But the fact is that on many important issues of principle we have no unity.

The Party of Labor of Albania is of the opinion that things should be re-examined in the light of a Marxist-Leninist analysis and the errors should be corrected. Let us take the question of the criticism of Stalin and his work. Our Party, as a Marxist-Leninist one, is fully aware that the cult of the individual is an
alien and dangerous manifestation for the parties and for the communist movement itself. Marxist parties should not only not permit the development of the cult of the individual, which hampers the activity of the masses, negates their role, is at variance with the development of the life of the party and with the laws that govern it, but should also fight with might and main to uproot it when it begins to appear or has already appeared in a specific country. Looking at it from this angle, we fully agree that the cult of the individual of Stalin should be criticized as a dangerous manifestation in the life of the party. But in our opinion, the 20th Congress, and especially Comrade Khrushchev's secret report, did not put the question of Comrade Stalin correctly, in an objective Marxist-Leninist way.

Stalin was severely and unjustly condemned on this question by Comrade Khrushchev and the 20th Congress. Comrade Stalin and his work do not belong to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to the Soviet Union and to the Soviet people alone, but to all of us. Just as Comrade Khrushchev said in Bucharest that the differences are not between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China, but between the Communist Party of China and international communism, just as it pleases him to say that the decisions of the 20th and 21st Congresses were adopted by all the communist and workers' parties, in the same way he should also be magnanimous and consistent in passing judgment on Stalin's work so that the communist and workers' parties of the world could adopt it in all conscience.

There cannot be two yardsticks, nor two measures of weight over this matter. Then why was Comrade Stalin condemned at the 20th Congress without prior consultation with the other communist and workers' parties of the world? Why was this "anathema" pronounced upon Stalin all of a sudden to the communist and workers' parties of the world, and why did many fraternal parties learn of it only when the imperialist press published Comrade Khrushchev's secret report far and wide?

The condemnation of Comrade Stalin was imposed on the communist and progressive world by Comrade Khrushchev. What could our parties do under these circumstances, when unexpectedly, using the great authority of the Soviet Union, they were confronted en bloc with a matter of this kind?

The Party of Labor of Albania found itself in a great dilemma. It was not convinced, and will never be convinced, on
the question of condemning Comrade Stalin in that way and in those forms that Comrade Khrushchev used. Our Party adopted, in general, the formulations of the 20th Congress on this matter, but nevertheless it did not stick to the limitations set by the congress, nor did it yield to the blackmail and intimidations from outside our country.

The Party of Labor of Albania maintained a realistic stand on the question of Stalin. It was just and grateful toward this glorious Marxist, against whom, while he was alive, there was no one among us "brave enough" to come out and criticize, but when he was dead a great deal of mud was thrown, thus creating an intolerable situation which negated the leading role of J. V. Stalin in a whole glorious epoch of the Soviet Union, when the first socialist state in the world was set up, when the Soviet Union waxed strong, successfully defeated the imperialist plots, crushed the Trotskyites, Bukharinites, and the kulaks as a class, when the construction of heavy industry and collectivization triumphed, in a word, when the Soviet Union became a colossal power, in building socialism, when it fought the Second World War with legendary heroism and defeated fascism, a powerful socialist camp was set up, and so on and so forth.

The Party of Labor of Albania thinks that it is not correct, normal or Marxist to blot out Stalin's name and great work from all this epoch, as is being done at the present time. We should all defend the good and immortal work of Stalin. He who does not defend it is an opportunist and a coward.

As a person, and as the leader of the Bolshevik Communist Party after Lenin's death, Comrade Stalin was at the same time the most prominent leader of international communism, helping in a very positive way and with great authority in consolidating and promoting the victories of communism throughout the world. All of Comrade Stalin's theoretical works are a fiery testimony of his loyalty to his teacher of genius, the great Lenin, and to Leninism.

Stalin fought for the rights of the working class and the working people in the whole world; he fought to the end, with great consistency, for the freedom of the peoples of our countries of people's democracy.

Viewed from this angle alone, Stalin belongs to the entire communist world and not only to the Soviet communists. He belongs to all the workers of the world and not just to the Soviet workers.
Had Comrade Khrushchev and the Soviet comrades viewed this matter in this spirit, the gross mistakes that were made would have been avoided. But they viewed the question of Stalin very simply, and only from the internal aspect of the Soviet Union. However, in the opinion of the Party of Labor of Albania, even from this aspect, they viewed it in a one-sided way, seeing only his mistakes, almost completely putting aside his great activity, his major contribution to the strengthening of the Soviet Union, to the tempering of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to the building of the economy of the Soviet Union, its industry, its collective agriculture, and his leadership of the Soviet people to their great victory over German fascism.

Did Stalin make mistakes? In so long a period filled with heroism, trials, struggle, triumphs, not only Joseph Stalin personally, but also the leadership as a collective body, could not help making mistakes. Which is the party and who is the leader that can claim to have made no mistakes in their work? When the existing leadership of the Soviet Union is criticized, the comrades of the Soviet leadership advise us to look ahead and let bygones be bygones, they tell us to avoid polemics. But when it comes to Stalin, they not only did not look ahead, but they turned right around, completely backward, in order to track down only the weak spots in Stalin's work.

The cult of the individual of Stalin should, of course, be overcome. But can it be said, as has been claimed, that Stalin himself was the sponsor of this cult of the individual? The cult of the individual should be overcome without fail, but was it necessary and was it right to go to such lengths as to point the finger at anyone who mentioned Stalin's name, to look askance at anyone who used a quotation from Stalin? With great speed and zeal, certain persons smashed the statues of Stalin and changed the names of cities that had been named after him. But why go any further? At Bucharest, turning to the Chinese comrades, Comrade Khrushchev said, "You are hanging on to a dead horse. Come and get his bones, if you wish!" These references were to Stalin.

The Party of Labor of Albania declares solemnly that it is opposed to these acts and to these assessments of the work and person of J. V. Stalin.

Soviet comrades, why were these questions raised in this manner and in such a distorted form, while the possibilities
existed for both Stalin's mistakes and those of the leadership to be treated properly, to be corrected, without creating that great shock in the hearts of the communists of the world, which only the sense of discipline and the authority of the Soviet Union prevented from bursting out?

Comrade Mikoyan has said that we dared not criticize Comrade Stalin when he was alive because he would have cut off our heads. We are sure that Comrade Khrushchev will not cut off our heads if we criticize him correctly.

After the 20th Congress, the events we know took place in Poland, the counter-revolution broke out in Hungary, attacks began on the Soviet system, upsets occurred in many communist and workers' parties of the world, and finally this which is going on now.

We pose the question: Why did these things occur in the international communist movement, in the ranks of our camp, after the 20th Congress? Or do these things happen because the leadership of the Party of Labor of Albania is sectarian, dogmatic and pessimistic?

A matter of this kind should be of extraordinary concern to us, and we should look for the source of the malady and cure it. But certainly this sickness cannot be cured by patting the renegade Tito on the back, nor by putting in the Statement that modern revisionism has been completely defeated, as the Soviet comrades claim.

The authority of Leninism has been and is decisive. It should be established in such a way as to clean up erroneous views everywhere, and in a radical way. There is no other way out for us communists. If there are things that must and should be said outright, just as they are, this should be done now, at this conference, before it is too late. Communists, we think, should sleep with a clear conscience. They should strive to consolidate their unity, but without holding back their reservations, without nurturing feelings of favoritism and hatred. A communist says openly what he feels in his heart, and matters will be judged correctly.

There may be people who are not pleased with what our small Party is saying. Our small Party can be isolated, our country may be subjected to economic pressure in order to prove to our people that allegedly their leadership is no good. Our Party may be and is being attacked — Mikhail, Suslov equates the Party of Labor of Albania with the bourgeois parties and likens
its leaders to Kerensky. But this does not intimidate us. We have learned some lessons. Rankovich has not said worse things about the Party of Labor of Albania, Tito has called us Goebbels, but nevertheless we are Leninists, and they are Trotskyites, traitors, lackeys and agents of imperialism.

I wish to emphasize that the Party of Labor of Albania and the Albanian people have shown in practice how much they love, how much they respect, the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and that when the Party of Labor of Albania criticizes the wrong-doings of certain Soviet leaders, that does not mean that our views and our attitude have changed. We Albanians, as Marxist, have the courage to criticize these comrades, with our Marxist severity we tell them in a comradely way, we open our hearts and tell them frankly what we think. Hypocrites we have never been, nor will we ever be.

In spite of the severity we show, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will still love us, in spite of the fact that we also may make mistakes, but the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the other communist and workers' parties of the world will not accuse us of lacking sincerity, of talking behind their backs, or of swearing allegiance to a hundred banners.

In conclusion, I wish to say a few words about the draft statement submitted to us by the Editorial Commission. Our Delegation acquainted itself with this draft and scrutinized it carefully. In the new draft statement many amendments have been made to the first variant submitted by the Soviet Delegation, which was taken as a basis for the work of the said Commission. With the amendments made to it, the new draft statement has been considerably improved, many important ideas have been stressed, a number of theses have been formulated more correctly, and the overwhelming majority of the allusions against the Communist Party of China have been deleted.

At the meeting of this Commission, the Delegation of our Party offered many suggestions, some of which were adopted. Although our Delegation was not in agreement that certain important matters of principle should remain in the draft document, it agreed that this document should be submitted to this meeting, reserving its right to express its views once again on all the issues on which it disagreed. Above all, we think that those five issues which remain uncoordinated should be settled so that we may draw up a document which has the unanimous approval of all.
We think that it is essential to make clear in the Statement the idea of Lenin, expressed recently by Comrade Maurice Thorez as well as by Comrade Suslov in his speech at the meeting of the Editorial Commission, that there can be an absolute guarantee of the prohibition of war only when socialism has triumphed throughout the world or, at least, in a number of other major imperialist countries. At the same time, that paragraph which refers to factionist or group activity in the international communist movement should be deleted, since this, as we pointed out at the meeting of the Commission too, does not help consolidate unity; on the contrary, it undermines it. We are also in favor of deleting the words referring to the overcoming of the dangerous consequences of the cult of the individual, or else, of adding the phrase "which occurred in a number of parties," a thing which corresponds better to reality.

I do not want to take the time of this meeting on these questions and on other opinions which we have on the draft statement. Our Delegation will make its concrete remarks when the draft statement itself is under discussion.

We shall do well, and it will be salutary, if we have the courage at this conference to look our mistakes in the face and treat the wounds wherever they may be, wounds which are threatening to become aggravated and dangerous. We do not consider it an offense when comrades criticize us justly and on the facts, but we never, never accept that, without any facts, they may call us "dogmatic," "sectarian," "narrow nationalists," simply because we fight with persistence against modern revisionism, and especially against Yugoslav revisionism. If anyone considers our struggle against revisionism as dogmatic or sectarian, we say to him, "Take off your revisionist spectacles, and you will see more clearly."

The Party of Labor of Albania thinks that this conference will remain an historic one, for it will be a conference in the
tradition of the Leninist Conferences which the Bolshevik Party organized in order to expose distorted views and root them right out, in order to strengthen and steel the unity of our international communist and workers' movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. Our Party of Labor will continue to strive with determination to strengthen our unity, our fraternal bonds, the joint activity of our communist and workers' parties, for this is the guarantee of the triumph of the cause of peace and socialism.

RADIOGRAM TO COMRADE HYSNI KAPO IN MOSCOW

November 30, 1960
10:40 hrs.

Comrade Hysni,

We received your radiogram. If all the things you wrote about in the radiogram are removed from the draft Declaration, if the Chinese proposal is added, and the 20th Congress remains according to the [1957] Moscow Declaration, you may sign the Declaration. Go about these questions always in full agreement with the Chinese comrades. If a declaration on non-acceptance of the inclusion of the 20th Congress, or on the formulation according to the Moscow Meeting is necessary, make a written statement, hand it in, and sign the Document of the Meeting.

We had a good trip. (1) Last night we were at a dinner given at the Palace of Brigades. (2) Indescribable enthusiasm. The comrades are well. Regards to Ramiz. We are waiting for you.

Affectionately yours,

Enver

Published for the first time
in Volume 19 according to the
original in the Central Archives of the Party.

1) In the afternoon of November 29, 1960, Comrades Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu returned to their country.

2) On the occasion of the 48th anniversary of the proclamation of the independence of Albania and the 16th anniversary of the Liberation.
From the report at the 21st Plenum of the CC of the PLA "On the Meeting of the Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties which was held in Moscow in November 1960"

December 19, 1960

In the first section Comrade Enver Hoxha makes a scientific analysis of the fundamental disagreements that existed at that time in the ranks of the international communist and workers' movement concerning the definition of the character of our epoch, the questions of war and peace, peaceful coexistence, the question of the road of transition to socialism, the questions of revisionism and dogmatism, and the question of the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement.

These questions of such great importance became the subject of a major struggle over principle, first in Bucharest, where as is known the Soviet leaders and those of some other parties wanted to make an accomplished fact of the "condemnation" of Marxism, the condemnation of the correct views which were defended by the Communist Party of China, by labeling it "dogmatic" and "sectarian." Our Party did not associate itself with this anti-Marxist conspiracy, because in principle it did not agree either with the methods adopted by the organizers of the Bucharest Meeting, or with the content of the issues they put forward. An even greater struggle was waged on the above-mentioned matters of principle at the meeting of the commission in Moscow during October, and finally, a determined struggle was waged at the Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties in November in Moscow over the correct Marxist meaning of these questions, for the defense of Leninism in the explanation, comprehension and interpretation of them.

In the course of this struggle, through this long process, the positions of various parties with respect to these questions were also defined. Thus, from the time of the November Meeting it was clear that the disagreements on these problems were not just between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the
Communist Party of China, and even less, between the Communist Party of China and the whole of international communism, as the Soviet leaders claimed in Bucharest, but these disagreements included many parties, and became disagreements between Marxists and opportunists, between parties which defended the purity of Marxism-Leninism and parties which were distorting a number of its theses and interpreting them in a one-sided manner. If it was only the Communist Party of China and our Party of Labor which rose openly in defense of the Marxist principles at Bucharest, against the trend that was distorting the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the Moscow Declaration [1957], in the October commission seven out of the 26 parties represented took correct positions.

At the Moscow Meeting this ratio of forces underwent a change. Besides the former seven parties, another four to five parties adopted the correct stand regarding all the questions under discussion. But there were a considerable number of parties, which on particular questions such as the problem of the road of transition to socialism, the aggressive nature of imperialism, the necessity of the struggle against revisionism and especially against Yugoslav revisionism, and other questions, supported our theses. Such positions were adopted by almost all the parties of Latin America.

The change in the ratio of forces speaks of the determined struggle waged at the Meeting by the Chinese delegation, the delegation of our Party, and others, which, through convincing arguments, refuted the distorted views and made clear to everyone their principled position on the issues under discussion. The fact that a considerable number of parties, completely or partially, adopted the correct positions indicates that Marxist-Leninist right is on our side, that it is being rapidly adopted by others, that right will triumph over wrong, that Marxism-Leninism will always triumph over opportunism and revisionism. Absolutely convinced of this, our Party will continue to fight with determination, as it has done until now, for the purity of our Marxist-Leninist ideology, for the triumph of socialism and communism.
II. THE STAND OF THE PARTY OF LABOR OF ALBANIA TOWARD THE DISAGREEMENTS WHICH AROSE IN THE RANKS OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Our Party of Labor has always pursued a correct Marxist-Leninist line and has upheld the principles of the Moscow Declaration [1957]. On all the fundamental matters which we mentioned above, that is, in connection with the definition of the epoch, the question of the struggle against imperialism, the problem of war and peace, etc., our Party has defended and implemented the correct Marxist-Leninist view. Our Party has never accepted or said that Leninism has become "out-dated." On the contrary, it has fought incessantly and with determination against the Yugoslav revisionists who, in order to cover up their betrayal, declare Marxism "out-dated." Our Party has never had any illusions about the character of US imperialism and its leaders, but has constantly educated the masses of the people to hate it and be vigilant against it; we have never thought that peace will be donated to us, that without first liquidating imperialism it is possible to create a world without weapons, without armies, and without wars. On the contrary, having a correct view of the problem of war and peace, the danger threatening mankind from imperialism and reaction, our Party has mobilized the people under the slogan, "The pick in one hand and the rifle in the other." Our Party has fought consistently to unmask imperialism and its lackeys, the Yugoslav revisionists, and has never approved the "soft" policy, the "big" policy of the Soviet leaders, or even that of the Bulgarian leaders, either toward US imperialism or toward Yugoslav revisionism. Our Party has never thought that for the sake of coexistence the class struggle in the capitalist countries should be extinguished or the political and ideological struggle against imperialism and the bourgeoisie liquidated. On the contrary, our Party has always opposed any such opportunist concept of peaceful coexistence.

Thus, the position of our Party on these matters of principle has been in complete accord with the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, and it has long been in opposition to the position of the Soviet leaders. However, our Party has taken a principled stand in opposition to the views and actions of the present Soviet leaders also on a series of other questions of principle, about which our Central Committee has been informed.

For instance, we have not been in agreement with the Soviet
leaders in connection with their stand toward Yugoslav revisionism. This dates back to May 1955, at the time when Khrushchev and Bulganin (1) went to Belgrade and, in a unilateral manner and overriding the Information Bureau, decided to rehabilitate the Tito clique, a thing which, as is known, later brought about many evils in the international communist and workers' movement. At that time our Party expressed its opposition to this rehabilitation, and since then it has never approved the tactics and the stand of the Soviet leadership toward Tito and his clique, a clique which was coddled, considered to be socialist, and with which they should consult about everything, etc.

Our Party did not agree with the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, especially with the criticism against Stalin and the explanation of the peaceful road of transition to socialism. On the first issue we were not, and are not today, in agreement, first, because the criticism against the "cult of Stalin" was made without prior consultation with the other fraternal parties, although Stalin was not only the leader of the Soviet Union but also of the international proletariat, and second, because only the mistakes of Stalin were mentioned without saying a single word about the positive aspects of his activity. On the second issue, the 20th Congress in fact gave the opportunists ideological weapons to propagate only the peaceful road of taking power.

At the 20th Congress, Khrushchev presented the issue of the transition to socialism in a distorted way. He put special stress on taking power in a peaceful way and through the parliamentary road, something which is contrary to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and the experience of history so far.

Apart from these questions, our Party did not agree with the Soviet leaders also in regard to the events in Hungary, with their assessment of them, with the hesitation they showed over the liquidation of the counter-revolution there, and over the complete exposure of the Yugoslav revisionists on this issue. The Central Committee has been informed about this matter; therefore it is not necessary to dwell on it at length.

Finally, our Party was not in agreement with the Soviet leaders and has been opposed to them also on many other issues

1) At that time President of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.
which have to do with the correct Leninist concept of relations among fraternal parties, which are equal and independent from one another. In connection with this, the Central Committee is also informed about the improper interference of the Soviet leaders in the internal affairs of our Party, such as in the case of the enemies of our Party, Liri Gega, Tuk Jakova, Panajot Plaku, and others.

Hence, it is evident that on the fundamental questions of foreign policy, of the tactics and strategy of the communist movement, our Party has always maintained a correct Marxist-Leninist line, a line which has run counter to that pursued by the Soviet leadership. But while consistently pursuing the above-mentioned line, while resolutely defending the correct Marxist-Leninist principles, without making concessions on them, despite the many pressures exerted on it by the Soviet leaders, the Central Committee of our Party did not express its opposition publicly. Why did the Central Committee do this?

First, because after the 20th Congress, all the attacks of the imperialist and revisionist enemies were concentrated on splitting the unity of our communist movement. Therefore, for the sake of this unity, we had to contain ourselves and consistently apply the Marxist-Leninist line while avoiding open criticism addressed to the Soviet leadership.

Second, because, as is known, as a result of the criticism of Stalin, when reaction and the revisionists began to cast doubts on the entire Soviet system, and in particular, as a result of the events in Poland and in Hungary, the efforts of the whole world reaction to lower the authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the prestige of the Soviet Union itself were very great. In these circumstances, it was an internationalist duty to defend the Soviet Union and its Communist Party, to give reaction not a single weapon and to defend the Soviet leadership and, by means of comradely criticism, to put it on the right road. This was what our Party did. We publicly defended the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union itself, but from 1957 on, as the opportunity presented itself, we have also pointed out to the Soviet leaders a number of matters on which we had criticism, especially in connection with their stand toward Yugoslav revisionism, toward the events in Hungary, toward the interference in the internal affairs of our Party.

This stand of our Party is correct, internationalist, Marxist-Leninist. To have acted differently at that time would have
meant to play into the hands of the enemy, to damage the
general cause of socialism and the international working class.

But the Soviet leaders plunged more deeply into their errors.
Matters went so far that they were not only coddling Tito and his
clique, but they were also showering flattery on Eisenhower, thus
demonstrating that they were distorting the Marxist-Leninist
concept of imperialism and the class struggle. The Chinese
comrades, absolutely correctly, considered it reasonable to dot the
i's on the fundamental questions of the international situation
and the strategy and tactics of the communist movement, by
means of some articles which explained these things on the basis
of the Marxist-Leninist teachings. But the Soviet leaders did not
pause to reflect. On the contrary, they organized the anti-Marxist
behind-the-scenes plot of Bucharest in order to settle accounts
with the Communist Party of China and with any other party
which had become an obstacle to their erroneous course.

We shall not dwell on the proceedings of the Bucharest
Meeting, because the Plenum of the Central Committee is already
informed about this, but I shall briefly mention our stand at this
meeting.

As we said before, our Party did not agree with the organizers
of the Bucharest Meeting, the Soviet leaders, not only on the
anti-Marxist methods which were used there, but in essence it
also did not agree with the accusation brought against the
Communist Party of China. Therefore, it maintained the correct
and principled stand which is known.

How did it come to pass that our Party maintained that
stand? Was it accidental? The stand of our Party in Bucharest was
not accidental. It was in keeping with the consistent line always
pursued by our Party, with the principled positions always
defended by our Party on the fundamental questions under
discussion. In Bucharest we defended Marxism-Leninism, we
defended the line of the Party, and while waging this principled
and courageous struggle, on the one hand, we found ourselves on
the same side as the Chinese comrades who defended their
glorious Party, which, like our Party, was fighting in defense of
the purity of Marxism-Leninism; and, on the other hand, we ran
counter to the Soviet leaders and all the representatives of the
other parties who organized the Bucharest Meeting, who de­
defended a wrong course in opposition to the teachings of Marx­
ism-Leninism. Here lies the principled importance of our stand in
Bucharest, a stand which was the logical and consistent outcome
of the entire Marxist-Leninist line pursued by our Party, a stand which has enhanced the authority and prestige of our Party in the eyes of the international communist movement.

Our Party condemned the Bucharest Meeting and described it correctly as a blot on the communist movement. The correctness of our stand in Bucharest and our assessment of the anti-Marxist behind-the-scenes plot hatched up there was demonstrated at the Moscow Meeting and by the documents approved there. Not a single representative of any of the parties there had the courage to defend the Bucharest Meeting, to answer our criticisms and those of the Chinese comrades regarding the factional work which went on there. Not only this, but none dared to propose that a single good word should be put in about the Bucharest Meeting in the Declaration published, which comprised 52 pages. Not the slightest trace remained of the Bucharest Meeting.

On the other hand, however, the Bucharest Meeting marks the beginning of the overt aggravation of relations between our Party and the Soviet leaders, a thing which soon began to express itself in the political and economic relations between our two countries and states. The blame for the situation rests completely on the Soviet side, which was not pleased with the principled stand of our Party in Bucharest. It began to express this displeasure in many wrong actions which began to cause serious harm to the friendship and fraternal ties between our two parties and countries. This is how the anti-Marxist interference in the internal affairs of our Party by some Soviet persons began. It had the aim of splitting our Party, of arousing discontent with its leadership, of casting doubt on the correctness of the line of our Party, of attacking the leadership of our Party, with the final aim of liquidating it. The staff of the Soviet Embassy to Tirana, headed by the ambassador, worked in this direction; Kozlov in Moscow worked in this direction on our comrades who passed through there; this was the aim of the words of Marshal Malinovsky at the dinner for the chiefs-of-staff of the Warsaw Treaty; this was the objective of the economic pressures which began in regard to bread and the reduction of economic aid; the threats by Marshal Grechko to throw our country out of the Warsaw Treaty, and the provocations at the military base of Vlora, etc., are linked with this.

The objective of these wrong and anti-Marxist actions is clear: the Soviet leadership aimed either to make us change our stand, that is, to abandon the correct Marxist-Leninist course, the
principled stand maintained by our Party, or, as a result of the difficulties which would be created, in the opinion of the Soviet leaders, some division must take place in the Party, dissatisfaction must be increased in its ranks and among the people, and, as a way out, the leadership of the Party must be liquidated to bring to the head of it the "saviors," who would be loyal to the anti-Marxist line of the Soviet leadership.

But, as is known, in reckoning their accounts they had forgotten the host, and all these intentions were foiled. They did not succeed thanks to the loyalty of our Party to Marxism-Leninism, thanks to its staunch and principled stand, thanks to its steel-like Marxist-Leninist unity with the masses of the people, the unity of the Party with its Central Committee, the unity of the Central Committee with the Political Bureau. This unbreakable unity has been and is the guarantee of all the victories of our people and Party; therefore our primary duty is to make this unity ever stronger and defend it like the apple of our eye.

The source of the wrong actions of the Soviet leadership toward our Party should be sought in its non-Marxist views on fundamental issues and in the disagreements over matters of principle which exist between our Party and the Soviet leaders on the questions of principle of the international communist and workers' movement. The incorrect actions of the Soviet leaders against our Party also express the anti—Marxist concept they have about the relations between fraternal parties and countries, the concept they have about criticism and the Marxist-Leninist unity of the communist movement and the socialist camp. In Bucharest we expressed our opposition to the stand of the Soviet leaders, we criticized their crooked actions in a correct and principled way.

For Marxists, fair and principled criticism is not contrary to unity. On the contrary, criticism aids the consolidation of unity, it is a motive force, a law of development. The Soviet leaders do not see the problem in this way. They are not used to listening to criticisms, but only to making criticisms. In words they accept the principle of equal rights in the relations among parties, but in fact they recognize only their right to say the final word, while the rest must obey blindly. Therefore, according to them, if some party or other dares to criticize them, that party is in an anti-Soviet position, is factional, against the unity of the communist movement, and so on. This distorted concept impels them
to incorrect actions, like those mentioned above. In these concepts and acts Marxist dialectics has been replaced with metaphysics, with idealism.

The acts we mentioned and the erroneous stand maintained by the Soviet leaders toward our Party and our country following the Bucharest Meeting, made us more then ever convinced that our Party was in a correct Marxist-Leninist position, that its position on all the fundamental issues was principled, therefore those positions had to be defended with determination, standing firm against any pressure.

The delegation of our Party in Moscow, at the October meeting of the commission which worked out the draft of the Declaration approved later at the November meeting, maintained this correct and principled stand. At this meeting our delegation openly presented the correct viewpoint of our Party on all matters of principle under discussion, and together with the Chinese comrades and the comrades of those other parties which also took a correct stand, resolutely defended the Marxist-Leninist teachings with sound arguments. A great struggle for principle went on in the commission on every issue, over every paragraph, and every word. This work went on for nearly 25 days.

To give you an idea of the correct struggle waged by our delegation there, as well as by the other delegations which stood on sound positions, suffice it to mention these facts: in compiling the draft Declaration, the draft presented by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was taken as the basis. This draft of 36 pages contained many erroneous views, and in many parts there were hidden attacks against the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labor of Albania. For instance, it accused us of "national communism," of being opponents of the policy of peaceful coexistence, compared us with Yugoslavia, accused us of being "factionalists," and so on. Apart from this, the draft did not properly stress the necessity of the struggle against imperialism and had a soft and frequently opportunist spirit, putting great stress on the peaceful road of transition to socialism; the national bourgeoisie was presented almost as a supporter of socialism, it failed to mention Yugoslav revisionism, dogmatism was presented as more dangerous than revisionism, even though it said that revisionism was the main danger, and so on. One hundred seventy five pages of comments on this draft were presented, of which our delegation presented 20 pages and the Chinese delegation 40. It must be stressed that none of our
comments was refuted by argument as incorrect; but those which were not included in the Declaration were rejected on the pretext of tactics or by the majority of votes. Nevertheless, the basic draft was almost completely changed. It was extended from 36 pages to 52. The hidden attacks against us were thrown out, the section on imperialism was strengthened, the paragraph on Yugoslav revisionism was added, the question of the struggle against revisionism and dogmatism was put in order, and so on. However, some questions remained, such as that of the importance of the 20th and 21st Congresses, that of factions, of the cult of the individual, etc., with which our delegation, the Chinese delegation and the delegations of some other parties did not agree, but which should be taken up again for discussion at the November meeting.

In the meeting of the commission it was very clear how correct and principled our positions were and how distorted were the positions of the Soviet leaders and the parties supporting them. The opportunist spirit which has gripped some parties, such as the Communist Parties of Italy, Syria, Britain, the United States of America and others, showed itself plainly, and this emerged even more clearly at the November meeting. The Soviet leaders tried hard to manoeuvre, resorting to all kinds of methods, ranging from working on individuals among the various delegations to procedural machinations. Here is a typical fact: the commission agreed that a phrase which Maurice Thorez had used in a speech during those days should be put in the Declaration. It was: "There will be an absolute guarantee of the liquidation of all kinds of war only when socialism has triumphed in all countries or in the main capitalist countries." This thesis was put in on the proposal of the French delegation and was supported by our delegation and the Chinese. But before two days had passed the Soviets proposed that it should be re-examined, presumably because their Presidium had not approved it. Despite our resistance, the majority of the meeting decided to omit it, but at the November meeting they were forced to put it back again in another form.

The proceedings at the preparatory meeting and the views expressed there indicated clearly that the Moscow Meeting in November would become an arena of the struggle between the correct Marxist-Leninist view and the tendency to deviate from the revolutionary positions of our ideology.

Our Party and the delegation appointed by the Central
Committee of the Party were prepared for this struggle. The Central Committee of our Party instructed its delegation that at the Moscow Meeting it should put forward the principled view of our Party on all questions under discussion, frankly and sincerely, and with Marxist-Leninist courage, that it should inform the meeting of the erroneous acts of the Soviet leaders against our Party following the Bucharest Meeting, and criticize them severely with the aim of preventing any repetition of such acts in the future. We report to the Central Committee of our Party that the delegation carried out this directive and, as was decided by the Central Committee of the Party, all the matters were put before the meeting of the representatives of the 81 communist and workers' parties that was convened in November this year in Moscow.

Did the Central Committee of the Party act correctly when it decided that all matters should be put forward openly at the November meeting? We answer: Yes, the Central Committee acted correctly, for the following reasons:

1) Because, as a Marxist-Leninist Party, we were duty-bound to defend the principled positions of the Moscow Declaration [1957] that were being violated. If we were to remain silent in the face of the distortions of Marxism-Leninism, in the face of actions contrary to the fundamental principles of our ideology, irrespective of the fact that the violators and deviators were the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, we could not call ourselves communists. In order to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism, to defend the cause of socialism and communism, we must always be principled, never sentimental or one-sided.

2) Because, in its violation of the Moscow Declaration [1957] and the principles of Marxism-Leninism, as well as in its concrete actions, the Soviet leadership had gone so far that to have remained silent about these grave errors and offenses would have been suicide, a crime against our common cause. The Bucharest Meeting and the anti-Marxist behind-the-scenes plot which was organized there by the Soviet leaders, the pressures and damaging actions against our Party, on the one hand, and against the Communist Party of China, on the other (I mean the withdrawal of the specialists, the cancelling of orders for various machinery, etc.), were the first signs of a very dangerous action which, if not unmasked, would have had even more serious consequences for the communist movement and the socialist
REPORT TO THE 21st PLENUM

3) Because our sincere and principled criticism had a good purpose: by condemning the wrong views and actions, it aimed at liquidating them, at closing the door to them so that they would never be repeated, at clearing the air of the negative manifestations, and on this basis, at helping to strengthen our communist movement and to reinforce our unity which was endangered. This aim, and this aim alone, was what impelled the Central Committee of the Party to express its view openly, and it was absolutely correct to do so.

4) Finally, we say with absolute conviction that there is another reason why the Central Committee was correct when it decided to put forward these questions at the Moscow Meeting. We saw for ourselves, both before the meeting and during its proceedings that the Soviet leaders, on their part, were determined to continue on the course on which they had embarked against our Party. Because if we had remained silent, they had prepared themselves to cast the blame on us for everything, and for this reason they brought extreme pressure to bear on our delegation in order to make us shut our mouths.

It is clear that if we had remained silent at the meeting about the wrong actions of the Soviet leaders, this would not only have meant abandoning our whole principled line, but it would also have been fatal to our Party and to the future of socialism in Albania.

III. ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET LEADERS TOWARD OUR DELEGATION, AND OUR TALKS WITH THEM

As is known, our delegation went to the Soviet Union as an official delegation, invited by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the celebrations of the 43rd anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution. This being the case, from the formal angle they did us all the honors of the occasion. But their attitude toward us was cold and the talks unfriendly. Thus, we talked with Kozlov on our arrival in Moscow, with Kosygin and Polyansky at the dinner on the 7th of November, and their position became clear: in everything they sought to cast the blame on our Party. The next day, that is on the 8th of November, everything became even more clear.

On the 8th of November we were handed a copy of the letter which the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in reply to the September letter from the Communist Party of China. This fact in itself did not please us, because it was a bad prelude to the holding of the meeting, but we shall speak of this later. What made an impression on us were the following facts: In one paragraph of the letter, speaking of the socialist countries of Europe, they were all listed by name, with the exception of Albania. This meant that the leadership of the Soviet Union had wiped Albania off the books as a socialist country. Further down, although the letter was addressed to the Communist Party of China, there was an open and tendentious attack against our Party. While claiming that, following the criticism of "the cult of the individual," all problems were solved in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union allegedly according to the rules of democratic centralism, the letter said:

"Unfortunately, there are other examples. We can bring up such a fresh example as the settlement of such matters by the Albanian comrades. In September this year they expelled Comrade Liri Belishova from the Central Committee and discharged her from the post of Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, while Comrade Koço Tashko was discharged from the post of Chairman of the Central Auditing Commission of the Party of Labor of Albania and expelled from the Party. And for what? Simply because these comrades expressed their beliefs that it is impermissible to slander the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

"We express our suspicions that there is a bad end in store for all those people whose only 'sin' is that they are friends of the Soviet Union, have a correct understanding of the situation, and express their sympathy for the Soviet people and for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."

From this presentation of things it emerges: First, that allegedly the Central Committee of our Party did not carry out the rules of internal democracy of the Party when it expelled Liri Belishova from its ranks and Koço Tashko from the Central Auditing Commission. It seems to me unnecessary to prove here, in the Central Committee of the Party, that this is deliberate slander. Second, it emerges that in our Party the friends of the Soviet Union are being condemned and persecuted, that is, the Central Committee of our Party is allegedly in an anti-Soviet
position, etc. There is no need to prove that this, too, is another slander. But in these tendentious accusations the aim of the Soviet leadership is clear: to discredit our Party, to present it as though it has gone off the rails of Leninism, as though it has taken the road of Yugoslavia (therefore, in the same document Albania is not mentioned as a socialist country).

This shows that the Soviet leaders were not interested in resolving the disagreements which had arisen between us. On the contrary, they wanted to deepen them, indeed to use them to discredit our Party. On the other hand, in order to achieve complete success in their actions against our Party they resorted to all means to make us keep our mouths shut.

The first method was that of threats. To this end, Nikita Khrushchev himself twice spoke to the Chinese comrades about Albania. First, on October 25 [1960], he told the delegation of the CP of China, "We shall treat Albania like Yugoslavia." The second time, he told a representative of the CP of China, "The Albanians behave toward us just like Tito used to do," "We lost an Albania and you Chinese won an Albania," "The Party of Labor of Albania is our weak link."

What was their aim?

First, the Soviet leaders intended to intimidate us, to make us review our position and to desist from raising all the questions we had in mind. It should be borne in mind that the Soviets were more or less aware of what we would raise at the Moscow Meeting. Koço Tashko had kept them informed about our views.

Second, while speaking against our Party and threatening us, in fact, they were also warning the Chinese; that is, they intended to kill two birds with one stone.

Third, by presenting the case as though we were following the road of Yugoslavia, the Soviet leaders sought to discredit our Party, to distort our stand, to divert the discussion away from the basis of principles to slanders, etc.

Together with the method of indirect threats, the Soviet leaders also used the method of direct pressure, through meetings and talks with our delegation.

Before speaking of the meetings we had in Moscow, it is necessary to say a few words concerning our view on the method of talks, meetings and consultations. This is essential because the Soviet leaders tried many times to present the question as though we were against talks, and to illustrate this they brought up these examples: our refusal to meet the Soviet leaders on the basis that
they proposed in the well-known letter of August 13 [1960]; the fact that Comrade Enver did not go to spend his summer holiday in the Soviet Union, allegedly as if we wanted to avoid any meeting with them, and finally, our refusal of Khrushchev's invitation to meet him on November 9, of which I will speak later.

The Party and its Central Committee have been and are of the opinion that the method of meetings, talks and consultations among the leaders of fraternal parties, the exchange of views on various problems of mutual interest, the more so when differences have arisen between two parties or socialist countries, is the most correct and advisable Marxist-Leninist method. Therefore, in the past our Party and its Central Committee have not refused any meeting and will not do so in the future, especially when the aim of these meetings is to strengthen and consolidate the Marxist-Leninist unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement.

But at the same time, proceeding from these principled positions, our Party is of the opinion that in these meetings certain other principles of Marxism-Leninism must be respected, among which: First, it is impermissible and contrary to Leninist norms that a third party should become a subject of conversation at a meeting of two other parties, that the general line of the former should be talked about in the absence of this party; and second, any discussion or meeting between two parties, whichever they may be, should be held on an equal footing, on the basis of consultations and mutual respect, avoiding any manifestation of imposing the will of one side upon the other side, or of any privileged position of one side over the other side, etc. Our Party has respected and will respect these principles. This is the principled position of our Party concerning the question of meetings, talks and consultations; we have maintained such a position in the past, and we shall maintain it in the future, too.

Now let us see in concrete terms whether the Soviet leaders are right when they accuse us of being against meetings, by bringing up the above-mentioned cases. It is true we refused the meeting proposed in the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dated August 13, 1960. But we refused to meet them, not because we were against meetings in principle or because we wanted to avoid meeting the Soviet leaders, but because such a meeting would have been contrary to Leninist norms, because, as is known, in their letter
the Soviet leaders proposed that we should hold discussions in order to put out "the spark of misunderstanding" which had flared up between us in Bucharest "in time," so that our two parties "could go" to the meeting next November "with complete unity of opinion." Why did misunderstandings arise at Bucharest? What was the fundamental problem of the Bucharest Meeting? It was the criticism of the Communist Party of China. Therefore, we were supposed to discuss China, to formulate a common view on this issue, and all this was to be done behind the back of the Communist Party of China. Is this principled? Isn't this the same as factionalism? We explained this to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in our reply, back in August, stressing that a meeting between us for that purpose was not in order. Again we think we acted very correctly.

Let's take the question of our refusal to meet Nikita Khrushchev on November 9, 1960. We think that our delegation acted correctly when it refused that meeting, and we explained this to the Soviet leaders. The thing is that, on the one hand, on November 8, 1960, the Soviet leadership handed us a letter addressed to the Communist Party of China, in which, as we said above, Albania was not ranked among the socialist countries, and our Party was accused of anti-Sovietism, of having allegedly violated the principles of democratic centralism, and so on, and this material was distributed to the representatives of 81 parties; while, on the other hand, on the very same day they were inviting us to talks to examine the misunderstanding which had arisen between us! On the one hand, they tell the Chinese comrades, "We shall treat Albania like Yugoslavia," and on the other hand, they want to meet us! Is this talking on equal footing? Has the basis been created for the comradely spirit indispensable for fruitful talks? Is not this a clear expression of the tendency of the Soviet leaders to have a privileged position in talks? It is clear that we could not possibly hold talks under such conditions, because this is contrary to the principles of mutual equality and respect, especially so when we had not whispered a single word to the international communist and workers' movement about the concrete disagreements between us and the Soviet leaders up till that time. This is why we refused that meeting. It is up to the Central Committee of the Party to judge whether our delegation acted correctly or not.
As for the question of "Comrade Enver's failure to go to the Soviet Union for his holiday this year," this is not worth speaking about, because there is nothing political in it. I did not go to the Soviet Union for my vacation last year either, and no scandal was made of it. The nub of the matter is that this year the Soviet leaders "had thought" that when Comrade Enver came there they would talk to him! But neither I nor the Political Bureau had been informed of this. We were supposed to find this out by divination.

In fact, it is not our Party, but the Soviet leaders who have been against talks, against the solution of disagreements through consultations. As is known, at the beginning of August we sent the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union a letter informing it of the anti-Marxist acts of some members of the staff of the Soviet Embassy headed by Ambassador Ivanov. Why is it that the Soviet leaders, who tell us they are determined that the problems should be solved through discussions, have still not replied to this letter to this day? In Moscow they told us that they had not replied because they did not want to worsen relations, because their answer might be offensive to us. This clearly shows that it had never crossed their minds that the disagreements should be resolved, that it was necessary to discuss them, but they had decided their attitude: to deny everything. Then, why talk at all? Hence, who is actually against talks? It is clearly not us, not the Party of Labor of Albania, but the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that is against talks.

Regardless of all this, in spite of the unequal conditions for talks, which, as we said above, were created by the Soviet leaders themselves, and despite their uncomradely attitude toward our delegation, an attitude which went so far as to resort to such anti-Marxist and police methods as eavesdropping on our conversations by means of various bugging devices both in our residence and in our embassy, our delegation, seeing their insistence on meeting us, and upholding our Party's principle on the necessity for talks, consultations and exchanges of opinion before the meeting began and during it, consented to, and held, three meetings with the Soviet leaders.

Our delegation understood the real aim of the Soviet leaders from its talks, on November 9, 1960, with Maurice Thorez, who, as the conversation showed clearly, had been charged by them to meet us. Thorez tried to "convince" us of the correctness of the
line pursued by the Soviet Union in all directions, on the question of war and peace, on the policy of peaceful coexistence, calling Khrushchev the "Lenin of our time," and so on. On the other hand, he spoke against China, presenting the Communist Party of China as "dogmatic, factionalist and Trotskyite, as a great danger to the communist movement, a partisan of war, which seeks to discredit the Soviet Union," and so on. Finally, he told us of the love which the Soviet Union has for Albania, of the aid it has given Albania, as well as that we ought to be grateful to it, and in the end he said that all of us must follow in the wake of the Soviet Union.

We told him of our views, stressing that we had disagreements with the Soviet leaders, which we would put forward at the meeting (we were aware that everything we said would be eavesdropped by the Soviet leaders or would be transmitted to them by Thorez). Thorez tried to "dissuade" us from raising these matters at the meeting, otherwise the whole meeting would be against us and would call us provocateurs, that we should resolve these things by sitting down to talk with the Soviet leaders, and here he mentioned that we had been wrong not to meet Khrushchev. The meeting with Thorez lasted three hours, and in the end we parted with each side maintaining its own viewpoint. This was the first direct pressure to stop us from speaking openly at the meeting, and the first effort to learn what we would put forward there.

Following this meeting, we held two meetings with the Soviet leaders, on November 10-11 and Nov. 12.

At the first meeting the views of each side were put forward and, as you might say, the ground was prepared for the next meeting, which, in fact, was the official meeting. (2)

2) Comrade Enver Hoxha reported to the Plenum how, at the first and the second meeting, the Soviet leaders blamed the Party of Labor of Albania for the deterioration of Albanian-Soviet relations, while they themselves had allegedly done nothing wrong. They accused the PLA of anti-Sovietism because it had expelled from the CC and the Party Liri Belishova and Koço Tashko, who had sided with the Soviet Union, and because the Albanian officers did not submit to the threats and provocations of the Soviet officers at the Vlora base. With factual arguments our delegation refuted all these slanders and showed that those who were truly responsible for the deterioration of relations were the Soviet leaders, whose aim was to put the PLA under their control, to force it to deviate from its revolutionary road.
As a conclusion, it can be said that the Soviet leaders did not want to talk or to reach agreement with us on anything. They had made up their minds on their plan and point of view. They had even started to talk with others about this, with the sole aim of discrediting our Party. If they asked us to talks, they did this not because they wanted to resolve the disagreements, but to threaten us, to force us to give up the idea of our speech at the meeting. After these meetings it was clear once again who was for talks and who was not. They also showed that the Soviet leaders had no intention of making a self-criticism over anything they had done against our Party and against our country. On the contrary, as their threat about the Vlora base indicated, they were determined to go further.

Therefore, we can repeat once more than in those conditions the Central Committee of the Party acted very correctly. It did well when it decided to raise, and when it actually did raise, all our contradictions with the Soviet leaders at the Meeting of the representatives of the 81 communist and workers' parties of the world in Moscow.

IV. ON THE DEVELOPMENTS AT THE MOSCOW MEETING

The Moscow Meeting was organized to discuss the current problems of the international situation and the questions of the strategy and tactics of the international communist movement. The basis for the proceedings of the meeting was the draft Declaration prepared by the commission of 26 parties, which, as we said, was convened in Moscow in October. In discussing these questions, the meeting, in fact, had to pass judgement on the disagreements which had appeared in the ranks of the international communist and workers' movement, to condemn the erroneous views, and to fix the correct Marxist-Leninist view, the united view of the whole communist movement on these questions, in the Declaration which it would approve.

But from the very beginning of the meeting, even prior to it, it was evident that the Soviet leaders and those of some other and adopt the revisionist course of the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

At the point when Khrushchev, angry at the refusal of the delegation of the PLA to accept his anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian views, likened these talks to talks with MacMillan, our delegation walked out of the meeting in protest. (See pp. 161 and 171 of this volume).
communist parties of the socialist and capitalist countries of Europe, thought differently. The distribution of the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the eve of the proceedings of the meeting, and the working on all the delegations with this letter, made the plan of the Soviet leaders even more clear. The tendency was to organize a new Bucharest, to gain approval outside the meeting for all those things that were said in Bucharest against China, to create the opinion among all the parties that the Communist Party of China "is dogmatic and factionalist" that "it has violated the Moscow Declaration and acts in opposition to the entire communist movement, that together with the Communist Party of China, the Party of Labor of Albania too is following the same course," opposition to which is expressed in the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In order to create this opinion, the Soviet leaders organized intensive preparatory work among the various delegations in the first days before the beginning of the meeting. Working especially actively to this end were the delegation of the Communist Party of France (with the delegations of the capitalist countries of Europe), the delegation of the Communist Party of Spain, and the People's Party of Cuba (with the delegations of Latin America), the delegation of Syria (with the delegations of the Arab and African countries). On top of this organized work, in which the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dated November 5 addressed to the Communist Party of China was read and commented on, many bilateral meetings and talks were held with the Soviet delegation and the delegations of the socialist countries of Europe. Of course such work cannot be considered normal; on the contrary, it is incorrect and anti-Marxist. On the other hand, it indicates how weak the positions of the Soviet leaders are, because he who is on the correct course and abides by the teachings of Marx and Lenin has no need to win allies through improper methods, pressure, and working on people in this way.

By doing this preparatory work outside the meeting, the Soviet leaders intended to impart a show-piece character to the very holding of the meeting, in which the speeches made would be in general terms, with eulogies for the successes achieved, without disclosing the existing contradictions, but casting veiled allusions against the correct Marxist-Leninist positions of the
Communist Party of China and the Party of Labor of Albania on the fundamental issues. Such a development of the meeting would have been to the advantage of the Soviet leadership and the parties supporting its view, because, on the one hand, they did their work outside the meeting, creating the opinion that the Communist Party of China had allegedly made mistakes, indeed that it was in favor of war, of adventures, against peaceful coexistence, and so on. And on the other hand, by not uncovering the contradictions at the meeting, the Soviet leaders presented themselves as allegedly staunch partisans of the defense of the unity of the communist movement and the socialist camp; hence they displayed their "magnanimity" and avoided discussion of their line, of their mistakes, and of their deviations from the Moscow Declaration [1957] and from the teachings of Marxism-Leninism.

The Soviet leaders saw clearly that an open discussion of the contradictions at the meeting would discredit them before the movement in many respects: \textit{First}, because they have trampled on the Moscow Declaration and have adopted a conciliatory policy in the struggle against imperialism and revisionism; \textit{second}, because they have broken the Leninist norms regulating the relations among socialist states and communist and workers' parties, as is the case with China and Albania; \textit{third}, because in the eyes of the entire communist movement, of the representatives of 81 communist and workers' parties of the world, the existing opinion of the infallibility of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its leaders would vanish together with the notion that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its leaders are beyond criticism, that everything they say "is law, is correct, is the last word in Marxism, and therefore must be implemented by all," etc., etc.

In keeping with this tactic, Nikita Khrushchev spoke on behalf of the Soviet delegation on the first day of the Moscow Meeting. In fact, his speech was an attempt to set the tone in which matters should be discussed at this meeting.

Khrushchev's speech was cunningly prepared, and differed greatly from the letter which the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on November 5, which was distributed to all the delegations prior to the meeting, in which the Chinese comrades were openly accused of having violated the Moscow Declaration and the principles of Marxism-
Leninism. The speech delivered to the meeting was written in such a tone as though no disagreements whatsoever existed between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. Moreover, throughout that speech of 80 pages the Communist Party of China was never mentioned by name. Khrushchev's speech gave the main "arguments" in defense of the theses of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union concerning the main questions about which there are disagreements, such as the question of war and peace, the theoretical problems of the 20th Congress, the question of the struggle against "factionalism" in the international communist movement, etc. The speakers who followed in support of Khrushchev, such as Zhivkov and others, described Khrushchev's speech as a "creative development of Marxism" and repeated his arguments in other forms.

Although efforts were made to avoid mentioning the disagreements in Khrushchev's speech, to maintain a moderate tone, nevertheless, in a hidden manner, it contained venomous allusions, which were directed first of all against the Chinese comrades, on a series of important problems.

Khrushchev strongly insisted on condemnation of the so-called factionalist activity in the international communist and workers' movement, hypocritically declaring that this thesis was not directed against any party in particular, and he put great stress on the fact that the decisive condition for the achievement of unity in the international communist movement was allegedly respect for, and the implementation of, the decisions taken by the majority on the part of the minority. With this he set the line for all his supporters at the meeting on the key problem and his main aim: the condemnation and subjugation of the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labor of Albania.

Immediately after Khrushchev's speech, the meeting began its "tranquil" course, as the tactic and purpose of the Soviet leaders required, according to the principle, "Roast your meat but don't burn the spit." Thus, during the first three days of the meeting, 18 representatives of various parties took the floor, among them the representatives of the parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, Canada, Greece, Argentina, Iraq, the Union of South Africa, and others, who, while supporting the stand of the Soviet delegation on all matters raised in Khrushchev's speech and eulogizing him, leveled masked criticism against the correct views of the Communist Party of China. All of them, on Khrushchev's example, insisted
that the Declaration which had been prepared should remain unchanged on the questions about which the delegation of China, our delegation, and those of some other parties had expressed opposition since the meeting of the October commission. As is known, these questions had to do with the evaluation of the 20th and 21st Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the question of the "cult of the individual," the question of "factions," and that of "national communism."

This is how the meeting began, and this is the "tranquil" appearance it had in the first stage of its proceedings. But if, formally, its appearance was tranquil, in essence the atmosphere was tense because they all had an uneasy feeling, all had something on their chests from which they could not get away unless they brought it out. They were all worried about the question of unity, but the course the meeting had taken was not leading to unity. It covered up the contradictions without eliminating them, so sooner or later they were bound to burst out and would come to the surface, and the later this happened the worse it would be for the fate of our movement. Marxism-Leninism teaches us to look the truth straight in the eye and not to be afraid of it, no matter how unpleasant it may be. The contradictions existed; therefore they had to be discussed courageously. Who was right and who was wrong had to be found out through criticism and self-criticism, through a frank and comradely consultation and discussion, and then, purged of the filth, united in genuine Marxist-Leninist unity, we had to march ahead toward fresh victories. This is how we and the Chinese comrades conceived the proceedings of the Moscow Meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties.

Therefore, it was essential to change the spirit of the proceedings and the discussions at the meeting; it was necessary to put an end to the stage of relative "tranquility" which was in the interests of the Soviet leaders, but did not serve the genuine strengthening of our unity.

The spirit of the proceedings of the meeting changed after the speech by the Chinese delegation and the speech I delivered on behalf of the delegation of the Party of Labor of Albania. The meeting entered its second phase, which is characterized by the open discussion of the disagreements existing in the international communist and workers' movement over fundamental questions. This discussion forced the representatives of every party to take a stand concerning these major issues, and thus the real views of
every party came out more clearly.

The speech of the delegation of the Communist Party of China was a speech of a high ideological content, a principled, very well argued speech, which unmasked the erroneous views and the distortions and deviations of the Soviet leaders concerning the fundamental questions of the strategy and tactics of the international communist movement. Right from the start of his speech the delegate of the Communist Party of China exposed the method and aim of the Soviet leaders in not opening up the problems at the meeting. He described the November 5th letter of 125 pages, which was full of savage attacks against the Communist Party of China and its leader, Comrade Mao Tsetung, as in fact the main speech of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The difference, he stressed, consists only in the fact that, taking advantage of the favorable conditions created for them, because the meeting was being held in Moscow, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had distributed that speech outside the meeting, while delivering another speech in the meeting.

The Chinese delegate rebutted the distortion made of the position of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China concerning the principal content of the present epoch. He said that the Communist Party of China has never characterized the present epoch as the epoch of imperialism, of war and revolution, but as the epoch of revolutions, of the overthrow of imperialism, of the triumph of socialism and communism. This slander was first uttered at the Bucharest Meeting by the head of the Soviet delegation, and was accompanied by other distortions that allegedly the Chinese overestimate the strength of imperialism while underestimating our strength. Speaking of the content of the present epoch, the Chinese delegation expressed its opposition to replacing the activity of the masses in the struggle for peace with the activity of state leaders, explained the meaning of the expressions, "the East wind prevails over the West wind" and "imperialism is a paper tiger" and stressed the need to educate the masses in the spirit of determination to fight the class enemy.

Speaking of the problems of war and peace, and of peaceful coexistence, the delegate of the Communist Party of China pointed out the sources of wars, refuting the charge brought against the Communist Party of China that it allegedly wants war, that allegedly it is in favor of the cold war and that allegedly
it seeks to establish socialism throughout the world by means of war. This he said, amounts to saying that the threat of war comes from China and not from imperialism. The delegate of the Communist Party of China said that we must speak of both possibilities — that of the prevention of war and that of the outbreak of war — and that we must carefully prepare ourselves for both possibilities. "Overestimation of the strength of the people and underestimation of the strength of the enemies," he said, "is one tendency. If this tendency is not combated, it might lead to adventurist leftist and sectarian errors. Overestimation of the strength of the enemies and underestimation of the strength of the people is another tendency. If this tendency is not combated, it might lead to revisionist and right-opportunist errors. It is important to combat both these tendencies. We think," he said, "that in the present conditions the main danger in the ranks of the international communist movement is the second tendency, not the first."

He demanded the inclusion of the following phrase in the draft Declaration: "We can be sure that there will be no war only when socialism has triumphed in at least the principal countries of the world." He explained the difference between the possibility of avoiding world war and the possibility of excluding any kind of war. The oppressed peoples will inevitably rise in war against their reactionary governments, and we must support these wars. The representative of the Communist Party of China pointed out that the policy of the Soviet Union on talks has been supported by the People's Republic of China. But we must not base all our hopes or even our main hopes on talks. Everything depends on the active struggle of the masses all over the world for peace.

The Chinese delegate said that the main danger in the international communist movement is revisionism. It has never happened, he said, that revisionism has developed because there has been too much struggle against it, as the Soviet leaders claim. He demanded that the section of the draft Declaration dealing with this question should be more complete, and said that there were also dogmatic tendencies, which, under particular conditions, might become the main danger. But dogmatism was not manifested in the Communist Party of China, and even less on the questions over which it was being slandered.

He devoted a special place to the relations among the fraternal communist and workers' parties. He laid special stress
on the principle of equality and independence of the various parties and on proletarian internationalism. He attached particular importance to the principle of consultations among parties and the achievement of unanimity. He said that criticism among parties is a sound basis for unity among them. The Chinese delegation refuted the charge that allegedly the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China intended to reject everything the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had done. It was wrong to think that criticism harmed unity. If criticism had been in a harsh tone, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was not to be blamed for that. The principle of the majority and minority should not, and could not, be applied in the relations among parties. This is a principle applied within the parties themselves, and not at international meetings, at which each party preserves its own independence.

The delegate of the Communist Party of China criticized the Bucharest Meeting at which the Marxist-Leninist principles were violated; he pointed out the positive and negative aspects of the 20th and 21st Congresses of the CPSU, criticized the stand of the Central Committee of the CPSU toward the Party of Labor of Albania and rejected the proposal that "factionalist activity" should be condemned in the Declaration, a move that was directed against the Communist Party of China.

Finally, he dwelt in detail on the disagreements between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. After outlining the history of the disagreements and showing how the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was extending them to state relations, he said that these disagreements had been aggravated as a result of the violation of the principle of equality among parties on the part of the Soviet leadership, and that the Moscow Declaration had not been respected.

The Central Committee knows the content of the speech of our delegation; therefore it is unnecessary to dwell on it here. However, we can say that it was listened to with great attention by the participants at the meeting, and despite the attacks heaped upon us later, of which we shall have more to say below, no one, not even the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in its written declaration of December 1, could produce convincing arguments to refute a single one of our theses. On the contrary, its principled character, its correct
analysis of the questions and its courageous criticism addressed to the Soviet leaders were welcomed by many delegations of fraternal parties.

As I said above, following our speeches, the meeting took another course. This stage of the meeting also can be divided into two parts: the first two to three days after our speeches were dominated by the contributions of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties who defended the thesis of the Soviet leaders and consequently attacked the Communist Party of China and our Party of Labor. Whereas, during the last two to three days of the meeting there was a predominance of speeches of the delegations of the communist and workers' parties who defended the correct Marxist-Leninist positions, that is, the parties which were of the same opinion as the Chinese comrades and us. Why did this happen? Because even in this matter the Soviet leaders pursued an incorrect procedure: wanting to create the impression that the entire movement was against us, they gave the floor, one after another, to those delegations which they were sure would defend the view of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, while refusing it to others. Thus, for example, they postponed the right of the Indonesian delegation to take the floor for three days on end. But, in this manner, by putting off the demands of all those delegations, it came about that the last speeches delivered were by the parties maintaining a correct Marxist-Leninist stand.

What is characteristic of the speeches of the second stage of the meeting?

First, the attacks against the Communist Party of China and against our Party in particular were organized (to such an extent that they were even furnished with quotations from the documents of our Party which were only at the disposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union); and another characteristic is their lack of arguments, the replacement of arguments with offensive language.

Second, at first, following the speech of the Chinese delegate, the attacks were spearheaded only against the Communist Party of China. After our speech the attacks were directed mainly against our Party, and by the end of the meeting, especially during the second contributions, criticism was concentrated against our two parties at the same time, against the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labor of Albania.

Third, their discussions were tendentious; they condemned
everything Chinese or Albanian, passing over in silence, that means supporting, even the most extreme manifestations of right-opportunism, which tried to take advantage of this situation in order to spread its ideas. For example, in his speech, which gave the impression of being more of a speech of a social-democrat than of a communist, the representative of the Communist Party of Sweden, Hagberg, raised these opportunist theses:

1) He said that within the framework of its collaboration with the Social-Democratic Party, the Communist Party of Sweden had achieved successes precisely thanks to the fact that it was in favor of broad collaboration with all the social-democrats, that they spoke of what united them and not of what divided them. He declared that the leadership of the Communist Party of Sweden was against the creation of a Left-wing within the Social-Democratic Party because the communists should collaborate with all the detachments of the working class.

2) He defended the Yugoslav revisionists and criticized those who spoke in harsh language against them. He declared that the main thing for us was to isolate the principal enemy and not the Yugoslav League of Communists, that we should not maintain a sterner stand toward the Yugoslav leaders than toward the leaders of the social-democrats, because this hurt the feelings of the Yugoslav people. We should not aggravate our relations with the Yugoslav leadership, so that we could have them as fellow-travellers, be it even temporary and not very reliable, in our common struggle for peace, etc.

3) He declared that the term "dictatorship of the proletariat," which might cause only harm, should not figure in the Declaration which the meeting would adopt. The term "dictatorship of the proletariat" was an old term of the 19th century, which had become outdated and frightened the masses. Although we communists understood the content of this term, we didn't use it because, from both the logical and the philological aspects, "dictatorship" meant the opposite of democracy, its negation. The Swedish workers took offense if you spoke to them about the "dictatorship of the proletariat." This term was not included in the program of the Communist Party of Sweden and "when we spoke to the workers about the socialist state, we stressed that this was the most democratic state," etc.

Likewise, the representatives of the Communist Party of the United States of America and of the Communist Party of Great
Britain, under various pretexts, also demanded that the formulation on the dictatorship of the proletariat should be omitted from the draft Declaration.

The representative of the Communist Party of the United States of America also demanded the omission from the draft Declaration of the phrase which said: "If the crazy imperialists launch their war, the peoples will wipe out and bury capitalism." Whereas the delegate of the Communist Party of Italy declared in his speech that not a single Italian worker would consent to pay for the victory of socialism in blood, that is, they were for "peace at any price." The representative of the Communist Party of Italy proposed a new formulation of that part of the draft Declaration which speaks about Yugoslav revisionism. This new formulation left out the thesis that the Yugoslav revisionists have betrayed Marxism-Leninism and have engaged in undermining activity against the socialist camp and the international communist movement.

However, none of the delegates to the meeting, including even the Soviet delegation, stood up to oppose these anti-Marxist and blatantly revisionist theses. Only the delegation of the Communist Party of China and our delegation, as well as those of some other parties which stand on Marxist-Leninist positions, fought against and refuted these incorrect and opportunist views in the editing commission.

ON THE STAND OF SOME DELEGATIONS TOWARD THE SPEECH OF OUR DELEGATION

Immediately after the speech delivered by our delegation at the meeting, the representatives of a number of communist and workers' parties launched heavy attacks full of offensive epithets against the Party of Labor of Albania. Regardless of the facts, or without knowing them at all, they labeled as slanders all criticisms contained in our speech directed at the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The attack was opened by Dolores Ibarruri, who said, among other things, "This morning I heard the most disgraceful speech I have ever heard in my many years in the communist movement; we have not heard such a speech since the time of Trotsky. It was a provocative speech. How can anyone speak such falsehoods against the Soviet Union.... We protest against the slanders addressed to Khrushchev. We believe that the entire movement
will condemn your speech. . . ," etc.

Most offensive adjectives were employed by Gomulka against our speech and our Party. He called our speech "an irresponsible attack against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, an act of hooliganism, which no one who has any sense of responsibility could permit himself." Further on Gomulka said: "If anyone does not believe that the Chinese are factionalists, let him look at their factionalism with the Albanians. . . ."

Attacking the speech of our delegation, Longo and the representatives of some other parties declared that "it sounds like an insult and vilification, not only of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union but also of the entire international communist movement."

The representative of the Communist Party of Morocco, Ali Yata, also made base attacks against the leadership of our Party.

Georgiu Dej pronounced himself in this manner against our speech: "We listened with indignation to the speech by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania. We controlled ourselves, put our patience to the test, for it seemed as if The Voice of America or Free Europe were speaking from this tribune. No difference whatsoever from the Yugoslav revisionists. With their adventurist policy, the Albanians are creating a difficult situation in the Balkans. . . . Our meeting should resolutely condemn the disruptive speech and action of the Albanian delegate."

The delegations of some parties which had not yet pronounced themselves before my speech hurried to issue written declarations to condemn the speech of the delegation of the Party of Labor of Albania and its leadership. This is what the delegations of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the French Communist Party, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and others did.

The declaration distributed by the delegation of the Bulgarian Communist Party, among other things, says: ". . . What the representatives of the Party of Labor of Albania did was an expression of the blackest ingratitude and cynicism. In return for fraternal help they have brought up the basest falsification and slanders against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Belgrade revisionists have no reason to be dissatisfied with the struggle waged by the leaders of the Party of Labor of Albania against them. Through this 'struggle' they have simply become more valuable on the US market and will receive more generous
aid and loans from the United States of America."

The declaration of the delegation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, in connection with the speech by the delegation of the Party of Labor of Albania, says among other things, "What are the aims of the monstrous slanders of the Albanian delegation which dared to describe the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as almost to blame for the Hungarian counter-revolution? The present words of the Albanian delegation, which levels against the Soviet Union the grave accusation of resorting to almost colonial methods and great-power chauvinism, arouse even greater indignation. These insults can only be grist to the mill of the bourgeois and revisionist propaganda about the so-called Soviet 'colonialism' and Soviet 'hegemonism'."

A large number of the delegations that spoke against us in connection with our speech expressed themselves only with some phrases, such as "This was not the place to open these discussions," or "The speeches by the Chinese and Albanian comrades were inappropriate and harmful, and contained slanders against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," or "We agree with the assessment of the speech of the Albanian delegate made by the preceding speakers," etc.

Generally speaking, based on their stand toward the views expressed in our speech, the various delegations may be divided into three groups:

a) The first group includes those parties that defended us openly, or that supported our theses without mentioning us at all, or that merely spoke a few odd words against our speech simply for the sake of appearances.

In this group mention should be made, first of all, of the Chinese delegation that resolutely defended our Party.

Besides the Chinese delegation, many delegations of the communist and workers' parties of Asia came out openly in defense of our Party. Some of them, such as those of Burma, Malaya and Indonesia, criticized the un-communist methods and the offensive language used against those parties that speak openly and courageously, whereas some other delegations did not declare themselves openly but told us on the side that they agreed with us.

b) The second group is made up of the delegations which spoke against us, but, as we said above, in very mild terms, such
as "improper speech," etc. Most of the delegations from Latin America, the Scandinavian countries, some delegations from Africa and others may be included in this group.

c) The third group is made up of the delegations that rose against us with great heat and unreservedly defended the position of the Soviet leaders. But even among them there are some shades of difference:

— The most aggressive were Gomulka, Ibarruri, Ali Yata of Morocco, Zhivkov, and the Czechs (the latter two came out with written declarations), Dej, Longo of Italy, and others who used the most abusive language against us.

— The less aggressive were the French, who issued written declarations, the Tunisians and others who spoke against us, not in the above-mentioned terms, but such as "disgraceful speech," "impermissible and unacceptable speech," "aimed at discrediting the Soviet Union," etc.

— Lastly, the moderates, among whom the Hungarians may be included, for they were very measured in their written declaration.

The fierce attacks against the Chinese delegation and ours came as no surprise. They were an organized outburst of unprincipled passions, an unsuccessful attempt to stifle our principled views and criticism through base attacks and offensive language, to divert the discussion, by means of sentimental phrases, away from the questions of principle on the agenda, etc. But they did not achieve their aims. In fact, most delegations began to waver, and the more passions cooled down and logic prevailed, the more objectively the correct and principled Marxist-Leninist views upheld by the Chinese delegation, our delegation and some other delegations were assessed by a series of delegations.

This is clearly expressed in the shift of the ratio of forces and in the conclusion of the proceedings of the meeting.

As we said at the start of this report, apart from the Chinese delegation and our delegation, the representatives of many other parties, too, took a resolute Marxist-Leninist stand at the November meeting. All stood for the unity of the communist movement, and frankly admitted that without China and its Communist Party there could be no talk of unity, either in the communist movement or in the socialist camp. This stand was in open opposition to the proposals and theses of the Soviets and their ardent supporters, who wanted to condemn the Communist
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Party of China and the Party of Labor of Albania as factionalists, etc.

At the end of the plenary session of the meeting, after 79 representatives of the various parties had made their contributions to the discussion, N.S. Khrushchev took the floor for the second time, and so did the Chinese delegate and 23 other persons. A characteristic of the last speeches of Khrushchev and his supporters was that they assumed a more moderate appearance, their expressions were more controlled, they were more engaged in defending their viewpoints than in attacking those of others.

Nikita Khrushchev's second speech was a reflection of the situation created up to then at the meeting: on the one hand, the speech of the Chinese delegation and that of our delegation had dealt heavy blows at the arguments of the Soviet leaders concerning the accusations against the Communist Party of China; and on the other hand, it was a fact that besides the parties openly supporting the stand taken by the Soviet delegation against the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labor of Albania, although without convincing arguments, there was also another group of parties (and not a small one) that supported our viewpoints, and still another group in the center that were against the split.

In conformity with this, Khrushchev's second speech had two characteristic aspects:

a) Although in its external form it was sharper than his first speech and directly attacked both the Chinese comrades and us, in essence it was a speech from defensive positions. Defending himself against the criticisms by the Chinese comrades and us, Khrushchev tried to justify the viewpoints of the Soviet leadership on a series of questions: war and peace, the stand to be taken toward imperialism, the thesis of the 20th Congress on the road of transition to socialism, the attitude toward the national liberation movements, the criticism of "Stalin's cult of the individual," etc. Concerning all these questions, he did not dare to enter into an analysis of facts, but said only that all "the slanders and attacks against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" would be answered by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in a special letter. Apart from this, in Khrushchev's second speech the first signs of a retreat were apparent when he declared that, facing the enemy,
the meeting must, without fail, be concluded with a joint document and the elimination of disagreements.

b) Relying on the support of the majority, in his second speech Khrushchev continued his pressure on the Communist Party of China to have it condemned and force it to its knees. In this respect he was very insistent that allegedly the disagreements were between the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labor of Albania, on the one hand, and all the communist and workers' parties, on the other; that the minority should submit to the majority and respect its opinion; that "factional activity" in the international communist movement should be condemned, etc. He went on with his attacks against the Chinese comrades, accusing them of being unwilling to acknowledge their mistakes simply for the reason that they put their pride above the interests of the international communist movement, etc. Without any arguments, and on false evidence, he also attacked the leadership of the Party of Labor of Albania.

Khrushchev's second speech showed that the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with Khrushchev at the head, had not renounced its erroneous views and methods in its relations with the fraternal parties.

After Khrushchev's speech and in reply to it, the delegate of the Communist Party of China took the floor for the second time.

His speech was centered on two main questions: First, did the leadership of the Communist Party of China defend the Moscow Declaration of 1957, or did it violate it? Second, was the stand taken by the Communist Party of China aimed at defending the solidarity of the international communist movement, or had it endangered it?

Concerning the first question, the Chinese delegate pointed out that the leadership of the Communist Party of China had consistently stood on the positions of the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and had defended it with determination. He once more refuted the accusations brought by many preceding speakers to the effect that the Chinese comrades, especially in the articles included in the pamphlet *Long Live Leninism!*, had allegedly departed from the Declaration of 1957, that they allegedly negated the importance of the world socialist system in the international arena, negated the principle of peaceful coexistence, were left-adventurers, dogmatists, etc. He proved that, on the contrary, it was the Soviet leaders and the leaders of some
other fraternal parties who began to declare that some important theses of Leninism were obsolete, to act according to the supposition that imperialism had allegedly changed its nature, to spread harmful illusions about the summit meetings, etc. The articles included in the pamphlet *Long Live Leninism!* were directed against imperialism, against revisionism and the harmful illusions fostered by the Soviet leaders in connection with imperialism. So it was they who had departed from the positions of the Moscow Declaration of 1957, and not the Chinese comrades; as a result, they should have consulted the other parties about their viewpoints which they changed from those of the Moscow Declaration, and not the Chinese comrades about their articles which had defended the theses of the Declaration in question.

Concerning the second question, the delegate of the Communist Party of China rejected the accusation made by many speakers to the effect that the first speech of the delegation of the Communist Party of China allegedly endangered the solidarity of the international communist movement. On the contrary, that speech was meant as an answer to the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dated November 5th, which in fact had deepened the contradictions. The delegate of the Communist Party of China also resolutely rejected the accusations that many speakers during the meeting made against the Communist Party of China, as well as the accusation made by Khrushchev in his second speech, to the effect that the Chinese comrades allegedly put their pride above the interests of the international communist movement.

He clearly showed that an unhealthy and impermissible situation had been created in which any criticism directed at the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was labeled as "factionalist activity," whereas the Soviet comrades were permitted to decide everything on their own, without asking the others, and the other parties had only to follow them. This violated the principle of equality and consultation in relations among the fraternal parties. In this respect, the Chinese delegate exposed the manoeuvre of Khrushchev who, attempting to justify his arbitrary actions, in his second speech said that the question of the condemnation of "Stalin's cult of the individual" could not have been made an object of discussion among the fraternal parties before the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union without previously soliciting the
opinion of the Party, while after the decision of the congress, this decision could not be violated. (In this way, in fact, the possibility of consultation among the fraternal parties is totally denied.)

The Chinese delegate emphasized that the principle of consultation did not mean in the least the imposition of the will of the minority on that of the majority, that the unity of the communist movement was not threatened by the principle of equality and consultation, but on the contrary, by the fact that this principle was being violated. He expressed himself resolutely against the inclusion in the draft Declaration of such theses as that on the so-called "factional activity" in the international communist movement, on "national communism," etc., which were directed against the Communist Party of China, and he stressed that no unity could be reached on this basis. He also expressed his opposition to the thesis on the importance of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the inclusion of which in the draft Declaration would be considered as an imposition of the views of one party on the other parties. He said that the common struggle of all the communist and workers' parties constituted a broad basis for overcoming all the existing divergencies.

The speech by the delegate of the Communist Party of China showed that the Communist Party of China stood firm on its correct Marxist-Leninist positions, that this was the only right road for the achievement of unity.

Our delegation decided not to take part in the discussion for the second time, so it did not ask for the floor, but we issued a brief written declaration which was distributed to all the delegations. In this declaration we emphasized that we stood firm on the positions expressed in our speech and pointed out that the insulting criticism leveled at us was hasty and did not serve the strengthening of the unity of our movement. In this connection we stressed:

'Typical in this respect was the speech of the delegate of the United Workers' Party of Poland, Vladislav Gomulka, who went so far in his unworthy attempts to distort the truth about the Party of Labor of Albania as to use against it epithets, descriptions and insinuations which are altogether impermissible in the relations among the Marxist parties and which only the imperialists and the Yugoslav revisionists repeatedly fling at us each
passing day. From the content and tone of the Polish delegate's speech it is clear that he is not in the least interested in the elimination of disagreements among parties and in strengthening the unity of the communist and workers' movement; but on the contrary he is striving with great zeal to deepen them, which is only to the benefit of our enemies. His intention was to lead our meeting into a blind alley and to discredit the Party of Labor of Albania in the eyes of the international communist and workers' movement. However, this attempt to isolate the Party of Labor of Albania ended in failure and disgrace, as it was bound to do.

"We reject all the slanders and provocations made at this meeting against our delegation, against our Party and people.

"The Party of Labor of Albania regrets that a number of delegates of some other fraternal parties hastened to use an incorrect and uncomradely language toward the Party of Labor of Albania in their speeches or written declarations distributed at this meeting, without going thoroughly into the real facts and without being aware of the truth. However, the Party of Labor of Albania hopes that those comrades will reflect more deeply and will understand the truth about the content of the speech made by the delegation of the Party of Labor of Albania."

As you see, apart from Gomulka, we did not name anyone else, nor did we respond to the personal attacks so that we would not deviate from our principled position. Our brief written declaration was well received by the delegations, and none of the 23 second-time speakers, including even Gomulka, said anything against it.

In this manner the first and more important part of the Moscow Meeting came to an end, and the commission for the final editing of the Declaration started its work. The commission met five days in succession. The Chinese delegation, our delegation and other delegations with the same viewpoints as ours, waged a stern and determined struggle there. The change in the situation was clearly apparent in the commission. Not only the shift in the ratio of forces, but also the result of the resolute struggle and the courageous and unflinching stand taken, particularly by the Chinese delegation and ours at the plenary session, was even more evident there. Many delegations of parties in a centrist position behaved with respect toward the proposals made by our delegations.

In conclusion, some amendments were made for the improvement of the draft Declaration, whereas all the proposals intended
to weaken the Declaration, to give it an opportunist character, like those of the Italians who wanted to water down the paragraph on Yugoslav revisionism, or the proposals of the Swedes, etc., were rejected. The Commission also rejected the thesis about "national communism" but, at the end, four questions remained unresolved: the assessment of the 20th and 21st Congresses, the question of the cult of the individual, the question of factions, and the inclusion in the Declaration of the principle of consultation for the achievement of unity, as proposed by the Chinese delegation.

A break of one day was taken for consultation with the heads of delegations about finding a way out. However, our delegations expressed their determination not to accept the inclusion in the Declaration of the first three of the above-mentioned four questions. Indeed, through some delegations that had taken a centrist position we had let it be understood that, if the above-mentioned questions remained in the Declaration, we would not put our signature to it.

Only at midday of the last day, as a result of our struggle and clear-cut stand, was complete unanimity reached, after the delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was obliged to back down. In fact, the questions under discussion were resolved as follows: the question of factions was removed from the text altogether; the Chinese proposal about consultations was included; the assessment of the 21st Congress was removed completely and only the characterization of the 20th Congress according to the 1957 Declaration remained, with the addition of a phrase on the contribution made by other parties to the enrichment of Marxism-Leninism; the formula about the cult of the individual remained, but no longer as a phenomenon connected with the whole international communist movement. After these amendments the Declaration was unanimously approved by all the delegations.

The fundamental questions about which there were different opinions are presented correctly and interpreted from the Marxist point of view. The characterization of the epoch, the problems of war and peace, the question of peaceful coexistence, the problems of the national liberation movement, of the communist movement in the capitalist countries, of the unity of the socialist camp and of the communist parties, find their correct reflection in the Declaration. The only fundamental question about which we disagreed, but on which, for the sake of unity, we were
obliged to make a concession, was the mentioning of the 20th Congress.

But one thing should always be kept in mind. There exists the possibility that each will try to give his own interpretation of the theses of the Declaration. The Moscow Declaration of 1957, too, was correct, but many disagreements arose concerning its interpretation. Distortions could be made, not by revising the theses of the Declaration and replacing them with new theses, but by stressing its theses in a one-sided manner, by mentioning only one side of the question and leaving out the other. For example, there exists the danger that in the characterization of our epoch only our forces may be emphasized or overestimated; there is the danger that in connection with the problem of war, the danger of war may not be properly stressed and imperialism not exposed; there is the danger that only the policy of the alliance with the social-democrats and the national bourgeoisie may be emphasized, and the struggle against, and criticism of, their reactionary viewpoints and actions may be left aside; there is the danger that the peaceful road of transition to socialism will be the most stressed, and the non-peaceful way not mentioned, as it should be; there is the danger that revisionism may be acknowledged as the main danger only in words, and more stress laid on the struggle against dogmatism and sectarianism. Similar distortions can be made with regard to the other problems taken up in the Declaration, too.

Hence the question arises: How will this Declaration be implemented? Will it be honored by everyone?

We can answer this question with certainty only as far as our Party is concerned. Not only will our Party of Labor fight with might and main to implement the Declaration approved, but at the same time we feel ourselves duty-bound to fight against anyone who may violate it, or who may attempt to distort its content.

As far as the other parties are concerned, we hope that for the sake of unity, of the common struggle against imperialism and revisionism, for the sake of the camp of socialism and communism, they will all implement the Declaration which was approved. The implementation of this Declaration to the letter will mark a decisive step toward the liquidation of all disagreements in the ranks of the communist movement, will make a valuable contribution to the tempering of the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement,
which is indispensable for victory over the enemy. The Declaration itself and its content represent a real basis on which this unity can be built.

But we cannot fail to inform the Central Committee of the Party about some reservations that are even now becoming apparent in the attitude of the Soviet leaders toward the implementation of the Declaration.

The reservations they have expressed, which in our opinion are unjustified, are these: In a speech he delivered in October, at a banquet in honor of the participants in the editing commission of the Declaration, Nikita Khrushchev himself called the Declaration a "compromise document." "As you know," he went on, "such documents are not long-lived." Later, at the farewell banquet given in honor of the participants of the Moscow Meeting of December 2nd, that is to say, after the Declaration was signed, speaking about Yugoslavia, Nikita Khrushchev stressed that it is not a socialist country but that its economy is developing along socialist lines (!), and that "we (the Russians) would not fight Yugoslav revisionism as the Albanians are doing, for we keep in mind that in case of war Yugoslavia could muster a number of divisions, and we do not want them lined up against us."

On what is hidden behind these declarations, what is their purpose, we shall not attempt to comment. Let us wait and see. We only observed these facts, and now we are informing the Central Committee of the Party about them. Of course, in our opinion, such statements cannot give rise to optimism. They make you think that the Soviet leadership will not fight, as every party should, to implement the pledges stemming from the unanimous approval of the Declaration that was signed.

V. THE TASKS OF THE PARTY IN THE FUTURE

The activity of our delegation, its determined and principled stand, the courageous speech and all the work carried out at the Moscow Meeting, have been very good and, as we said, have given good results. We must emphasize that, as a result, the individuality of our Party has been raised, admiration and respect for its courage, its principled stand, and its determination to defend Marxism-Leninism have increased immeasurably. This rejoices us, but it should not go to our heads and make us boastful. We did nothing but our duty to Marxism-Leninism, to proletarian inter-
nationalism, to our Party and our people.

But, at the same time a number of new problems confront us, which we must solve with the wisdom characterizing our Party, with cool-headedness and intelligence.

We should be aware that our courageous and principled stand was not to the liking either of the Soviet leadership or of the representatives of some parties of the socialist and capitalist countries, and this is evident from the attacks they directed against our Party. On the other hand, as a result of the work done by the Soviet leaders with the various delegations, especially after our speech, and the slanderous lies they told the meeting about us, among many delegations there is the impression that we attacked the Soviet Union and its Communist Party.

After having spoken of the attitude toward the Soviet Union, Comrade Enver Hoxha continued:

ON RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

In recent times our ties and relations with the Chinese comrades have become still closer. This is explained by the fact that our two parties are following the same course, the same aim, because the principled struggle for the defense of Marxism-Leninism united the two of us and linked us closely. Some representatives of various parties in Moscow, like Zhivkov and others, tried to present the matter as if the Party of Labor of Albania has acted, and continues to act, according to the instructions of the Communist Party of China. It is not necessary to stress here that our Party has its own opinion, its own view, its own individuality. It has fought resolutely for many years in defense of Marxism-Leninism, and it continues to do so. In this struggle we found ourselves shoulder to shoulder with the Chinese comrades, who are fighting, too, with courage and determination in defense of our triumphant ideas. And it is on this basis, on the basis of the struggle for Marxism-Leninism, that our two parties became united and firmly linked together.

It must be said that at the Bucharest Meeting we defended the Chinese comrades, proceeding from the positions of Marxism-Leninism. Likewise, on the basis of these same positions we defended them also at the Moscow Meeting. But, for their part, the Chinese comrades, too, at the Moscow Meeting, resolutely defended our Party and its principled positions. Allow me to put
forward here what the delegate of the Communist Party of China said in his two speeches with regard to our Party.

In the first speech he said, among other things, that the position adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in these recent times toward the Party of Labor of Albania had caused them great concern. The Soviet Union had given aid to Albania, and nobody denied that. "But," he stressed, "can one consider as entirely insignificant the internationalist aid which the heroic and industrious Albanian people give the Soviet Union, the whole socialist camp, the international communist movement, the cause of peace throughout the world and the revolution of the peoples of various countries? In any case, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union cannot, because it has given aid to Albania, consider it permissible to use this as a privilege to interfere in the internal affairs of Albania; nor have the Albanian comrades in any way lost the right to solve their internal questions independently for this reason.

"In recent times the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have more than once made attacks on the Party of Labor of Albania before the Chinese comrades, stating that they will adopt toward the Marxist-Leninist Party of Labor of Albania and toward the People's Republic of Albania the same stand they adopted toward Yugoslavia, that they want to condemn the Party of Labor of Albania, cutting off any kind of aid to it, simply because the Albanian comrades defend their own views on a series of questions and, especially at the Bucharest Meeting and after this Meeting, they did not follow the Soviet comrades in their actions directed against the Communist Party of China. In its letter of November 5, addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union even expressed its open support for anti-Party elements in Albania, calling them friends of the Soviet Union. We hope that the Soviet comrades will quietly ponder over whether, by adopting such a stand toward the Party of Labor of Albania, they are guided by the principles of proletarian internationalism or by patriarchal principles that are impermissible in the ranks of the communists. If things reach the point that all the sister parties and all the fraternal countries interfere in one another's internal affairs and provoke disruption of each other, without hesitating to use any means whatever, then the question arises: What will become of our great com-
munist family? There is no doubt that such acts are absolutely incompatible with the interests of the socialist camp and of the international communist movement. . . ."

And in the second speech he stressed:

"The delegation of the Communist Party of China is of the opinion that the questions presented by Comrade Enver Hoxha in connection with the relations between the parties and states of the Soviet Union and Albania are serious and deserve serious attention and study on the part of the comrades. The comrades may not agree with this or that point of his critical remarks, but meanwhile they must base themselves only on facts, and they must not, without having examined the facts, describe as calumny everything that has been said, as though the serious disagreements that have arisen between the sister parties and fraternal countries can be solved in this way. The Communist Party of China sincerely desires that the disagreements between the parties and states of the Soviet Union and Albania should be solved by means of friendly consultations, and that the good fraternal relations that have been created between them in the course of many years will be maintained in the future, too. The interests of the socialist camp and the international communist movement require this. Some comrades insulted the delegation of the Party of Labor of Albania, a thing which is contrary to the spirit of equality between sister parties. We were astonished by the fact that even Comrade Gomulka allowed himself to use offensive terms, saying that the speech of the Albanian comrades was a 'dirty attack by hooligans.' Can it be said that Albania is not a socialist country, and the Party of Labor of Albania is not an internationalist and communist Party? Are the Albanian comrades not waging a determined struggle against imperialism and Yugoslav revisionism? If we reflect calmly that Albania is a small country in our socialist camp and is surrounded by enemies, it will be difficult to believe that the Albanian comrades treat others with contempt. Offensive words addressed to the Albanian comrades are no contribution either to the solidarity of the international communist movement or to the improvement of the relations between the Soviet Union and Albania.

"Some comrades allowed themselves to declare that the speech of the Albanian comrades is allegedly a result of the factional activity the Chinese comrades are carrying out — indeed, they declared that this was a 'distribution of roles' between the Albanian and Chinese comrades. It is very difficult for us to
understand how these comrades could invent such tales. If the fact that the Albanian and Chinese comrades expressed identical views on a series of questions is to be called factional activity or the result of factional activity, the question arises: How can we call the expression of identical views by the comrades of the other sister parties? Comrades, in our ranks, in the ranks of the sister parties, such an atmosphere of irresponsibility and injustice has been manifested. This cannot fail to cause us serious concern...."

Our Party of Labor is grateful to the sister Party of China for its internationalist and Marxist-Leninist support.

In the future our Party will strengthen its ties and friendship with the Communist Party of China and the great Chinese people, always upholding the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and the correct line always pursued by the Central Committee of our Party.

ON THE DISCUSSION OF THESE QUESTIONS IN THE PARTY AND AT THE CONGRESS

So far, the Central Committee of the Party has informed the Party, through a special letter, only about the Bucharest Meeting. We think that now, by means of another letter, we must inform the party organizations of the Moscow Meeting and the contradictions which exist between our Party and the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We think this letter of the Central Committee should be analyzed and discussed at district party conferences (or in actives), and then in the party branches. It would be good if all this work can be completed before the Congress, so that the delegates who come to the Congress will be aware of these problems beforehand.

The party organizations must see to it that our people, in the first place the communists, further enhance their revolutionary political vigilance and devote more attention to the problems of production and the realization of economic plans, in industry, construction, the mines, trade, agriculture, etc. Under present conditions total mobilization is needed — indeed, a tenfold increase of the enthusiasm and the determination of the masses, to
cope with the difficulties and obstacles (3) ahead of us, so that both the Party and the people emerge successful.

As to the Party Congress, we think that it is better to postpone it, hold it toward the beginning of February, so that we shall have time to put the questions of which we spoke before the Party, and also to prepare ourselves better for the Congress.

Comrades,

These were the questions we wanted to report to the Plenum. Our Party, as always, will march forward toward new victories under the banner of Marxism-Leninism. We shall achieve ever greater successes, for we are on a correct road, we are fighting for a noble cause, and there is and will be no obstacle or difficulty that can stop our triumphant advance. (4)

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3) Time confirmed the predictions of the PLA. The Soviet leadership launched an all-out open attack against the PLA and the PRA. It unilaterally broke off all the agreements, stopped all the credits which were due to be provided for the PRA in the years 1961-1965 on the basis of agreements, broke off all trade, technical-scientific and cultural relations, used the withdrawal of all the Soviet specialists from Albania as a means of pressure, withdrew all the warships from the Vlora naval base before the eyes of the whole world, robbing Albania also of eight submarines and all the Albanian warships that were under repair at Sevastopol in the USSR, cancelled the scholarships of all the Albanian students studying in the Soviet Union and expelled them, and finally, carried out an absolutely unprecedented act in the relations among socialist countries - broke off diplomatic relations. Subsequently, a total economic blockade was organized against the PRA.

4) The Plenum fully and unanimously endorsed the activity of the delegation of the CC of the PLA at the Moscow Meeting.
THE PRINCIPLED AND CONSISTENT STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM AND REVISIONISM HAS BEEN AND REMAINS THE ROAD OF OUR PARTY

(Closing Speech at the 21st Plenum of the CC of the PLA)

December 20, 1960

I shall try to be brief, since the contributions of the comrades of the Plenum to this great problem, so decisive for the defense of Marxism-Leninism and the line of our Party, were at the proper level and supplemented the report submitted to the Plenum on behalf of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee very well.

First of all I want to emphasize that what we did in Moscow, where we put forward the line of our Party, is not a personal merit of mine or of our delegation only, but it is the merit of our entire Party and, in particular, of its leadership, the Central Committee, which has always led our Party correctly, has always analyzed the situations in the light of Marxism-Leninism, has always remained loyal to our glorious theory, has carried out to the letter all the correct decisions that have been adopted, and has also known how to transmit these decisions properly to the Party and to arm it powerfully. For these reasons the whole general line of our Party has achieved great successes. Hence we should be clear that the credit for this belongs to the Central Committee and our entire heroic Party.

The revisionists may think and say that if our Party were to learn about the stand our delegation maintained at the international Meeting in Moscow, it would not tolerate its Central Committee. But none of us has the slightest doubt about the steel-like unity that exists in our leadership, the steel-like unity of our Party around the Central Committee and the Political Bureau. This constitutes the great strength of our Party, and this unity has made it possible for our Party to contribute to the defense of Marxism-Leninism on the international level. In this regard, of course, we have done nothing but our duty as a Marxist party, as internationalists. With this correct concept of its duty which is characteristic of our Party, we are firmly
convinced that all of us, in solid unity, will pour out all our strength to apply Marxism-Leninism precisely, through to the end, unwaveringly and in all circumstances.

As the comrades said, we are confronted with a great and difficult struggle. We all are aware of the struggle which awaits us, but we are not afraid. We do not say this out of the desire to give one another courage; the whole life of our Party has demonstrated this, and the recent events have especially proven this. In its principled, consistent stand, in defending its correct line, i.e., Marxism-Leninism, our Party did not flinch in the face of either the current difficulties or of those of the future. Thus, difficulties and the struggle do not frighten us. This is a Marxist characteristic. We have not been, nor will we ever be, pessimistic about the future. On the contrary, we will be optimistic for we are convinced that Marxism will always triumph over opportunism and revisionism, as well as over imperialism.

Why is this struggle difficult? Because when we say that we are confronted with modern revisionism, we mean that we are confronted not only with Yugoslav revisionism, which the Moscow Declaration describes as the essence of modern revisionism, but that we are facing even more dangerous revisionists. For the sake of appearances, everyone — even the other revisionists, even Khrushchev and company who are such themselves — admitted this. They did this to camouflage themselves, choosing the lesser of two evils. Otherwise, it would have looked a bit fishy, and what they sought to conceal would have been exposed. They put up a fight and will continue to do so in future too, resorting to all sorts of tricks to camouflage themselves.

These people proposed that nothing should be said about Yugoslav revisionism in the Declaration, and only after a prolonged struggle did they agree to the inclusion of this issue. But revisionism is not concentrated in Yugoslavia alone. It is a dangerous trend in the whole international communist movement. It has become dangerous especially because of the efforts of the opportunists to tranquilize the people by spreading the idea that revisionism exists in Yugoslavia alone; hence they fight to confine the struggle just to Yugoslavia. In this way international revisionism is causing great confusion, which will become even greater in the future; it will try to conceal this serious danger which is threatening the international communist movement, and will continue to confuse and deceive other people in
the future. Faced with this danger, one of the Marxist-Leninist parties which must, and will, wage a stern and consistent struggle against revisionism, is our Party.

It is a fact that we are not alone in this struggle. When Khrushchev said to the representatives of the Communist Party of China, "We shall treat Albania the same as Yugoslavia," or "The Albanians behave toward us just like Tito," he was bluffing and could deceive nobody. It is not Tito who is Khrushchev's enemy, but us. But since the Yugoslav revisionists have been condemned, against Khrushchev's will, by the international communist movement as traitors and renegades to Marxism-Leninism, Khrushchev and company, while not defending them directly, strive to smear the positions of the genuine Marxists and to put the "dogmatists" — in reality, those who defend the principles of Marxism-Leninism — on a par with the revisionists, with whom, as Marxism teaches us, one fine day Khrushchev and those who follow him will completely agree on the road they should follow. So Khrushchev says that we Albanians are not revisionists but "dogmatists," and that allegedly we fight the Soviets the same as the Titoites; that is to say, according to him, he and his cronies are allegedly Marxists, while we constitute the "left" wing of Marxism. "Therefore," he says, "both Tito from the right and the Albanians from the left are fighting against us, the Marxists."

But it is not the revisionists who are the enemies of Khrushchev and his entire group. Life is demonstrating that only the Marxists are the enemies of this group. The Political Bureau emphasizes that, following his advent to power, Khrushchev and his revisionist group had worked out a complete plan: Marxism-Leninism would be negated and all those trends and people that had been unmasked, attacked and defeated as anti-Marxists, or who had been liquidated by Marxist-Leninism in action, were to be rehabilitated; the entire struggle of the Soviet Union and of the CPSU against renegades from Marxism-Leninism, a struggle which was personified in the CPSU(B) led by Lenin and Stalin, was to be negated.

This meant that both Lenin and Stalin had to be attacked. But to attack Lenin was impossible for them; it would have been a great catastrophe for the revisionists, so they confined themselves to Stalin and they dragged out a thousand and one things against him. Today it has become even more apparent that these intriguers, liars, opportunists and revisionists are doing all these
things openly, devising all these villanies in the international communist movement, organizing disgraceful behind-the-scenes plots within the fraternal parties.

Seeing all these despicable methods which the revisionists use, our Party is fully convinced that all the monstrous accusations and slanders brought against Stalin were aimed at discrediting both him as a person as well as the work of this great Marxist-Leninist. The revisionist, career-seeking, non-Marxist elements in the Soviet Union have accepted these concoctions. They have accepted the theses of Khrushchev and his group concerning "Stalin's mistakes," and so on.

The Political Bureau emphasizes that the Soviet leadership headed by Khrushchev tried to rehabilitate the Tito clique, and this is a fact.

No great weight should be given to the variations and zigzags of Khrushchev, because he has not been able to avoid them, since he was not in a position to change the situation in a single day; there were sound Marxist-Leninist forces in the party who did not allow him to follow his course at the speed he would have desired, so that he and his group could carry out their plans immediately. But it is fact that he has made every effort to completely rehabilitate all the enemies of Marxism-Leninism who had until then been condemned in the Soviet Union. He dug up old accusations against Stalin, such as whether or not Kamenev and Zinoviev, who had betrayed Lenin, should have been executed. Whether or not it was Stalin who shot these traitors, they were shot for the treason they had committed against the Soviet Union and against communism. Now Khrushchev is dragging out all these things and striving to rehabilitate these people. Therefore, in order to rehabilitate the Yugoslav revisionists, too, he had to fabricate all sorts of lies against Stalin. We should have no illusions at all that the line of Khrushchev and his group will change. This line will not change in the least as far as his international policy and his defense of revisionism are concerned. Khrushchev and his group are on a revisionist course. This stand of his has had, and will continue to have, grave repercussions in the international arena.

But will Khrushchev and his group succeed in their plans? We are fully convinced that they will not be successful, although we shall encounter many difficulties in our course. We should keep his policy in mind and deal with it very carefully, for he is no ordinary revisionist, but a wily devil and a skilful acrobat to
boot. If we carefully analyze his activity since he came to power, we shall see that he has captured key positions everywhere, has used all sorts of methods to disguise himself, and is continuing to do dangerous work. In the beginning, through his tricks, he managed to create a situation which prevented the emergence of any opposition; he took up a few slogans about international political life and the development of the economy, and publicized them far and wide with enough clamor to confuse people for a while.

He followed this tactic in the USSR as well, by preaching a sort of change, right down to the way people live. He trumpeted that, in Stalin's time, the life of the Soviet working people was hell, whereas now Khrushchev has become "the promoter of a new life, democratic and rich from the economic aspect." Then he raised the question of peace in the world, which he was going to "impose" on the imperialists, etc.

This policy was loudly propagated right from the start of his career, when his instructions had not yet yielded their fruit. Words there were aplenty, but nothing came of them. All this was done in order to prepare the ground and create a favorable situation. Khrushchev continues to follow this road.

His course has had grave repercussions in international policy. He has lulled people to sleep and made them shut their eyes to the imperialist danger, the revisionist danger, and all the other opportunist trends menacing international communism.

By means of his views and his opportunist and revisionist policy, Khrushchev has aroused and activated all the revisionist elements, and has therefore become very dangerous. In the other countries the revisionists did not make their presence felt — not because they were terrified of Stalin, not because he would have shot them, for in Bulgaria, Albania and elsewhere, even if Stalin had wanted to, or had really been as Khrushchev is presenting him now, they were out of his reach; they did not make their presence felt because at that time, in all the parties, there was a correct Marxist-Leninist line which did not allow revisionism to become active.

Yugoslav revisionism was exposed and condemned by the CPSU and by Stalin. This line was embraced by all the other parties. When Khrushchev and company came to power, all the revisionists saw that in them they had powerful support, because these people are at the head of the Soviet Union. Therefore, now it can be seen that within many Marxist-Leninist parties which have
had a consistent stand, people of opportunist-revisionist trends have raised their heads and even managed to have themselves elected to the leading organs. For a while Khrushchev thought that he would push through his line smoothly, therefore he was reckless in the propagation of his views, both in the internal economic and organizational measures which were taken in the Soviet Union and in its international policy. Thus, in pursuing his opportunist and revisionist line, he would say whatever came into his head, and he made repeated concessions to imperialism. In words, you may threaten the imperialists as much as you like, but they are no fools; they make their calculations well, they take into account not only your declarations and tactics but also your means and forces. The imperialists also have the assistance of the revisionists who know the concrete reality in our countries.

It is a fact that ever since Nikita Khrushchev and his group came to power, imperialism has made no concessions at all. On the contrary, it has armed itself more powerfully and is preparing for war. We are absolutely right when we say that the camp of socialism and the forces of peace are much more powerful than those of imperialism. But these forces can be weakened if we slacken our vigilance, if we do not defend Marxism-Leninism resolutely, if we do not put a stop to these actions of the revisionists and fail to ceaselessly expose imperialism and revisionism, if we do not educate the people politically and fail to arm them so that they are always ready to cope with any possible danger.

It is clear that the methods used by Nikita Khrushchev and those who assist him result in reduced vigilance toward this danger. Therefore, as the report of the Political Bureau points out, the time came when we could wait no longer, we could go no further by these methods. When the Soviet revisionists say, "You started the fight," etc., they are telling lies, trying to cover their tracks. The thing is that they began to follow an opportunist line which has become more and more pronounced since the time they seized power.

Their defense consists only of, "You say this, you say that." But it doesn't hold water. We see that ever since they came to power, they have been following a revisionist line and working to weaken the struggle against imperialism, the vigilance of the peoples, and to help revisionism gain control of the international
communist movement.

Now, however, we have said "Stop!" to this whole business. Thus the whole opportunist line headed by Khrushchev was endangered. As an opportunist, he wanted to defeat the Marxist-Leninist resistance to his line. He thought that this resistance in the Soviet Union would be smashed by bringing up the question of Stalin, by condemning the "cult" of the individual around Stalin. He thought, too, that, in the international communist movement, there were enough forces available to strike a decisive blow at the Marxist-Leninist attack on his opportunist line. This was clearly evident at the Bucharest Meeting where efforts were made to condemn the Marxist-Leninists and liquidate the situation which was hindering him; but, as we know, they failed.

Our Party played an important role at the Bucharest Meeting. It was the only party to oppose what was being done there. And from then on the hostility against us, until then covert, came out in the open. From this we can judge how grave and damaging to them was the stand of our Party.

We should have complete confidence that the situation Khrushchev has created in many communist parties of Europe, which he has tried to win over to his side, is a temporary one. We base this conviction on the strength of Marxism-Leninism. However, for the time being, he has created this unhealthy situation by bringing people with opportunist-revisionist views into the leadership of a number of parties by one means or another. In the face of these favorable conditions which he had created for himself, apart from the great Communist Party of China, there was a small Party too which also realized the danger of this line and stood up to say resolutely: "Stop! I am not with you at this point. I do not support the course you are pursuing!"

Up till now, in the interests of the international communist movement, we too have used tactics, but now that Khrushchev seeks to deal blows at the sound part of the international communist movement and compel it to follow his opportunist line, we say to him: "Stop!" Of course, to them, this is a great loss.

But the situation became more complicated for them at the Moscow Meeting. The Moscow Meeting did not proceed as they had envisaged. The proof of this is the Moscow Declaration, which is a good document, approved by all. Naturally, had there been a healthy situation, a more fiery, more militant declaration would have come out of it. However, this document is acceptable
and it must be understood correctly, just as it is.

Now the question arises: Can it be said that these people who signed such a document will change? We must say to the Central Committee that they will not change their line. This is implied from the words of Khrushchev, which were mentioned in the report and which should not be forgotten. In connection with the Declaration he said, "It is a compromise document." To Khrushchev this is a compromise because he is entering another phase; but our tactics, too, are entering another phase.

All the Marxist-Leninist communist and workers' parties ardently loved the Soviet Union, the CPSU, and the leadership of the CPSU, with Stalin at the head, and had unshakable confidence in it. This was a well-deserved, correct, Marxist-Leninist confidence. When the Khrushchev group came to power, it no longer found that warmth in the hearts of the Albanian communists and those of the other countries as before. We continued to nurture the same feelings of love and confidence as before, with the difference that, basing ourselves on the events taking place there, we said that injustice is being done in the CPSU, that the line is being distorted there. In the beginning there were a number of ill-defined things, but later they were concretized.

Even in this phase, we preserve our love for the Soviet Union, but during this time we saw and understood that the leadership of the CPSU was moving to the right, toward an opportunist, revisionist course. Under these conditions, we adopted the tactic of keeping silent in public, especially before world public opinion. This was a correct tactic of our leadership and was not adopted by accident. Its aim was to defend Marxism-Leninism, to defend the line of our Party.

But what is our line? The struggle against revisionism and any opportunist or dogmatic trend which attacks and aims at the destruction of Marxism-Leninism, the ideological and political exposure of imperialism and Yugoslav revisionism and of every kind of revisionism, the sharpening of vigilance, the arming and permanent readiness to deal with any eventual danger, and unbreakable friendship with all the communist and workers' parties and with the countries of the camp of socialism, regardless of whether Khrushchev, Zhivkov, Gomulka and others like or dislike our line. It means that we have not made political or ideological concessions in our line; it was they who made concessions. We have tried hard to defend our line and our love for the CPSU and the Soviet Union, but with Khrushchev and
company we have not been and are not now in agreement. This they have understood and know.

Now a new stage is approaching, one which the Bucharest and Moscow Meetings opened. In this stage too their tactics have taken and will take new forms. But our tactics too will not mark time; they will be adapted to the development of events, but we shall always continue our resolute defense of Marxism-Leninism, we shall expose all the enemies of Marxism-Leninism.

After the Bucharest Meeting and especially after the Moscow Meeting, the positions of those who thought they had won have been shaken. No one doubts this. Nikita Khrushchev can no longer cut a great figure on the throne he had occupied in the international communist movement, because of the principled struggle waged by our Party, the Communist Party of China, and by many other parties which maintained a Marxist-Leninist stand.

These stands are of great historic importance, for they said "Stop!" to Khrushchev. They shook the very foundations of his positions among the various parties, although he had thought them impregnable.

But we should bear in mind that Khrushchev will try to keep all those who followed him at the Bucharest Meeting on his side, because they are heavily compromised. The Soviet revisionists and their flatterers who were present at the Moscow Meeting were greatly concerned that we should not criticize them; therefore they strove to throw dust in our eyes by cajolery. This was what Mikoyan tried to do before we spoke at the Meeting. "We agree with you," was more or less what he said. "We are for Stalin, too, for the 'condemnation' of Yugoslav revisionism, so tell us, what do you want?"

If we look at the problem from the ideological viewpoint, we shall be convinced of what was of greater importance: whether to speak about those major problems of principle of the communist movement, or about something else — about what Malinovski said, for example. Of course, the defense of questions of principle of the communist movement, first and foremost, was of greater importance than the things the Soviet leaders had done to us, but these too were extremely discrediting to them, therefore they tried to induce us not to mention them in our speech, for this would expose not only their opportunist line but also the underhand, fiendish and dirty methods which the revisionists and the Soviet leadership have used against us and many others,
which now they want to cover up. But they have left scars and have not been forgotten, and have had their influence on the mistakes made on many major questions of international communism.

Maurice Thorez, for example, may have had other reasons to maintain the stand he took against us at the Moscow Meeting, though, when he was on holiday in Albania, he was in full agreement with as much as I told him. But the speech of our Party in Moscow did not leave him unscathed because as the representative and leader of the Communist Party of France he bears great responsibility since he permitted such a very important matter, as that of the stand toward the Yugoslav revisionists, whom the Information Bureau had condemned, to be settled by N. Khrushchev and his followers, not in the Marxist-Leninist way, but simply by means of a telegram.

For a number of reasons Gomulka got up at the meeting and demanded that the question of Albania should be considered within the Warsaw Treaty, but he said this also because the representative of our Party had opposed his policy and had not agreed with Gomulka's proposals in the UNO. This is a question of great importance, because his proposals amounted to saying to the imperialists: "Keep all the numerous military bases you have set up, keep the atomic bomb, and don't let others have it." It is easily understood that, according to Gomulka, China must not have this weapon, and the imperialists are very interested in this. The stand of our delegation, therefore, was a telling blow to their adventurous and opportunist policy which aims at leading the socialist camp toward the abyss. That is why Gomulka said that Albania should be expelled from the Warsaw Treaty.

The raising of these major questions had very great importance for the fate of socialism. The Soviet leadership would not have been much concerned if we had only pointed out what Ivanov had done in Albania, etc. The raising of problems in the way we did upset them because this would expose their policy. But by also raising the question of their interference in the internal affairs of our country, the question of their attempts to split our leadership, we touched Zhivkov on a sensitive spot, since it is known that it was Khrushchev who interfered to bring him to power in Bulgaria.

Thus, our speech at the Moscow Meeting was exceptionally harmful to Khrushchev. It is understandable that this exposure would open up very great troubles for him. This is what impelled
them to heap unprincipled insults on us, because if the others were to go thoroughly into these things, it would lead to a lot of troubles, not only for those who aimed their insults against us but also for those directing them.

It is known that, subsequent to the 20th Congress of the CPSU, there were changes in the leaderships of many communist and workers' parties. Khrushchev understood that the parties in which the leadership was not changed constituted a great danger to his line, because his efforts and his views could not find a foothold among them. So he was obliged to grin and bear it, and for the sake of appearances, he maintained friendly relations with our Party. But he saw that he was failing to achieve his ends, and if not today, he planned to have another try in the future. This is what he intended for our Party, for the Communist Party of China and for some other parties. In these parties, he was quite unable to undermine the leadership; therefore, seeing a danger in them, he went about achieving his plans in other ways.

At first he tried to strengthen his positions, to create an atmosphere of trust — because he was allegedly the "Lenin" of today — to eliminate all doubts about himself, and in the course of this activity to prepare his loyal cadres who would support him. He saw that good propaganda work about the Soviet Union was being done in Albania and he hoped that the time would come when we too would follow his course. But it did not turn out that way.

Although they signed the Declaration, it does not mean that they have changed their course. This is only one of their tactics. No one knows how long this will go on, but it is a dangerous tactic. We shall keep our eyes on it, we shall follow it closely. The international situations will become more complicated, despite the propaganda of Khrushchev and his followers about peaceful development. Wherever we look, we see strikes, uprisings, national liberation movements on the part of the peoples, and terror on the part of the imperialists. This refutes the view that Khrushchev has propagated so widely about the peaceful development of events.

Nothing can stop these people in their course except the great force of international communism and the strength of the parties that fight consistently for the defense of Marxism-Leninism.

We must be optimistic. The issues are becoming clearer day by day, and the international situation will undoubtedly confirm
our theses. But we face a protracted struggle. It should in no way be thought that they will lay down their arms. On the contrary, they will try to manoeuver in the most brutal and sophisticated ways. The contradictions of the policy they follow toward the imperialists will emerge ever more clearly; whoever is a Marxist will understand them, because the imperialists are preparing for war, and the revisionists want to restrain them with words alone. With the policy they are pursuing they are leaving imperialism a free field of action; therefore, day by day, it is becoming a grave danger to the camp of socialism, the entire communist movement, and peace in the world.

We have had faith in the Soviet Union, because when we experienced difficulties before both she and the countries of people's democracy have helped us. But at no time have we gone to sleep basing our hopes on the aid of friends alone. Khrushchev used to say demagogically, "Why do you need weapons? We are defending you!" Fine, but what are all these things that are happening? Why have we not met even once to talk over those problems that are so important for the fate of the socialist camp and international communism, to look into these great problems together? Why was our minister of defense appointed deputy commander of the united forces of the Warsaw Treaty? Similarly, why have his colleagues in Poland, Czechoslovakia and others been appointed? Their appointment is entirely formal because nobody invites them to talks; all the measures on behalf of the socialist camp are taken by Khrushchev and company. "You can put your trust in us," says Khrushchev, "we are well armed." But somebody might launch a surprise attack on us, and we may not have the weapons to retaliate. "We shall attack them from Siberia," says he.

But as events are developing, all of us together should be well prepared. We shall go to war together; therefore how we shall defend ourselves should be decided together. We do not seek to know the military secrets of the Soviet Union, but Khrushchev in the Kremlin continues to lay down his grand strategy for all the countries of the camp and doesn't call us even once to tell us at least: "We have these kinds of weapons and in safe places." The representatives of the Warsaw Treaty countries do not meet from time to time to check on armaments, to take joint measures, so that our armies get to know and fraternize with one another. These situations are known only to Khrushchev's friends. I am sure that the others, too, even Gomulka who is keeping quiet
now, certainly have reservations about these questions, but now he sees eye to eye with Khrushchev, and, over a criticism that we made, in addition to other threats he demanded our immediate expulsion from the Warsaw Treaty.

Hence, the struggle ahead of us in the existing situation is not an easy one. On the contrary, it will be very difficult. But we should fight with determination, we should follow the situation step by step, being clear in our minds about what these people are and what they want to do. If they put themselves on the right road, we shall change our attitude toward them and we shall march together with them as before, but we should not allow ourselves to be lulled to sleep. After all these things which are occurring, we shall not have blind trust, because the views and actions of this man are blatantly anti-Marxist. Khrushchev is committing a great crime against the Soviet people and international communism.

We should take the threats he is making against us seriously. If they do not manage to throw us out of the Warsaw Treaty, if they do not withdraw their men from the Vlora naval base, if they do not cut off their credits, this will not be because they love us, but because their impetus was checked in Moscow, as well as because of international political circumstances. What they did to us in connection with the naval base was not only blackmail, but an entire line mapped out not by Khrushchev alone.

Why did they take a stand against us when we had not yet expressed our viewpoint? They had consulted one another, and the Bucharest Meeting was the alarm signal for them to do this. Later they called on us to march on their road, and since we did not follow them, they had already decided the stand to be adopted toward us.

If their course had not been stopped at the Moscow Meeting, they would have tried to drag us on to their anti-Marxist road, or if they failed to achieve this, to discard us, and if they were unable to expel us, to take the stand they are adopting now.

They could achieve neither the first nor the second objective, and so it came to the situation we know. Of course, they had a different plan for us, but it would not have been easy for them to achieve, because they would have been exposed in the international communist movement, especially in the eyes of the peoples of the Soviet Union. Although their plan toward our Party failed, they will never forget the courageous and correct
Marxist-Leninist stand our Party has maintained and continues to maintain, and they will cook up fresh plans in order to take revenge, if not today, then tomorrow. But we shall not give them weapons to fight us. We are not going to make mistakes, we do not violate the line, nor kowtow to anyone, we shall stand as always, vigilant on the positions of Marxism-Leninism.

The Marxist-Leninist stand we maintain, as well as the stand of the Communist Party of China, is of decisive importance for the life of the socialist countries, for peace and socialism throughout the world. The Communist Party of China remains undeviatingly on the Marxist-Leninist road and has become an extraordinarily serious obstacle to them. One of the main causes of their retreat at the Moscow Meeting is the correct and principled stand of the Communist Party of China.

We think that if Khrushchev and company had not retreated, it would have been a great disaster for them and for all their minions, because their parties would not have allowed such a crime to be committed against international communism. But even if their parties had accepted this temporarily, after a time it would certainly have become clear that they are revisionists and traitors, whereas China and Albania are on the Marxist-Leninist road, fighting against revisionism and building socialism.

That is why they preferred to retreat, in order to gain new strength from the new positions they would withdraw to. For this reason we think that we shall be facing a difficult struggle of great responsibility for the defense of socialism in Albania, the general line of our Party, and the correct principles of the Moscow Declaration.

But the grave situation that has been created in the international communist movement and in our relations with the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and with the leaderships of some other parties sets before us very important tasks, which we must always carry out correctly, with Marxist-Leninist wisdom and courage, as we have done up till now.

First of all, day by day, we must consolidate the unity of the Party. This is a steel-like unity, but we should work continuously to temper it, since these moments are important turning points, and at these turning points there are people who waver. Therefore the Party should be close not only to its members but to each individual, close to all the masses of the people, so that the unity of the ranks of the Party and the Party-people unity is
tempered in a Marxist-Leninist way.

We are of the opinion that the Party should know the hostile and revisionist activities of these traitors, should see who are the individuals who want to dig the grave for our Party as well as for international communism. There are written documents about this, but we should also work by word of mouth in order to make it clear to the Party that a stern struggle must be waged against revisionism, not only theoretically but also in practice and with concrete examples. The Party members should be vigilant, should defend its line, and safeguard the interests of our people, the Party and Marxism-Leninism.

Thus, it is important that we educate the Party well, for in this way it will understand correctly the tactics we have to use in such complicated situations.

Our Party will use tactics; this is necessary, among other things, so that the Soviet people and the other peoples of the countries of people's democracy understand that we are on the Marxist-Leninist road and in friendship with them, but in opposition to those who are their enemies and enemies of Marxism-Leninism.

If the leaderships of these countries continue to act against us, they will receive the proper reply; but we shall try to maintain friendly relations with all the socialist countries, without making concessions on principles, without distorting the line, and always maintaining correct attitudes on the basis of Marxism-Leninism.

We should keep in mind that we shall have contacts with Soviet people or people of the countries of people's democracy. We shall not change our attitudes, but of course the relations with them will not be as they used to be, and it is not us who have brought this about, but they themselves. Mikoyan said to us: "Now it is not necessary to have close Party relations, but only trade relations." We said that we did not agree with such a view, but since that is what they want, that is how we must act too.

When Ivanov or Novikov came to meet us, we were the ones who gave them the information they wanted with the greatest goodwill. We did this, not because we had to render account to them, but because this stand was connected with the question of the close and unreserved friendship we nurtured for the Soviet Union. Now that the situation has changed, and this only because of them, when they come again we shall receive them, we shall
ask what they want, but we shall give them only what we consider it reasonable for them to know, and nothing more.

With the technicians and specialists who work in our enterprises, our relations should be warm, cordial and friendly. Of course, there may be evil people among them, but even if they are not so some will be instructed to become so. Therefore, we should be careful and vigilant, we must clearly distinguish between those who are honest and sincere toward us, and those who have been sent to carry out the hostile instructions of Khrushchev and company. We should defend our Marxist-Leninist line all the time and with anybody. We should have no hesitation at all in giving them the proper answer when they attack our Party, our leadership and our unity in an improper way. We should be on guard against provocations because there are people who commit provocations, but there are also provocations to which we should reply on the spot and deal the deserved blows at those who hatch them.

We should be careful and vigilant to orient ourselves correctly on the basis of the line of the Party at every instant. Here the capability and intelligence of the communists should show itself. It is easy to say to the other: "Get out!" or "I don't want to talk to you!", but such a stand would be neither politic nor Marxist. Therefore we should act with maturity and flexibility.

We should talk to the foreigners residing in Albania about the line of our Party, about our stand. We should try to explain it to them so that they may understand these things correctly, because many of them may be unclear.

The press organs in particular should be very vigilant and mature. Our press must present the line and tactics of our Party properly. This work should be done carefully by the Department for Agitation and Propaganda. It is important to steer a correct course in the press, because a mistake made by us there may be exploited by the foreign imperialist and revisionist enemies, or it may confuse the broad masses of the Party and people.

Therefore we should work carefully to guide the Party correctly through the press. Everything that is on the correct Marxist-Leninist road, in the interests of the Party, the people and socialism should be reflected there, whereas the manoeuvres of the revisionists, which may even seem fine, but which actually are harmful, should not be published in the press, and we shall render account to nobody over this.

We must consider everything deeply, we must carefully weigh
both its good and its bad aspects, and choose the best, that which serves our work and our cause.

We shall certainly overcome these difficulties. Therefore, in the first place, the Party should be mobilized, it should be clear about everything and in complete unity, its political and ideological level should be enhanced, its Marxist-Leninist line should be applied consistently, and we should be totally mobilized to realize our plans.

The comrades working in the Party and State organs should keep these situations in mind and pay great attention to the work of convincing and educating the masses, to make them conscious of the need to carry out all the tasks, especially the utilization of internal resources. Thus, while working to open up new land, we should not base all our hopes on tractors alone. If possible, we shall bring in tractors too, but we must strengthen our economic potential with all the possibilities we have, in order to keep up regular supplies for the people, to avoid being caught in a crisis, and we must create reserves in all fields through economical use of our resources.

With regard to this, a program of work should be worked out by all the Party and State organs. Many tasks face us in practice in relation to this question.

Our Party and people have been hardened to difficulties; therefore our plans have always been realized. So we shall overcome these new difficulties as well, better days will come for our Party and our people, because right is on our side and because we have many friends in the world — not only great China, but all the peoples and the true communists, to whom the cause of freedom, independence and socialism is sacred.

This is what I had to say. Now let us approve the Communique. Besides this, we have the 4th Congress of the Party ahead, which, as we decided, will be held in February next year. During this time, the Party should mobilize all its forces, carry out all-round political, ideological and economic work, in order to go to the Congress in steel-like Marxist-Leninist unity, with tasks realized in all fields, well prepared to discuss problems in a lofty Party spirit, and to shoulder the difficult but glorious tasks we shall be charged with.

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QUOTATIONS ..... from VOLUME 19
of ENVER HOXHA'S WORKS:

We have fought empty-bellied and bare-footed, but have never kowtowed to anybody. (p. 171)

We shall go to Moscow not with ten banners, but with only one, with the banner of Marxism-Leninism. (p. 88)

Even if we have to go without bread, we Albanians do not violate principles, we do not betray Marxism-Leninism. (p. 153)

Whether Albania is a socialist country or not does not depend on Khrushchev, but it has been decided by the Albanian people through the wars they have fought and the blood they have shed. (p. 159)

When the enemy attacks you, this means that you are on the right road. (p. 24)

Albania and the Albanian communists do not sell themselves either for rubles, or for wheat, or for dollars. (p. 158)

Real unity is achieved and strengthened only on the basis of Marxism-Leninist principles. (p. 80)

So far, no people, no proletariat and no communist or workers' party has assumed power without bloodshed and without violence. (p. 184)

The principled struggle against imperialism and revisionism has been and remains the road of our Party. (p. 279)